

GPANet 2010

Prevention and Mitigation of Genocide and Mass Atrocities

Focus on
East and Central Africa
and the Islamic World

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What is Known about Prevention and Mitigation of Genocidal Violence: Papers from the June 2010 Meeting of the Genocide Prevention Advisory Network Focus: Prevention and Mitigation of Genocide and Mass Atrocities in East and Central Africa, and in the Islamic World

Yehuda Bauer
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The Genocide Prevention Advisory Group (GPANet) is an informal, international network of experts on the causes, consequences, and prevention of genocide and other mass atrocities. Its members provide risk assessments and advice to any interested parties, including the UN, individual governments, regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, and any other international political grouping that designs and promotes policies aimed at preventing and mitigating mass atrocities that have or may acquire genocidal dimensions.

The first annual meetings were held in Switzerland. In June 2010, GPANet members met in the USA to review current expert knowledge about the prevention and mitigation of genocidal violence. Most of the papers focused on East and Central Africa or on the Islamic world. This report consists of contributions by GPANet members presented at the Point of View Center of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Virginia. The style of the GPANet workshops is one of in-depth consultations opened by papers that focus debates on crucial issues. The purpose is to deepen the collective knowledge of the participants, observers, governmental representatives, and the institutions involved, and in so doing hone the group's advisory capabilities.

The inception of GPANet took place in the late 1990s when some of its members were (and are) involved in the work of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF) initiated by the Swedish government (1998), along with those of the United States and United Kingdom. The ITF now consists of 27 member governments. Group members then became the core of the academic planning group for the Stockholm International Forum on Holocaust Education in 2000, and subsequently for the inter-governmental Stockholm Forum in 2004 on Genocide Prevention, both initiated and organized by the Swedish government. The group subsequently renamed itself the Genocide Prevention Advisory Network and expanded its membership. With the help of the Swiss Federal government, it has held annual meetings since then.

GPANet's collective contributions, as well as the contributions of its individual members, have been offered, largely, in confidential submissions. To this have now been added efforts to make the group's work better known in public fora. Members of the group contributed to the journal

POLITORBIS (issue 47, on Genocide Prevention, 2010) published by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (EDA), <http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/doc/publi/ppol.html>. Now, in addition, the papers from the June 2010 meetings are available at <http://www.gpanet.org/>. They are intended to attract decision-makers' attention and promote the accumulation and sharing of greater knowledge about genocide prevention, especially through the interaction of established experts and committed governments.

Against the background of a discussion about what is currently known globally about prevention and/or mitigation of potentially genocidal violence, the GPANet 2010 conference devoted special attention to current and potential conflicts in East and Central Africa, an area extending west-east from Chad to Somalia and north-south from Sudan to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The reason for this focus is the fact that it is home to nine of the world's 25 countries at highest risk of future instability. From a parallel perspective, the region includes six of the 20 countries at highest risk of future genocide and politicide, according to Barbara Harff's 2009 analysis. It is however also the region where new commitments to genocide prevention are emerging.

GPANet also discussed the very important initiative of the Swiss and Argentinian governments, which held a first regional inter-governmental conference on Genocide Prevention for Latin American countries in Buenos Aires in December 2008. Some GPANet members participated as outside experts. After the success of this meeting, a second regional Forum on Genocide Prevention, in which all African countries took part, was organized by the governments of Switzerland, Argentina and Tanzania in Arusha in March 2010. Important initiatives resulted, especially of course for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). GPANet members again participated as outside experts. Attempts are and will be made to arrange for similar meetings in other world regions as well, and GPANet members will make their expertise available if and when asked.

The June 2010 discussions of GPANet were enriched by the informal contributions of members of other key organizations in the field, including representatives from the Office of Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and from the Committee on Conscience at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.

Thanks to the generous contribution of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (EDA), GPANet has been able to organize the annual meetings and its activities so far, including the issuance of these proceedings. Swiss diplomats and colleagues have been centrally important observers and friends at all our meetings, and have shared their extensive knowledge with us, just as we have tried to be of use to their initiatives. The Network is now pursuing further contacts with potentially interested governments. An exploration is underway to host the 2011 annual meeting of GPANet in Sweden.

We look forward to hearing comments and feedbacks from those who review these papers, and hope to collaborate with all academics and others of good will in this vital undertaking.

Some Current Problems of Genocide Prevention

Yehuda Bauer

It seems to me that we may be committing the mistake of misidentifying some major issues of genocide prevention. Surveying the large and growing literature on the subject, I find that most writers deal with three types of genocidal threats: possible mass atrocities/genocidal massacres/full-scale genocides of ethnic/national/religious/political minorities by ruling elites in certain types of state; similar threats by one state against other states or groups within other states or state-like organisms; and similar threats by non-state actors in situations of civil wars/unrest. Darfur and Rwanda are obvious examples of the first type, the Holocaust and Bosnia of the second; the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda may be an example of the third type. All three concentrate exclusively on states or state structures, and conceive of genocidal threats as requiring or opposing some form of state organism. A fourth type is occasionally mentioned, but not really addressed: groups, whether based in or on a state or not, identifying with global genocidal ideologies attempting to conquer the world or large parts of it and advocating annihilation of opposing groups in the process. The four types of genocidal threats are not exclusive of each other. In the cases of Stalinist Bolshevism (B) and National Socialism (NS) the four converged. In the case of Radical Islam (RI) they do not, although on a number of issues there are clear parallels with B and NS: their religious or quasi-religious ideologies, the desire for world conquest, and their clear intent to use genocidal means to achieve a utopian goal. The fact that the goal is utopian did not in the past and will not in the future prevent the genocidal intent from being translated into genocidal action if the occasion arises.

RI of the Sunni type is not, contrary to B and NS, based on an existing state structure – yet. One of its forms, the Taliban, was in control of Afghanistan, and is trying to re-conquer that state; its close ally, the Pakistani Taliban, is attempting to conquer Pakistan, with its nuclear arsenal (allegedly, 35 atomic weapons). A variety of groups are targeted for elimination if these aims are accomplished. RI is not, as opposed to the other two cases, centralized, but consists of diffuse elements in a loose mutual alliance, from North Africa, the Middle East, to Indonesia, the Philippines, and groups in Europe. Among the 23 million Moslems in Europe, RI is a small minority, but it is spreading. There and in other places, elements of mainstream Islam are increasingly adopting the ideas and the language of RI.

Shiite RI, with its base in Iran, is not identical with the Sunni version: it is more pragmatic, as it aims to establish Iranian supremacy in the Middle East, in alliance with Sunni forces, Hezbollah and Hamas, and Alawi Syria; it also accepts a controlled version of popular representation (the Iranian Majlis/parliament), contrary to the Sunni RI which opposes all forms of elected representation. The aim of global supremacy and the readiness

to use genocidal means, however, is common to both.

Non-military tools for prevention of all types of threats must of necessity be based on an analysis of power relations. Historical precedents may provide some clues, as proposed in the analyses of Gurr (2009) and Harff (2009) because the first three types of genocidal threats are not new. Examples: the annihilation of the Cathars in the 13th century, or the ethnic cleansing of the Five Nations in the southeastern US (the Trail of Tears), starting in 1830, or the Armenian genocide, are examples of the first type; the destruction of Carthage by the Romans in the second pre-Christian century, or the Holocaust, are two examples out of many of the second. For the third type, the anti-Abassid Hashasheen rebels, using policies targeting groups of civilians (11th century), may serve as a prototype. The fourth type has no exact parallels in the pre-modern era, because global control was a practical impossibility. Today, with globalization, it becomes possible. We should try to address the issue.

Many colleagues, also among our group are, rightly, devoting much energy to the development of international legal tools. Our group are, rightly, devoting much energy to the development of international legal tools. These deal, primarily, not with the prevention of genocide but with post-genocidal punishment of perpetrators, in the hope, not yet shown to be justified, of deterring potential perpetrators. True, international law (IL) is at the base of all international attempts to rein in future perpetrators, but that works only insofar as political players accept it in practice. Often they only seem to be paying lip service to it. Global international factors are not yet strong enough to enforce it universally. This is certainly not an argument against IL, quite the contrary. But it is an argument against a utopian reliance on it, as though it were the ultimate contemporary solution to the problem. On the other hand, any examination of real power relations will of necessity include consideration of IL, because IL has to underpin both non-military and military means to prevent genocide.

As a result of great advances that have been made in the identification of risks, almost exclusively of the first three types mentioned above, members of our group have concentrated on two central issues: prevention, and dealing with actual genocidal massacres. Ted Gurr (2009), dealing with prevention, suggests, as do others too, we should learn from successful past attempts to prevent deterioration of conflicts into genocidal situations; this is very useful, though it deals exclusively with the first three types. Moreover, in all the cases he – rightly – cites, none of the great powers, or a combination of lesser ones, had any interest in opposing preventive measures. Kenya, Macedonia, and East Timor, are examples of this. The conclusion appears to be that the UN and/or regional forces are effective only when major powers

or a combination of smaller ones do not oppose preventive action and accept IL as a guiding principle. Darfur is the opposite example, because there China, Russia, and the Arab League obstruct both prevention (of a future outbreak of war in the South) and actual mass murder (the continuing genocidal situation in Darfur), as persuasively presented by Eric Reeves (see www.sudanreeves.org). His outlook is justifiably extremely pessimistic, because the various mutually conflicting international forces do not appear to permit effective counter-action. IL is of doubtful help there. The ICC's arrest warrant against Bashir has yet to be proved effective, and even in this instance there is no explicit charge of genocide. The Congolese situation is murky; while it is clear that local genocidal groups exploit vast natural resources, using indentured or enslaved local labor for the process, and murdering masses of civilians, the exact form of involvement of foreign business and political interests of African states and foreign powers is not quite clear.

It is therefore essential to consider the role of the Powers (and pressure groups consisting of a number of medium states), and what to do about that. It is there that one must differentiate between Powers or groups of states in which there exists public opinion expressing itself in at least relative freedom, and others where there is no such access to the public. Unsurprisingly, our major efforts have been directed at states where such access is possible, and that includes the Western Powers, Latin America (in large part), India, Japan, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. But the problems in some of the countries where the risks are greatest (see Barbara Harff's list, 2009 pp. 75-78) are under the decisive influence of non-accessible states. Chief of these, though not the only one, is China (see my separate paper on China).

We are dealing here today (June 9-10, 2010) with the Great Lakes region, Sudan, and generally speaking, vulnerable African areas (recent reports indicate Chinese economic penetration into Zimbabwe and Ethiopia). Chinese investments, and in their wake political influence, follow the imperialist pattern of attempts to control (not physically, in this case) areas important for the survival and development of a dramatically growing Chinese economy. In this, China follows in Western footsteps – Western investments and political support in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nigeria, etc., behaved and behave similarly. I concur with Barbara Harff's conclusion in her paper for the GPANet conference a number of that diplomatic and political pressure is the only way to convince China (and Russia) to permit preventive action in Africa (and elsewhere, e.g. Burma). A military option does not exist, and serious, direct, economic pressure is not really feasible either. However, if it becomes obvious that Chinese economic interests are affected by genocidal threats, then Chinese collaboration becomes a possibility. Constant engagement is therefore a must. In the case of Sudan, the oil wells are largely in the South, but the pipeline goes through government-controlled territory. Hence, a renewed civil war cannot be in Chinese interest – this is contrary to Darfur,

where until recently there was no Chinese economic involvement (though a recent report says that Chinese interests acquired oil concessions in Southern Darfur). Diplomacy directed towards a Western-Chinese alliance (which would involve the Russian junior partner as well) to prevent a North-South war might have a chance. Pressure on Bashir solely from the West seems useless.

But we should consider the fourth genocidal threat, the one emerging from Radical Islam, and especially the West's reaction to it. The threat emerges, not from any direct economic situations, nor from direct ethnic or national conflicts, and has only indirect connection with what we normally see as political problems. It is motivated, as I indicated already, by an ideology that emerged in the 1920's as a reaction to a basic cultural and political issue: the helplessness of the Moslem world in the face of Western penetration and conquest. Following in Bernard Lewis' footsteps I would say that there grew a feeling that the reason why Islam, which had created the leading world civilization during the High Middle Ages (10th-15th centuries), had fallen behind and yielded to the barbaric Christian Europeans was that they had abandoned the only true religion and had therefore been punished by Allah. This, by the way, is reminiscent of radical Jewish theology as well. The solution was to return to a literal interpretation of Islam. Then, Allah would support Moslems and establish his rule over the world. This, in the nutshell, is the ideology of Hassan el-Bana, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Ala' Mawdudi, and now Yussuf Qaradawi in Qatar, the current most influential Sunni cleric. He, by the way, is supposed to be 'mainstream', and that indicates that RI is penetrating the Moslem center. RI also opposes nationalism and, of course, communism. It is a universal ideology of tremendous importance and impact.

We are dealing with a major, decentralized, religious ideological movement, whose solution for the world's ills is the establishment of a cleric-ruled international coalition of Islamic states. Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians (whatever that might mean today), are People of the Book (Ah'l el-Kitab), and provided they accept Moslem supremacy and a third-class existence they can continue to exercise their religions and have their property protected. If they insist on independence of any kind, they must be eliminated. All others (in theory, Indians and Chinese as well [!!!]), must either convert or be killed. Christians and Jews who refuse to be ruled by Islam are immediate targets of a murderous ideology, and have to be annihilated. The clip I showed at the GPANET meeting and that proves my point is part of a whole library of such material.

Certainly, one does not need to be a Marxist to realize that the indirect, but very basic, causes of RI are embedded in the economics and politics of the Middle East and the impact of the modern world on it. But the motivation today is clearly and unambiguously religious-ideological, so that, in Marxist terminology, the

superstructure has come to determine the economic basis, and not the other way round (Friedrich Engels actually admitted such a possibility in 1894, shortly before his death).

The West, mainly of course the US, awoke to the threat on 9/11. Before and afterwards came Kenya, London, Madrid, and so on. Then came the ill-advised invasion of Iraq, where RI, of both the Sunni and the Shi'a types, had previously been brutally suppressed by Saddam Hussein. The Americans managed to establish RI in Iraq, where it now flourishes in different ways. Their invasion of Afghanistan followed a similar pattern: the removal of the Taliban created a situation where the impossibility of a united Afghan society and state were and are being demonstrated. The traditional forms of internal Afghan rule were based on a live-and-let-live (until I manage to crash your skull) accommodation with feudal lords (a.k.a. 'warlords') ruling different ethnicities and sub-groups within these ethnicities under the loose rule of a king (Shah); the alternative of a foreign conquest had succeeded only once, for a very short time, under Alexander the Great. The Americans, in their naivete, believed and believe that the Taliban can be defeated by armed force, and that they can create an Afghan Army controlled by a democratically elected government.

Really, how naïve can you get? For one, there are only two cases in the 20th century when guerillas were defeated by a regular army: in 1944-1953 in the Ukraine, and in 1947-8 in Malaysia, and in both cases this was possible only because the local population withdrew its support from the guerillas (why – that is another question, and I could expand on that). Two, and mainly, you cannot defeat a decentralized radical ideology by force of arms. Nazi Germany was a centralized state that could be dissolved only by armed force, and Soviet Bolshevism collapsed under the weight of its internal contradictions, corruption, inefficiency, and an ideology totally removed from real life. RI will not collapse, because it is not centralized, and cannot be conquered by arms, for the same basic reason. The Americans are conquerors, just like the British and the Soviets before them, though they present themselves as liberators (liberators liberate, and then get out). They believe, again naively, that if they build schools, hospitals and roads (assuming they do so) they will be accepted. An Afghan peasant, who is considerably less primitive than is generally believed, will say: ok, fine, let us have the school etc., and then chase those Americans away.

The whole American policy is based on the assumption that force can solve a situation like this; it can not. As Tony Blair said, famously: ideology can only be fought by ideology – and then he did the opposite of what he rightly understood. In my humble opinion, the US is headed for disaster, in both Iraq and in Afghanistan. In Iraq, they will leave and the Iraqis will fight each other, kill each other, and enjoy the blessings of a genocidal situation – for which the Americans, and the West generally, will (rightly) be held responsible. In Afghanistan, they will fight on, many American lives will be lost, and in the end, the Afghan 'government' will most likely make a deal

with the Taliban, if they do not yield to the Taliban unconditionally, and politely or impolitely ask the Americans to leave.

No, force is almost useless. Why almost? Well, I am not a pacifist, and in certain circumstances the use of force is inevitable and justifiable. When there are clear targets, and an immediate threat, force can and should be used. In the case of RI generally, and Afghanistan specifically, a reconquest of the country by RI may actually create a situation where the threat of American military power may be much more effective: if Taliban extremists, or their Al-Qaida allies, act against the West from a RI-controlled Afghanistan, and this can be proved, repeated use of US armed action may be internationally sanctioned and morally justified, and possibly reduce the threat. Physical presence of Western forces is the worst possible approach.

What, then, can be done by non-military means to deal with a very real genocidal threat? The answer seems to me to be pretty obvious: return to Tony Blair. There are anti-radical Moslems – i.e. people who are devoted to Islam, but interpret it in a way that stands in contradiction to RI. They include some seven million Sufis (according to research results for which I cannot vouch), a pietistic sect that is being attacked, viciously, by RI, but is gaining adherents nevertheless. There are Moslem liberals, both in the Moslem diaspora and in the Islamic countries themselves. There are whole societies that fight RI: Indonesia, India's Moslem community, Tunisia, and others. There are many Moslem liberal intellectuals – I can supply an initial list of names – in different countries. Why on earth not help them establish radio and TV stations that will argue for an interpretation of Moslem traditions that stands in contradiction to RI? Why not try to influence the annual meetings in Davos and create there an alliance of wealthy individuals and economic enterprises that will support a non-violent struggle against RI? Why not try and influence Western governments to spend a fraction of their military investments to fortify those Moslem countries economically that have not yielded to RI, in a Marshal-Plan type program? Why not arrange for academic-political conferences that will not be talkfests but present a media-friendly, persuasive, alliance between Moslem and Western liberals?

I think we might, marginally, help in an attempt to change suicidal Western policies towards RI.

References:

Gurr, T. R. "Options for the Prevention and Mitigation of Genocide: Strategies and Examples for Policy-Makers." *Politorbis* No. 47 (2, 2009), pp. 47-50.

Harff, B. "How to Use Global Risk Assessments to Anticipate and Prevent Genocide." *Politorbis* No. 47 (2, 2009), pp. 71-78

East and Central Africa: A Legacy of Deadly Political Violence and the Risks of its Recurrence

Ted Robert Gurr

For purposes of this research note the East and Central African region is broadly defined as extending west-east from Chad to Somalia and north-south from Sudan to the Democratic Republic of Congo. For decades it has been a **protracted conflict region** characterized by violent political contention within and among states and between communal groups. Insurgents, refugees, and munitions move easily across borders, armed conflict propagates with them. Governments, in response to pervasive insecurity, invest disproportionately in armies and militias and are quick to intervene in neighboring states. Socioeconomic investment suffers, communal tensions and interethnic rivalries flourish. These are common characteristics of protracted conflict zones elsewhere, not just in East and Central Africa.¹ The people of the region's 13 countries have been more victimized by political violence in the past half-century than those any other world conflict region except Southeast Asia.

The human costs in this region have been very high. Fourteen of the world's 42 episodes of genocide and politicide between 1955 and 2005 occurred in East and Central Africa.² Mass killings, a concept that includes but is broader than genocide, are equally common. A recent study commissioned by the US Government's Political Instability Task Force identified all episodes of mass killing globally from 1945 to 2006, defining such events as those in which *"the actions of state agents result in the intentional death of at least 1,000 noncombatants from a discrete group in a period of sustained violence."* [emphasis added] By this less restrictive definition – no "intention to destroy" a predefined collectivity is assumed – between 1955 and 2006 there were 95 mass killings of which one in four - 22 - were perpetrated by authorities, or groups claiming authority, in these 13 states. Some occurred when civilians were targeted by government forces during rebellions and civil wars, others were the result of sustained campaigns of repression and genocide. Djibouti, Kenya, and Tanzania are the only countries in the region in which no such killings took place.³

1 The concept of protracted conflict regions and evidence about their characteristics are developed by Monty G. Marshall, *Third World War: System, Process, and Conflict Dynamics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), esp. chaps. 4 and 5.

2 Barbara Harff, "Assessing Risks of Genocide and Politicide," in Monty G. Marshall and T. R. Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005* (College Park: Center of International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005), pp. 57-58, updated to include episodes two historical cases she has subsequently added to her roster, in Nigeria-Biafra, and Zimbabwe.

3 The study and data are reported by Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino, "Assessing the Risks of State Sponsored Mass Killings," and was released by the Political Instability Task Force in February 2008. The full set of events is listed in its' Appendix, pp. i-vi. The report is posted on the <http://GPANet.org>

The roster, at the end of this note, gives dates and low and high estimates of noncombatant fatalities. Of course such estimates are imprecise, as are distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. Some episodes of mass killing may have been overlooked, others overcounted. Such concerns ought not deflect attention from the fact that between 4 and 8 million ordinary people died in this region in the last half century, targeted by military, security, and militia forces – and continue to die.

We have two bases for assessing risks of future genocides and mass killings in East and Central Africa. First is Barbara Harff's risk list, last updated in 2009, that flags countries at high risk of genocidal violence in the near future.⁴ Seven had three or more of six genocide risk factors, as shown below:

Sudan had six risk factors that portend future episodes: past geno/politicide, groups subject to state-led discrimination, a polarized elite, exclusionary ideology, autocratic governance, and very low trade openness. The most likely precursor of renewed geno/politicide? A breakdown of the North-South peace process and civil war targeting Southerners.

Rwanda has four risk factors: past genocides, a Tutsi-dominated elite, autocratic governance, and low trade openness. But the government strongly favors inter-ethnic reconciliation and prospects for a return to interethnic violence are small.

Burundi has three risk factors: past genocides, a Tutsi-dominated elite, and low trade openness. But, as in Rwanda, the government is committed to political integration of Hutus; and again like Rwanda, there is a high degree of international political and developmental engagement that offsets limited economic interactions. Unreconstructed Hutu rebels remain an external threat.

Somalia had three risk factors: a past geno/politicide, exclusionary ideology (among the Islamists), and very low trade openness. The most likely precursor of genocide? A takeover by Islamist rebels who already control much of the country.

Ethiopia has three risk factors: a past genocide, an elite dominated by the Tigrean minority, and relatively low trade openness. The most likely precursor to geno/politicide? An armed challenge by one or more marginalized communal groups that triggers a politicidal response.

4 This is a summary of a more nuanced analysis posted at GPANet.org under Risks.

The **Democratic Republic of Congo** and **Uganda** also have several of the above risk factors but there is not clear and likely path toward new geno/politicides in either country – repression yes, in response to the predations of rebels and dissidents, but not attempts to eradicate threatening groups as such

Another approach to assessing risks of future atrocities in this region is to identify risks of future political instability. All 14 genocides and politicides in East and Central Africa occurred in response to rebellions or separatist political movements that challenged state authority. Mass killing also was a strategy used by weak post-colonial regimes to suppress political opposition. It may not be possible to forecast risks of mass killings or repression, but we are able to say what the chances are that any given state will experience their common precondition, violent instability, in the near future. Five risk variables go into a recent global assessment by J. Joseph Hewitt:⁵

- Major instability events in the recent past (analogous to the role that past genocides play in Barbara Harff's genocide risk analysis)
- High infant mortality (signifying widespread poverty and lack of social services)
- High levels of militarization (indicates a diversion of scarce resources and often a readiness to use coercion against internal opposition - a common characteristic of countries in protracted conflict regions)
- Low levels of economic integration into the global economy, signifying both poverty and a lack of external economic influence that might mitigate political conflict
- Lack of regional security, with one or more neighboring countries involved in armed conflict, domestic or international

These conditions have been shown by global empirical research to be precursors of instability in the recent past. When countries in East and Central Africa are analyzed in this framework, 33 countries world-wide have very high short-term risks of instability – and of these, nine are in East and Central Africa. In descending order of risk in 2010 they are

Burundi
Democratic Republic of Congo
Djibouti

⁵ J. Joseph Hewitt, "The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger: Ranking States on Future Risks," in J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and T. R. Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2010* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009), pp. 7-26. The global ranking of states is on pp. 21-24 with technical notes.

Ethiopia
Tanzania
 Kenya
 Somalia
Chad
 Uganda

Five of these nine states, shown in bold, also had the highest increases of any countries in the world in risks of instability between 2005 and 2008.

The conflict risks are compounded by the fragility of most states in this region. An index of state fragility has been developed by Monty G. Marshall and applied globally to information on 14 aspects of state's capacity to deal with political challenges, maintain legitimacy, and deliver economic and social goods to their citizens. Six of the 20 most fragile states in the world are in East and Central Africa: they are Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. The only country in the region that is below the global mid-point on the fragility index is Tanzania.⁶

In summary, three different comparative analyses highlight East and Central Africa as a region with a volatile combination of high potential for violent instability, weak regimes, and mass violence. None of the three analyses say when instability and genocidal killings might begin. There are stabilizing political factors and external support in some of these countries that may insulate them against exposure to risk, particularly in Tanzania and Kenya, and also – as noted above – in Rwanda and Burundi. The global comparative results nonetheless highlight once again that the peoples and governments of this region are at great risk of future political and humanitarian disasters and are in equally great need of support from regional and international organizations to help state authorities to recognize and counteract those malign conditions.

⁶ Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, *Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility*. Center for Systemic Peace and George Mason University's Center for Global Policy, 2009, www.systemicpeace.org.

Mass Killings of Noncombatants by State Agents in East and Central Africa 1955- 2005
from Ulfelder and Valentino, note 3

Country	Period	Estimated Deaths	
		Low	High
Sudan: First north-south civil war	1955-72	400,000	400,000
Congo: Kasai rebellion	1960-63	5,000	5,000
Ethiopia-Eritrea civil war	1960-73	180,000	200,000
Rwanda: ethnic killings	1963-67	12,000	20,000
Zanzibar: political repression	1964	4,000	5,000
Congo: CNL rebellion in eastern provinces	1964-65	2,000	5,000
Uganda: Idi Amin's repression/genocide	1971-79	30,000	300,000
Ethiopia: Derge repression , Tigre civil war	1974-91	200,000	300,000
Ethiopia: Ogaden rebellion	1977-85	40,000	60,000
Uganda: civil war	1981-86	200,000	300,000
Somalia: Barre repression of SNM/Issaqs	1982-90	55,000	55,000
Chad: political repression and civil war	1982-90	12,000	40,000
(Habre regime)			
Sudan: Second north-south civil war	1983-2005	1,500,000	2,000,000
Uganda: rebellions by LRA, others	1986 - present	1,000	2,000
Burundi: ethnic killings/genocide	1988-2005	150,000	200,000
Rwanda: ethnic killings/genocide	1990-94	500,000	800,000
Chad: political repression and civil war	1991-2003	1,000	2,000
(Deby regime)			
DR Congo: Kabila/Tutsi rebellion	1993-97	8,000	10,000
Rwanda: ethnic killings post-genocide	1994-99	13,000	13,000
*DR Congo: local uprisings/civil war in east	1998-Present	900,000	2,800,000
*Sudan: Darfur	2003-Present	200,000	500,000
*fatalities from different sources than those used by Ulfelder and Valentino			

Mass killings in bold coincide approximately with episodes of genocides and politicides on Barbara Harff's roster. Dates and estimates of fatalities differ somewhat because the two studies use different definitions. For example the episode of mass killings in Burundi from 1988-2005, above, is analyzed by Harff as two distinct episodes of geno/politicide, one in 1988 and a second in 1993. The mass killings list also omits her 1965-73 case of geno/politicide in Burundi.

Sudan on the Brink

Eric Reeves

In the wake of Sudan's massively fraudulent elections this past April, the country faces enormous difficulties and dangers. Far from encouraging the "process of democratization"—the phrase of choice for international actors accepting the election results—this travesty has convinced the regime of "re-elected" President Omar al-Bashir that going through the electoral motions is sufficient. Such conviction only highlights the immense challenges facing a world community that has no coherent plan for securing peace in Darfur, or for supporting key elections in southern Sudan and the contested border regions. Tragically, the voting gives some semblance of legitimacy to al-Bashir's regime, and helps to ensure that it will remain in full control of the army and security forces, as well as maintaining a stranglehold on Sudanese national wealth and power.

Such power presents Khartoum with a range of options in responding to Darfur's ongoing catastrophe and the southern self-determination referendum scheduled for January 9, 2011. In Darfur the military option seems to have been reinforced, and recent reports of military activity, ground assaults on non-combatants, and indiscriminate aerial bombardment of civilian targets are accompanied by other reports indicating a large military buildup by Khartoum; a corresponding build-up by the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) suggests that large-scale fighting is imminent. But while JEM remains militarily the most potent rebel group on the ground in Darfur, the recent rapprochement between Khartoum and N'Djamena suggests that Chad's President Idriss Déby has decided to end most support for JEM. He has been their mainstay for military and logistical support over the past five years, and has offered safe haven in Eastern Chad; his withholding of further aid may collapse JEM's military power. As a consequence, Khartoum has come to believe that a final military solution is in prospect.

This impending increase in fighting will almost certainly reduce yet further humanitarian reach and capacity in Darfur, even as the region enters the meanest part of the "hunger gap" (June through September). The Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) has recently offered extremely grim assessments of food security in both Darfur and southern Sudan. Conditions in many of the camps for Darfuri displaced persons have deteriorated badly following Khartoum's March 2009 expulsion of thirteen international humanitarian organizations, with water, food, sanitation, and primary medical care deteriorating significantly. There is virtually no remaining capacity to treat women and girls who have experienced sexual violence.

The Doha peace process, deeply flawed from its inception, is collapsing. JEM has suspended participation in the talks, and the key Sudan Liberation Movement faction of Abdel Wahid el-Nur will have no part of the negotiations. A recently formed rebel coalition—the Liberation and Justice Move-

ment—has yet to prove itself, either diplomatically or on the ground in Darfur. It is a thin reed on which to place any hopes for a negotiated breakthrough. Moreover, international attention has swung to the recent national elections and the January 2011 southern self-determination referendum.

Khartoum faces a key strategic decision in responding to the prospect of an election that will certainly result in a southern vote for secession (including the Abyei area, which will vote in a separate referendum to join the south). The regime can accede to secession, in which case there are enormously complicated issues that must be negotiated in the intervening eight months: sharing of oil wealth (80 percent of oil reserves are in the south, but all present oil infrastructure and the only export pipeline are in the north); finalizing border demarcation; determining citizenship (perhaps 2 million southerners reside in northern Sudan); fashioning commerce and transport agreements; establishing security and governance in the border regions, especially in South Kordofan and southern Blue Nile States. To date, Khartoum has shown no willingness to engage on any of these issues in serious and expeditious fashion; in the absence of substantial resolution and agreement, conflict becomes much more likely.

It is probable that Khartoum will decide not to allow the self-determination exercise to proceed. In aborting the referendum it has many options, both military and political. But the southern leadership—the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) dominates the Government of South Sudan (GOSS)—has made it abundantly clear that any move to delay or prevent the referendum will result in resumed war. Nothing unifies southerners more than their passionate resolve to exercise what they see as their right to self-determination.

A third strategy, one that is already in evidence, is to destabilize southern Sudan to the point where it seems incapable of self-governance. Certainly there are good reasons to be concerned about the ways in which ethnic tensions and violence have been handled by the Government of South Sudan. Some disarmament efforts have been poorly handled, and a sheer lack of capacity ensures that there are not enough trained police or a sufficiently disciplined deployment of army resources. Government corruption has sparked considerable resentment, and this also has fueled ethnic tensions. But the simple fact is that as an administrative entity the GOSS was starting virtually from scratch in January 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed (it is the CPA that guarantees the right to a southern self-determination referendum). Efforts at "nation building" must be judged accordingly, particularly in light of the GOSS's conviction that they are the only military guarantors of the referendum and must prepare accordingly. Such preparations have commandeered a

huge part of the annual budget and greatly reduced expenditures in key areas of development and human security.

But Khartoum has also deliberately inflamed ethnic tensions in the south, particularly among the Nuer, Murle, and Dinka tribal groups (the latter dominate the SPLM and GOSS). The regime has twice deliberately instigated large-scale violence in the town of Malakal using the leader of an ethnically-based militia; it engineered the destruction of Abyei town in May 2008, displacing some 100,000 Ngok Dinkas; there is strong circumstantial evidence that Khartoum continues to funnel weapons to its former militia allies in the south and the ethnic groups from which these militias were drawn; and there is also strong circumstantial evidence that the regime continues to support the maniacal Lord's Resistance Army, support that had been well-established prior to the 2005 CPA. The potential for large-scale ethnic targeting of civilians and the commission of atrocity crimes on a massive scale is clearly present.

The policy upshot is that the US and its European and regional allies must make clear to Khartoum that there will be punishing consequences if the regime chooses to abrogate the CPA or seeks to abort the referendum. The African Union has proved hopeless, especially on Darfur; but there are some nations (Kenya and Uganda are good examples) that will support south Sudan, however anxiously. Moreover, African civil society and human rights advocates have been much more critical of Khartoum, and supportive of the south, than the arrogant and callous leadership of the AU. No help can be expected from the Arab League; indeed, Egypt—Arab League heavyweight on the Sudan file—has long opposed southern self-determination, and will do much to ensure that a new nation along the Nile River does not come into being. The Organization of Islamic Conference has sided with Khartoum, even in the face of a Muslim holocaust in Darfur. UN Security Council permanent members China and Russia have relentlessly supported Khartoum diplomatically.

It falls, then, primarily to the US to take the lead in making clear what consequences the al-Bashir regime will face if it chooses to abort the self-determination referendum. So far, President Obama's special envoy Scott Gration has proved a dismaying disappointment, accommodating Khartoum even as he has alienated Darfuri civil society, much of the rebel leadership, as well as the southern political leadership. Some of his public commentary has been truly outrageous (declaring, for example, that the elections in Sudan would be "as free and fair as possible"). Behind the scenes last August, he sought to have GOSS President Salva Kiir acquiesce in a delay of the self-determination referendum. This infuriated many in the SPLM, and Gration's motives and ambitions remain suspect. Gration has proved himself as stubborn as he is out of his depth in handling the Sudan file, and his continuing tenure as special envoy of President Obama sends precisely the wrong signal to Khartoum. At this historic moment of truth, Sudan deserves much more

thoughtful and forceful US engagement. The stakes are enormous. Renewed north/south conflict has the potential to engulf all of Sudan in violence, much of it with an ethnic or tribal character.

May 13, 2010

U.S. Policy on Darfur and the Moral Obligation to Suppress

Eyal Mayroz

This paper explores normative influences of 'genocide' on US foreign policy, particularly in relation to the crisis in Darfur during 2004. Of the different ways that such considerations may affect American policies, the paper focuses on indirect effects of morally-driven public opinion on the policymaking process. These effects are seen as normative despite the fact that they manifest, politically, mainly as practical electoral concerns. The choice of focus is based on the supposition that political and other factors which tend to weaken the impact of 'idealistic'¹ concerns in the political *public* sphere are likely to be less dominant in the *private* sphere. Therefore, there is more room in the private domain for the allegedly strong normative character of 'genocide' to make an impact on peoples' attitudes. This still leaves the question of how much influence public opinion can exert on policy making in relation to what are mostly low salience conflicts.

Martin Mennecke has written in relation to Darfur that 'the only place where the "G-word" seems to retain...moral superiority... is within domestic politics', and he gave the United States as a prime example.² Obviously, the moral duty to 'prevent or suppress' should not be reserved to 'genocide'. Neither should action on 'genocide' be promoted on the expense of so called 'other crimes'. The question is how strong this normative influence really is. And whether this power could be used effectively without being significantly constrained by the 'genocide debate', as pointed out by David Schaffer,³ Gareth Evans,⁴ and others?⁵ But before addressing these questions, we need to first consider

1 The word 'idealistic' is used here rather than, for example, 'moralistic', because moral arguments could be employed in support of both interventions and non-interventions.

2 Martin Mennecke (2007) "What's in a Name? Reflections on Using, Not Using, and Overusing the 'G-Word'", *Genocide Studies and Prevention* Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 60.

3 David Scheffer, "Genocide and Atrocity Crimes," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 1 (2006): 229–50, 238.

4 Gareth Evans (2005) "Genocide or crime? Actions speak louder than words in Darfur," *The European Voice*, February 18.

5 Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp 129, 156; Scott Straus, "Rwanda and Darfur: A Comparative Analysis", *Genocide Studies and Prevention* Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51; Juan E. Mendez, in an interview: "United Nations Report from the Special Advisor on Genocide Prevention," *Voices on Genocide Prevention*, February 16, 2006; Mennecke, "Whats in a Name", pp. 62, 66; Samantha Power, "Dying in Darfur: Can the Ethnic Cleansing in Sudan be Stopped?", 2007, *The New Yorker*, 23 August, available at URL: http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/040830fa_fact1?040830fa_fact1, viewed 27/11/06.

some of the processes through which ordinary Americans form their opinions on how their country ought to respond to external situations of mass violence.

How the Public Forms its Policy Preferences

Most Americans formulate their policy preferences on foreign crises based on information they get from, or through, the media.⁶ It is widely agreed today that the way the information is *framed* has an impact on how large parts of the public form these opinions.⁷ Whereas there is little disagreement over the argument itself, the extent and circumstances of these influences are less clear.⁸ Research suggests that whoever controls the framing of a conflict in the public domain (origins, causes, parties, fatalities, etc); the discussion of policy options and their viability; and the nature and potency of constraints to action, is well-positioned to influence Americans' policy preferences.⁹ Control of these frames can also influence the ability and motivation of the public to endorse or, alternatively, sanction government policies. The *indexing* model describes how elite consensus or collusion leaves the media framing of a policy issue to the administration.¹⁰ On Rwanda as we all know this resulted in a little contested American policy of blatant disregard for the lives and fate of the victims. The indexing model, however, is also challenged, mainly on the argument that at least in the elite media, some journalists could and would resist political attempts to control the frame.¹¹ They may also provide

6 See more about the process of attitude formation in a discussion of 'purposive belief systems' model in Benjamin I. Page with Marshall M. Bouton (2006) *The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don't Get*, Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 104-5.

7 Even those who do not follow the media may be indirectly influenced by it through family members, friends, or work colleagues who do. See Shanto Iyengar and Jennifer McGrady *Media Politics, A Citizen's Guide*, New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company

8 See a good summary in Christopher Gelpi (2009) "Performing on Cue? The formation of Public Opinion Toward War", A Paper prepared for the *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association February 15-18, 2009*, New York, NY., pp. 8-15.

9 For example, hegemonic theorising could argue that the stronger the influence of political elites through partisan cues, agenda setting, and other types of framing on the public is, the more likely it is that the same constraints on moral concerns which affect the political elites will also indirectly affect public opinion through these framing effects. It is also possible, however - as discussed below - that the frame will be controlled by journalists, or other elites, which hold more moralistic attitudes.

10 See Jonathan Mermin (1999) *Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of US intervention in the Post Vietnam Era*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 7, 26, 151-2; Iyengar & McGrady, *Media Politics*, p. 7.

11 See Robert Entman's Cascading Activation model, which

their own frames which, in the case of genocide, may very well be more 'idealistic' than pragmatic. Yet, because most information on foreign conflicts comes from official sources, such a counter-frame will have to be very dominant to be picked up by key outlets in the mass media. Salience of a conflict is thus also important here. The more salient a policy issue is, the more likely it is that the public will form opinions independently of elite cues.¹² But at the same time, the more politically salient the issue, the more effort the elites are likely to put into controlling the frame.

How Policymakers Know what the Mass Public views Are

It is widely agreed that *perceptions* of public opinion matter more than what the public actually thinks. Politicians have been found to form their perceptions mostly by using Congress and the news-media as proxies, or surrogates, of public opinion.¹³ Opinion polls are also used to construct this image, although many policymakers profess distrust of their results.¹⁴ These three indicators are used below to try to form a rough picture of what public opinion on Darfur may have looked like for American officials back in 2004.

Congress— Members of Congress are said to form their views of what their constituents want through networks of personal contacts (the 'vocal public')¹⁵ as well as via the news media.¹⁶ Forceful Congressional activity concerning

both builds on and challenges the indexing theory, in Robert M. Entman, (2004) *Projections of power: Framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign Policy*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

12 'Salience' is defined as "the relative significance of an issue to an actor...relative to all other issues". See Stuart N. Soroka, "Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy", *Press/Politics* Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 29. See also discussion of 'salience' in Maxwell McCombs (1997) "Building Consensus: The News Media's Agenda-Setting Roles", *Political Communication*, Vol 14, p. 441; Maxwell McCombs (2003) "The Agenda-Setting Role of the Mass Media in the Shaping of Public Opinion", University of Texas at Austin, available at URL: http://www.infoamerica.org/documentos_pdf/mccombs01.pdf (viewed 12/7/10).

13 Bernard Cohen, (1973) *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy*, Boston: Little Brown and Company, pp. 111-113; R. Entman, *Projections of power*, pp. 12-6; Steven Kull and M. I. Destler (1999) *Misreading the Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism*, Washington D.C. : Brookings Institution Press, pp. 219-221; Philip J. Powlick (1995) "The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials", *International Study Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 4, pp. 434-7, 446-7.

14 B. Cohen, *Public's Impact on Foreign Policy*, pp. 115-117; Kull & Destler, *Misreading the Public*, pp. 208-213; P. Powlick, "Sources of Public Opinion", pp. 434-5, 438-9, 446-7. Officials can also disregard the public views, either because they don't trust their ability to judge them correctly, or because they don't trust the opinions of the mass public on foreign affairs.

15 S. Kull & I. Destler, *Misreading the Public*, p. 212-9.

16 *Ibid*, p. 220.

Darfur constituted early on a strong departure from past patterns. The unanimous joint genocide determination in 22 July 2004 (including calling for a US military action if the UN failed to act) was unprecedented.¹⁷ It is quite likely that 'genocide' did play an important normative role here, and it will be interesting to see exactly how that came about. In any event, as a proxy to public opinion the picture from Congress would have indicated a public mindset in support of strong American action on Darfur.

Opinion polls – National polls have consistently supported an American action on genocide - mostly in principle, but also in actual cases.¹⁸ The influence of moral imperatives, according to both polls and focus groups, has been strong.¹⁹ But there is also some evidence to suggest that suppression of genocide has been in itself interpreted by many Americans as a 'hard' national interest.²⁰ We have to be careful with polls however. Support in *principle* for the idea that the US has *some* sort of obligation to genocide suppression is consistent and firm. But the extent to which Americans are willing in specific cases to back such an 'obligation' with concrete action is much less simple to interpret. There are, for example, significant differences in Americans' support for different types of missions, depending on how survey questions are worded. Explicit or implicit referrals to multilateralism (which implies legitimacy); to burden sharing; to whether or not the mission is consensual; and to whether or not US ground troops are to be used, have been shown to greatly influence polls' results.²¹

17 U.S. House of Representatives, "House of Representatives Resolution 467: 'Declaring genocide in Darfur , Sudan'", *Library of U.S. Congress*, 22 July, 2004 (see also Senate resolution 133)

18 See below.

19 S. Kull & I. Destler, *Misreading the Public*, pp. 95, 104-5.

20 For example, in a June 1996 PIPA poll, 78% agreed (50% strongly) that the US should contribute to UN peacekeeping because "if we allow things like genocide or the mass killing of civilians to go unaddressed, it is more apt to spread and create more instability in the world so that eventually our interests would be affected (cited in Kull & Destler, *Misreading the Public*, pp. 52-53). Notably, it is difficult to separate in the polls national interest and humanitarian imperatives or to test causality between them. For example, explicitly stating absence of US national interests in a question about US intervention to stop genocide could not prevent respondents from being influenced by, and therefore factoring in, such a belief.

21 In July 2004 (shortly before the genocide determination at the US Senate) public support for a multilateral peacekeeping mission consented to by the parties to the conflict, stood at 57% against 32% (PIPA/NKP). In the same poll, 84% against 8% supported the argument that the US could not tolerate genocide and should use its military assets, again short of sending US troops. (This question, however, was somewhat flawed as respondents had to choose between this assertion and the argument that the US had no responsibility to intervene in genocide and crimes against humanity taking place in Africa). Steven Kull et al, "Americans on the Crisis in Sudan", *The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll*, July 20, 2004, p. 6. In a June 2005 poll (ICG & Zogbi International) 79% vs. 15% agreed that the international community and the US had a

In July 2004, *principled* support for using US military forces to suppress genocide was very high. These views existed among both policymakers and the mass public and, despite significant differences, held true not only in relation to multilateral but also for unilateral action. According to one poll, 70% (vs. 24%) of the American public and 73% (vs. 22%) of surveyed political elites²² believed that states should have the *right* to use military force to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide *even without UN approval*.²³ A record 94% (vs. 4%) of American leaders and 85% (vs. 9%) of the public also said that the UN Security Council should have the *right* to authorize the use of military force to prevent severe human rights violations such as genocide.²⁴





Figure 2-1

responsibility – *short of sending US troops* – to take action to stop the killing. ICG & Zogbi International, “Africa Briefing No. 26”: Do Americans Care About Darfur?, *International Crisis Group*, 1 June 2005, p. 3, available at URL: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/B026%20Do%20Americans%20Care%20about%20Darfur.ashx>, (viewed 12/7/10).

22 See description of surveyed elites in S. Kull & I. Destler, ‘Misreading the Public’, p. 25.


23 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (2004) *Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*. Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, p. 24, available at URL: http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202004/US%20Public%20Opinion%20Global Views_2004_US.pdf, (viewed 12/7/10).

24 Ibid.



Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (CCFR, p. 24)

Principled support even existed for the use of US troops to stop genocide although, importantly, the question in the poll did not specify whether in a unilateral or multilateral capacity. Here, 75% (vs. 22%) of the public and 86% (vs. 7%) of American leaders favored *in principle* using U.S. troops to stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people.²⁵



Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (CCFR, p. 29)

Unfortunately, I could not find so far surveys from 2004 in regards to US troop deployment in Darfur. This makes it difficult to assess the actual support (in the polls) for a US military action on the crisis during that year, in distinction to a principled one concerning 'genocide'. A poll conducted a year later on Darfur (ICG and Zogbi International, June 2005) shows a marked difference to the strong principled support in 2004. Majority support for multilateral or even unilateral action without using American troops was less high but still existed. Support for sending in the marines to Darfur however was low at 38% vs. 55% who objected.²⁶

9-13. I am going to read to you a number of steps that the U.S. could take to help stop the killings in Darfur. Please tell me if you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose each.


Table 2.

	Support*	Oppose*	Not sure
Cooperate with the International Criminal Court to help bring to justice those accused of crimes against humanity.	91	6	4
Impose tough sanctions on those Sudanese leaders responsible for controlling the militias.	81	12	7
Establish a "no fly" zone over Darfur to prevent aerial attacks on civilians and destroy those planes engaged in attacks on civilians.	80	13	8
Offer NATO logistical and troop support for an expanded African peacekeeping force.	76	18	6
Insert U.S. soldiers on the ground.	38	55	7

(*Support and "oppose" combine "strongly" and "somewhat.")

Africa Briefing No. 26: Do Americans Care About Darfur?, ICG and Zogby International

A third poll, from June 2005 also, got a higher support of 54% (vs. 39%) for US troop deployment as *part of a multilateral force*.²⁷



The Darfur Crisis: African and American Public Opinion, PIPA/KN June 2005

25 Ibid. p. 29.

26 ICG & Zogbi International, "Africa Briefing No. 26", p. 4. These are the earliest poll results about US military action I currently have.

27 Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) (2005) *The Darfur Crisis: African and American Public Opinion*, June 2005, available at URL: http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/GS_PIPA_darfur_report.pdf, (viewed 12/7/10).

As a comparison, in July 1994 (that is, 10 years earlier), the support in a PIPA poll for a *multilateral* deployment of troops, including Americans, in Bosnia and Rwanda was 62%. But when Americans were asked how this support would have been affected *had the UN was to determine 'genocide'* on these crises, 80% in both cases supported multilateral and American military response.²⁸

The results of the opinion polls on Darfur, therefore, should be analysed against a range of other factors, including external factors, such as Iraq and the war on terror; other national interests, both for and against intervention; the salience of the crisis; feasibility and estimated success of an intervention; perceived risks; multilateralism in terms of both legitimacy and burden sharing; and cultural factors, for example, identification with victims, dehumanisation of perpetrators, etc.²⁹ I have not yet seen this kind of research on Darfur. My analysis so far of the crisis confirms previous and more generalised findings by Steven Kull and others (discussed above) in at least one important sense: That although Americans continue to acknowledge an obligation to suppress genocide, when actual US action is discussed their support is conditional. In other words, they no longer see it as an 'obligation'.

The *news media* – If media coverage and media content do offer a reading into public moods, then this image during 2004 was a vacillating and overall a muffled one. It took almost a year for the elite papers to take up the story. Once they did, the salience of Iraq and Afghanistan;³⁰ the 2004 Presidential elections;³¹ lack of a significant American angle in the Darfur 'story';³² advertising economics and the disproportional preoccupation of news organisations and audiences with

28 Cited in Steven Kull et al, "Americans on the Crisis in Sudan", *The PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll*, July 20, 2004, p. 6, available at URL: http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Africa/Sudan_Jul04/Sudan_Jul04_rpt.pdf, (viewed 12/7/10).

29 Five common conditions for American public support for the use of military force cited in the literature include: multilateral legitimacy, a sense of burden sharing; high chances of success; low risk of casualties; and elite consensus.

30 Sherry Ricchiardi (2005) "Déjà vu", *American Journalism Review*, February/March Issue, pp. 38,40, available at URL: <http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=3813> (viewed 16/9/07); Carrol Bogert (2004) "Another Africa Calamity – Will Media Slumber On? ", *Human Rights Watch Website* (originally published in *L.A. Times* 28 April), available at URL: <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/28/sudan8540.htm>, viewed 13/9/07.

31 Ibid, p. 39.

32 Also, more specifically, lack of interest of American audiences in Africa and their total unfamiliarity with the region – on one hand, and 'excuses' that 'Sudan is not the only tragedy taking place in Africa' – on the other. Notably, Where a local slant was found (as in the case of the local *Kansas City Star* – with two local Senators active on Darfur), the coverage begun earlier and was more substantial. See Ricchiardi, "Déjà vu", pp. 37-40.

trivia on the expense of more serious stories;³³ foreign-news budgetary constraints (largely to do with the costs of the coverage in Iraq);³⁴ journalists' difficulty to get into the region,³⁵ and an alleged slowness of the American media in covering mass killings when the victims are not white;³⁶ all had a share in reducing the frequency and quality of coverage. This was true of most of the print media, with a qualified exception of a few elite papers (notably, the 'Washington Post' and the 'New York Times'³⁷).

Network coverage, where most Americans still get their foreign news from, was extremely poor. The combined Darfur reporting in the nightly newscasts of the three major networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) for the whole of 2004 was merely 26 minutes.³⁸ (The distribution was ABC 18 minutes; NBC 5 minutes; and CBS only 3 minutes). Darfur was a small intermittent side show in the evening news. Compare these 26 minutes, for example, with the coverage of some of the infotainment 'hits' of 2004 (the inside trading story on Martha Stewart received 130 minutes of coverage). On the

33 Ibid, p. 36.

34 Bogert, "Another Africa Calamity"; Ricchiardi, "Déjà vu", p. 39.

35 Ricchiardi, "Déjà vu", p. 35. See on the Sudanese effort to seal off media access to Darfur E. Reeves (2006) in an interview: "A Comprehensive Approach to Sudan", *Voices on Genocide Prevention*, 26 January. Available at URL: <http://www.usmmm.org/conscience/analysis/details.php?content=2006-01-26>, viewed 27/11/06; S. Chin (2006) in an interview: "No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Darfur", *Voices on Genocide Prevention*, 5 January. Available at URL: <http://www.usmmm.org/conscience/analysis/details.php?content=2006-01-05>, viewed 27/11/06. See also Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A short history of a long war*, pp. 115-6. Power, in *A Problem from Hell*, also describes efforts to seal off leakage of information on atrocities, or their denial, by perpetrators in Turkey (Armenian genocide), Nazi Germany, Cambodia, and Iraq (Kurdish genocide).

36 Pointing to Rwanda as another example, and to Bosnia as a contrasting case Bogert, "Another Africa Calamity"; Ricchiardi, "Déjà vu", pp. 38-9.

37 Ricchiardi, "Déjà vu", pp. 38-9. Nicholas Kristof in the *N. Y. Times* and Emily Wax for the *W. Post* were among the few journalists committed to the coverage of the story. Ricchiardi also highlights the crisis' coverage by *National Public Radio*. See a good analysis of the two dailies in Antal Wozniak (2007) "Genocide in the News: Media Attention and Media Framing of the Darfur Conflict", *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, San Francisco, CA*.

38 American Progress Action Fund (2005) *beawitness.org*, available at URL <http://beawitness.org/home>. (viewed: 12/3/2007). According to the APAF, the gap between infotainment stories and the coverage of Darfur was even larger in June 2005, with CNN, FOXNews, NBC/MSNBC, ABC, and CBS running 50 times as many stories about Michael Jackson and 12 times as many stories about Tom Cruise as they did about the genocide. These tendencies bring back to memory the total overshadowing of the O. J. Simpson trial on the coverage of Rwanda ten years earlier.

whole, although Darfur was the most 'visible' African conflict during 2004, media coverage was far from enough to turn it into a salient policy issue.³⁹

The Impact of the Mass Public on US Policy on Darfur

An analysis of public views based on the three indicators of Congress, opinion polls, and the news media, would have likely shown policymakers a clear but conditional support for a strong American action on Darfur. But the low salience of the issue would have implied that avoiding strong action on the crisis was also within the range of possibilities. This raises the question of the role of the 'mass public' in policymaking. Consistent support for strong action in past polls, for example, does not correspond well with Samantha Power's description of a 'society-wide silence' in the face of insufficient government action during the 20th century.⁴⁰ The same is evident in the lack of electoral repercussions of inaction for presidents. As Power puts it, 'No US President has ever made genocide prevention a priority, and no US President has ever suffered politically for his indifference to its occurrence'.⁴¹ It will be interesting but difficult to try to judge the impact of administration inaction on presidential approval ratings.

My work here is still ongoing but I'd like to raise three points. First, as already noted, *salience* is important. This includes salience of 'genocide' to the public. If the low prioritisation of 'protection of human rights overseas' can be used as a partial indicator of the salience of 'genocide', it is then not very high at consistently three quarters down the list of important foreign policy goals.⁴² In 'salience' I am also talking about the prominence of the Darfur issue to both the public⁴³ and policymakers. It is often said that foreign policy neither

39 In the future, I plan to study more closely the content of this coverage, mainly into public discussions of America's obligations and of policy options.

40 Samantha Power (2003) *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, London: Flamingo, p. xxi, p. 509.

41 S. Power, *A Problem from Hell*, p. xxi.

42 During the past three decades American citizens have ranked the importance of 'altruistic' policy goals consistently lower than more self-interested foreign policy goals. In 2002, for example, the goal of 'promoting and protecting human rights in other countries' was ranked as a 'very important foreign policy goal' by 39% of respondents, situating it in the fifteenth place in a list of twenty 'very important' goals. Notably, though, when adding together the 'very important' and 'somewhat important' categories, the combined percentage jumps to 90%. B. Page & M. Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect*, p. 43. Interestingly, this ranking was not significantly different to ranking of previous years despite the fact that this survey took place after 9/11: 39% was also the result in the 1998 poll (see *The Foreign Policy Disconnect*, pp. 40-43, 258n2 based on CCFR/GMF combined data set, 2002).

43 In the July 2004 Darfur PIPA poll, only 14% knew 'some or a lot' about the situation, 28% 'not very much' and 56% 'nothing at all'. In the June 2005 poll, already 64% were either 'very' or 'slightly' aware of the situation and 35% 'not very aware' or 'not aware at all'.

wins elections, nor loses them.⁴⁴ In fact, a CCFR 2006 study based on three decades of polling data has found significant divergences between public and official positions in no less than 25% of the policies that they tested.⁴⁵ However, the more salient a policy issue is to the public, the higher will be priority it will be assigned by policymakers. A key question here is how to increase the public salience of crises involving mass murder? The anti Apartheid movement in the US was successful back in the 1980s by establishing a link to an important domestic American issue: racial inequality.⁴⁶ Can we learn something from that?

Second, the contradiction between Americans' professed preferences on 'genocide' and official policies also raises the question of accountability for *inaction*. Power famously wrote that "[i]f everyone within the government is motivated to avoid "another Somalia" or "another Vietnam", few think twice on ... allowing "another Rwanda".⁴⁷ It is difficult for domestic constituencies to assess government policies on foreign interventions. This is because the most significant decisions about responses are made trans-nationally, mostly at the UNSC. It is therefore hard to judge the performance of national leaders in circumstances over which these leaders themselves have only a partial control. Also, public access to information on these decisions is largely controlled by the very actors that are being judged. It could be argued, therefore, that once the genocide determination was made by the Bush administration and Darfur was referred to the UNSC, a domestic backlash would have been unlikely regardless of the policy pursued.

Third, at the end of the day, public opinion does matter to policymakers, for practical reasons if for nothing else. Managing it successfully through the media gives them leeway to push preferred policies and also, political advantage over the competition.⁴⁸ I will be studying whether and how the public was managed in the case of Darfur, using a theory titled 'sham compliance'. The argument behind 'sham compliance' is that governments often try to appear as if they are complying with international or domestic norms, whereas, in fact, they are doing little of what the norms actually prescribe. For example, in the case of humanitarian intervention they send military aid as a substitute for other actions; or send troops, but with a weak mandate.⁴⁹ Instead of a focus on official justifications

44 S. Kull & I. Destler, *Misreading the Public*, p. 230.

45 See Page and Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect*.

46 Audie Klotz (1995) *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid*, Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.

47 S. Power, *A Problem from Hell*, p. 510.

48 Shanto Iyengar & Jennifer A. McGrady (2007) *Media Politics: A Citizen's Guide*, New York, WW Norton, p. 11; S. Kull & I. Destler, *Misreading the Public*, p. 233.

49 Cara Vanayan (2008) *Humanitarian Intervention and the Failure to Protect: Sham Compliance and the Limitations of the Norm Life Cycle Model*. (Dissertation: University of Ottawa), pp. 11-2.

for inaction, sham compliance conceptualises 'inaction' as a *consciously ineffective action*.

To sum up: As the polls show, majorities of Americans favour *in principle* a firm US action to suppress genocide.⁵⁰ These preferences are motivated both by humanitarian concerns and by views that putting a stop to an ongoing 'genocide' serves in itself an American national interest.⁵¹ The public's support for action, however, seems to be conditional and prudent. While offering an explicit support for strong action, it also provides an implicit legitimacy for inaction. This legitimacy is motivated, among others, by the low salience of conflicts to the public and by official management of public opinion. The imperatives for action are not powerful enough to offset the guaranties that the public would like to have in relation to military action, but cannot get. Assurances for high prospects of success; low risks of casualties or of quagmire; international legitimacy; and multilateral sharing of burden, are indeed difficult, if not impossible, to offer in advance. Next to these hindrances, the perceived benefits associated with suppressing mass violence – both practical and ideational – just don't measure up for both publics and policymakers. The prospects of failed interventions therefore constrain altruistic tendencies among the public; they diminish the influence of the public on policymakers in favour of intervention; and they also provide officials with ready-made justifications for inaction. Accountability also, is not likely to be imposed by a public that is undecided and largely disinterested, especially if crucial decisions are not believed to be under the control of the US government. The process therefore gets stuck not at the level of principle but of implementation.

At this stage my analysis does not support the idea that labelling a crisis as 'genocide' could lead to a significant shift in public attitudes, or officials' calculations. Americans have learned to live with what Huntington called in the early 1980s the gap between the ideal and the (political) reality.⁵² It is argued here that as long as military intervention is presented to the public, or perceived by them, as ultimately

50 Steven Kull et al, "Americans on the Crisis in Sudan"; B. Page & M. Bouton, *The Foreign Policy Disconnect*, pp. 104-5 (based on 2002 CCFR/GMF public survey combined data); ICG & Zogbi International, "Africa Briefing No. 26"; The Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2006 Global Views poll, available at URL: http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202006/2006%20Full%20POS%20Report.pdf (viewed 12/7/10); The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org, "Publics Around the World Say UN Has Responsibility to Protect Against Genocide", *thechicagocouncil.org*, 2007, available at URL: http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/POS%202007_R2P/2007%20Genocide_report.pdf (viewed 12/7/10).

51 Notably, it is difficult to separate in polls or even in focus groups the humanitarian imperative's influence from that of interest. Respondents understandably are tempted to project altruistic reasoning instead of self-centred ones in defending their views.

52 Samuel Huntington (1981) *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 3-4, 42, 72.

the intervention of choice, the difficulties outlined above make a stronger difference to them than the label imposed on the suffering of victims.

I would nevertheless argue that if the conditions and political interests *did* dictate a political decision to send in the Marines to suppress a 'genocidal' situation, the American public would have probably supported such a decision; especially if international legitimacy for action existed. Moral rhetoric by the President which would combine 'American exceptionalism' with 'genocide' themes, is likely to ensure such attitudes. Alternatively, if political will for intervention in a crisis would have been considerably higher than it has been so far, successful framing of the situation as 'genocide' coupled with promoting low risk policy options could have possibly helped tip the scale in favour of intervention.

The 'genocide' label can also stimulate media interest in a crisis, and make it more salient to the public and to policymakers, even if this is insufficient by itself to change the policy. The difference in 'visibility' between Darfur and other concurrent African crises during 2004 attested to this significance of the word. It is also worth asking how important public management was in allowing President Bush a relative freedom on Darfur.⁵³ This is because countering the management of the public is, arguably, within our realm of possibilities.

Other ways to try to address these problems is by promoting a more pervasive public focus on, and discussions of, non military measures at both national and transnational levels, as well as continued encouragement of research pertinent to non military options. Shifting focus away from the military option may help change public (mis)perceptions about the necessity of high risks in taking strong action to suppress genocide. More emphasis on other measures may also encourage publics to increase the pressures they will be willing to put on governments, and simplify mobilisation of international consensus for action. Evidently, these alternative measures would have to be feasible, efficient, and cost effective enough to ensure that governments will see and use them as viable solutions rather than as measures of 'sham compliance'.

53 The argument that US Presidents enjoy high level of discretion in framing policies on complex low salience crises, especially in situations of policy uncertainty, is supported by the following studies: Louis J. Klarevas (1999) *American Public Opinion on Peace Operations: The Cases of Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti* (Dissertation). American University; Robert C. DiPrizio, *Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 157. DiPrizio argues that since few humanitarian crises threaten vital national interests, thus leading to 'widespread consensus on the appropriate response', the decision-making is usually left in the hands of the president.

Management of Civil Wars and Genocidal Violence: Lessons from Statistical Research

Birger Heldt

The genocides (G/P) and mass atrocities particularly in Rwanda, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Darfur have generated a debate on whether and how peacekeeping operations (PKOs) should, and could, halt such events (Welsh 2006; Seybolt 2008. See also Donald 2002; Findlay 2002; Stephens 2005; Yamashita 2008). At issue is whether PKOs should use force beyond self-defence against perpetrators of atrocities, or even intervene for the sole purpose of halting such events. In conjunction with this there has been a movement in the direction of a larger permissiveness for UN PKOs (ranging from self-defence, to reactive and proactive use of force, and logistical support to – or joint operations with – one of warring parties) as express in UN PKO mandates, the UN's new capstone doctrine for peace operations (United Nations 2008) as well as actual praxis in the field (Donald 2002; Stephens 2005; Yamashita 2008).

The policy and scholarly debates have addressed this issue with the help of anecdotes and compelling and insightful arguments. Missing from the debate are insights from a systematic approach that builds on historical data across many PKOs and atrocities. In particular, knowing more about the historical track record of PKOs, and more about the causes of atrocities, can assist in offering broad policy guidelines that rest on solid empirical ground. Such guidelines may serve to complement – but not replace – fine-tuned case insights that are able to take into account important case specific details.

This paper assesses this question foremost on atrocities against civilians in the context of civil wars. "Atrocities" refers to deaths due to the intentional killing of civilians (non-combatants), and as such excludes indirect deaths caused by disease, starvation, and crossfire. This category of violence includes some elements, such as targeted violence by governments, of standard definitions of genocide and politicide (G/P), but excludes others, namely intentional starvation and other indirect methods. Moreover, and unlike common definitions of genocide, it does not require that victims of violence can be distinguished on ethnic or political grounds, or that governments carry out violence.

In order to clarify the magnitude of atrocities the next section offers an overview of historical pattern and character of the interrelated phenomena of civil wars, battle-related deaths, genocides and atrocities. To put the figures in a broader perspective, the section highlights the absolute as well as comparative magnitude of atrocities over time, and takes a closer look at the DRC. The following section discusses the causes of atrocities as identified by statistical research, whereas the next assesses the historical track record of UN PKOs and non-UN PKOs in halting atrocities. The last section is an attempt to summarize the findings with the normal caveat, and to suggest an agenda for research that may serve to generate more solid and relevant findings.

The Magnitude of Atrocities

Not only has the annual number of armed conflicts and G/Ps decreased drastically since the end of the Cold War, but so has also the annual number of direct war casualties.¹ Figure 1 below covers 1948-2007 and shows a peak in the number of ongoing conflicts and G/Ps in 1991, after which there has been a decrease of about 40% in conflicts and around 90% in G/Ps.² While there were fewer conflicts before the 1970s than today, the number of states and thus also the potential number of states with exposed to civil and interstate wars, have doubled after the second World War. One insight from figure 1 is that the historical conflict pattern shows "stickiness" or inertia: short-term increases/ decreases in absolute (not relative) numbers are limited. Annual changes by some ten conflicts have historically taken at least four years to materialize. If history is a guide to the future, then the number of armed conflicts will continue to not show any major changes in the short-term.

As for the medium- to long-term development, a simulation covering 2010-2050 and based on the most recent statistical models of civil wars, offer similar predictions: at worst, the global number of conflicts will stay virtually unchanged, and at best there will be a small global decline (Hegre *at al.*, 2009). Regional variations are predicted, and involves more conflicts in eastern, central and southern Africa, and less or unchanged numbers in other regions. Everything else equal, this means that we should continue to see more instances of genocides and mass killings in Africa as compared to other regions. This suggests that the global demand for peacekeeping will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future. Moreover, and assuming that needs is an important conditioning factor behind the UN's decisions to deploy PKOs, we are led to expect a continued as well as increased focus on Africa, and also continued challenges of the same types experienced in past and present African cases.

1 By "armed conflict" is meant organized armed violence between two governments, or one government and one non-governmental party, over the issues of government or territory, that has incurred at least 25 casualties in a single year (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2009). Genocides and politicides refer to "The promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil wars, either of the contending authorities – that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, communal, political or politicized ethnic groups" (Harff 2003: 58).

2 Conflict data are from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2009 at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm. G/P data is from Harff (2007).

Figure I. Armed Conflicts and G/P, 1948-2007





Figure II. Battle-Related Deaths and Atrocities, 1948-2008



While showing an overall positive development from the early 1990s and onwards, the figure does not reveal the extent of crossfire casualties and atrocities against civilians, which is the important question. Figure II below covers the same time period and shows, on the one hand, the number of direct war deaths in terms of military and civilian battle-related deaths, and, on the other hand, the number of civilians wilfully killed by warring parties.³ Note that the figure does not include the mortality of these conflicts, in terms of the difficult and often controversial estimates of the number of civilians dying because of disease, starvation, brought along either accidentally by the war, or by the warring parties as part of a war strategy or G/P, and which are often many times larger than the battle-related deaths.⁴ In just the case of the DRC, excess deaths have been very conservatively estimated to be at least around 1000.000 during the course of the most recent conflict (Human Security Report 2010).

The annual direct war deaths peaked at around 600.000 during the Korean War in the early 1950s, the Vietnam War and the war in Cambodia during the late 1960s and early 1970s (400.000), and the 1980s (300.000) when the data is dominated by the wars in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. During the 1980s, the annual number of battle-related deaths was close to 300.000, while from 1992 and onwards it is on average well below 100.000. Since the annual number of battle-related deaths has decreased proportionally (about 2/3) more than the number of armed conflicts (about 2/5) during 1989-2007, this means that conflicts have on average become around 50% less deadly in terms of annual and direct battle-related deaths. For the period 1950-2007, the average annual battle-related deaths per ongoing conflict has actually decreased by 90%, although this is mainly due to the statistical impact of a handful of large wars mentioned above (cf. Human Security Report 2009).

Concerning deaths caused by atrocities, the peak in 1994 represents the genocide in Rwanda. In general, the annual figure is between 5000 and 10.000, and refers often to sadistic killings by warring parties. The historical pattern fluctuates much less than the pattern for battle-related deaths, but the annual figures show a downward trend just like battle-related deaths. An important insight is that the estimated total of 635.000 of civilians wilfully killed in civil wars 1989-2007 is in general – but far from always – a small fraction of those killed in during the course of military battles, which in turn are a small fraction of the indirect war deaths or indirect deaths due to G/P. Thus, a halt to the direct violence against civilians in the DRC and Darfur would make a large contribution towards reducing the much larger number of indirect deaths.


Important to note is that, and excluding the Rwandan

3 Battle-death data are from *The Battle-Deaths Dataset* (version 3.0), Lacina & Gleditsch (2005). Atrocities data are from the *UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset* (version 1.3) 1989-2007. In contrast to estimates of armed conflicts, estimates of war casualties are controversial and difficult (cf. Lacina & Gleditsch 2005; Lacina *et al.* 2006; Spagat *et al.* 2009; Human Security Report 2010), and depend on whether only direct military and civilian battle deaths, or also indirect civilian deaths, should be included. Whereas the latter kind of direct casualties are very difficult to estimate, it is even more difficult to estimate indirect deaths as due to diseases and intentional/unintentional starvation, displacement, etc.

4 For an overview one of the controversies, see http://www.hsrgroup.org/images/stories/Documents/Overview_To_The_Debate.pdf. See also Spagat *et al.* (2009) and Human Security Report (2010) available for download at http://www.humansecurityreport.info/2009Report/2009Report_Complete.pdf.

genocide, data show that armed groups were responsible for almost 60% of the very conservatively estimated 135,000 intentional direct killings of civilians in civil conflicts. An extreme case is the conflict patterns in North and South Kivu, the DRC, from 2004 to September 2009, where rebel forces have been estimated to be responsible for almost 80% of all atrocities⁵. This means that, not counting the Rwandan genocide, during the past 20 years, it has not been governments but rebels that have carried out the majority of atrocities against civilians in civil conflicts. Nevertheless, some rebel movements are proxies for – or supported by – governments inside or outside the country in question. The role of governments in atrocities could thus also be indirect and larger than the above ratio suggests.

Figure II provides a relatively smooth line that indicates a stable rate of killings. This is partly caused by the use of annually aggregated data, which smoothens monthly variations. Figure III below, which builds on monthly aggregated data for North and South Kivu from 2004 to September 2009, illustrates the extent of the variation. Instead of a stable rate, there are extreme fluctuations, with bursts of killings followed by an almost a total absence of killings. The pattern appears to indicate a tit-for-tat pattern, in that that the violence is not easily explained by some simple mass atrocity policy from the parties involved, but rather that the parties appear to respond to, or are triggered by some sort of local circumstances or events: if the parties were bent on constantly killing civilians as part of some master plan, then the line should have been smoother, more consistent, as well as much higher. Moreover, data show that the atrocities are not carried out in the same locations, but instead move from one location to another. This implies that the international community can, in theory, do something about the violence by influencing the local circumstances or deal with the local triggers. The issue of the causes of atrocities will be returned to later in the paper.



5 Raw data for 2004-2008 are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project by kind permission. Data for 2009 are from Human Rights Watch (2009).

A final insight is that even though G/Ps are rare and, in general, fewer individuals are killed wilfully than by crossfire, their impact on post-conflict health is considerably negative and hence necessary to add to final casualty estimates as well as decisions to intervene. Hoddie & Smith (2009) report that the magnitude of atrocities (carried out by governments) in terms of G/P is a more robust predictor of post-conflict health (disability and death) than the magnitude of crossfire killings. One alleged reason is that G/P involves the murder of professionals (e.g., health care staff) and the destruction of human capital that serve important functions throughout societies. Another alleged reason is the large displacements of entire populations, which in turn loose access to healthcare and live under difficult conditions (incl. the spread of diseases, hunger, and lack of access to health care facilities). A third alleged reason is the destruction of social capital (e.g., trust) that in turn decreases the possibility of individuals to receive help through friends and contact networks. In comparison to civil wars, G/Ps and atrocities against civilians will continue to cause fatalities and worsened quality of life to a larger extent long after G/Ps have ceased.

The Causes of Atrocities

After the path breaking study by Harff (2003), the number of statistical studies trying to account for the onset, occurrence or magnitude of G/P, or the more general phenomenon of mass killings of civilians, has finally started to accumulate.⁶ Some of the studies focus on slow-moving country characteristics that serve as underlying causes or risk factors and are difficult for the international community to address in the short-term. Other studies focus on conflict characteristics that constitute immediate causes or triggers, some of which are, in theory, possible to influence in the immediate term.

In the context of civil wars, atrocities that are not genocidal in their goals are often claimed to be carried out for rational reasons, e.g., promote ethnic cohesion, secure access to resources, deter civilians from supporting the other warring party, forcibly recruit soldiers, or improve bargaining positions and counter military setbacks (cf. Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004; Kathman & Wood 2009; Wood 2010). Atrocities are thus a symptom of military weakness, inability to provide other incentives (such as providing public services, or security) or lack of public support in militarily contested areas (Ibid.). Meanwhile, when rebels enjoy broad support and/or can provide public services, rebel atrocities serve no rational purpose, and may instead undermine public support and in extension strengthen opposing warring parties. Whereas government forces usually have some form of logistics and financial resources, rebels are dependent on civilians for, e.g., material resources, food, information and sanctuary (Ibid.). This explanation describes accurately the situation in North and South Kivu, where civilians are “punished” and join rebel groups – or do not oppose them –

6 See Valentino, Huth & Lindsay (2004), Besançon (2005), Krain (2005), Easterly, Gatti & Kurlat (2006), Humphreys & Weinstein (2006), Eck & Hultman (2007), Bae & Ott (2008), Colaresi & Carey (2008), Bundervoet (2009), Hoddie & Smith (2009), Kathman & Wood (2009), Querido (2009), Esteban, Morelli & Rohner (2010), Wayman & Tago (2010) and Wood (2010).

out of fear. Rebels can often only offer life or death.

Since rebels are more exposed than government forces and more reliant on civilians, they should thus be more prone to resort to atrocities when their position is weak or weakening. This expectation is born out of the overall pattern of atrocities against civilians reported above, in that rebels are overall responsible for 3/5 of all civilians murdered in civil wars, and for almost 4/5 in the case of the South and North Kivu. However, when rebels become very weak compared to government forces, atrocities may not increase recruitment, as the risk for retribution from government forces is larger than the risk for atrocities against civilians that refuse to cooperate or be recruited (Ibid.).

These insights have been confirmed in a couple of recent statistical studies. Wood (2010), covering all civil wars from 1989-2004, reports that the smaller the relative rebel capability, the larger the magnitude of atrocities against civilians; when governments increase the level of violence against civilians, so do rebels, particularly weak ones. These findings are consistent with the ones reported in a study of the Vietnam War (Kalyvas & Kocher 2009). In this war, the insurgent side was highly disciplined as well as militarily strong, and resorted almost exclusively to discriminatory and targeted violence against carefully identified individual government (South Vietnam) collaborators.

An interesting qualification of these findings, while exposed to the caveat of building on just one case, can be found in statistical study by Humphreys & Weinstein (2006) that focuses not on killings but on rape, amputations, theft, etc., by rebels in Sierra Leone. It reports that poverty, co-ethnicity, social ties and local military dominance, among other factors, did not prove statistically significant. Meanwhile, unit discipline in terms of punishment for bad behaviour against fellow rebels as well as civilians strongly influenced the risk for abuse: when unit discipline was low, the risk for abuse increased sharply. Hence, lack of group discipline makes rebels even more likely to kill civilians.

Similarly, in terms of government forces, Valentino, Huth & Lindsay (2004) report that rebel support and military threats against governments increase the risk for government atrocities, which are seen as a government strategy: when the government is losing ground, the risk increases. A similar finding is reported in a study of the Spanish Civil War (Herrerros & Criado 2009). Parallel to this, and referring to the Vietnam War, Kalyvas & Kocher (2009) report that indiscriminate bombings and shelling by government forces took place mainly in contested areas, that is, where the parties were under pressure from opposing forces.

The Track Record of Peacekeeping

During the past 20 years a number of UN-led as well as non-UN-led peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have repeatedly, and to different extents, attempted to address war induced humanitarian crises (genocide, starvation, mass atrocities, etc.) arising during the course of an operation. UN mandates commonly involve the protection of/support to civilians – either directly, or through the protection of relief operations or NGOs, but the enforcement elements are usually weak,

and seldom involve the proactive use of force.

Do atrocities against civilians increase the willingness of the UN to deploy such operations, as demanded by the concept of R2P? The question of the conditions under which peacekeeping operations are established has been discussed from many perspectives, as summed up by Gilligan & Stedman (2003). Some scholars stress major powers' interests and "imperialistic motives", and it has in this tradition been claimed that UN operations are established in countries where the permanent members of the UN Security Council have national interest or major powers have raw material interests. Other approaches emphasize an interest in establishing democratic regimes as a motivating factor. Another major strand of thought claims that it is not outside countries' interests that are important, but rather the needs – in terms of war casualties and conflict durability – of the war-torn countries, and thus altruism rather than egoism on the part of the great powers. Still other approaches highlight the alleged importance of, e.g., a "CNN effect", the presence of a peace agreement, type of conflict, and the number of warring parties.

The statistical studies on the topic are recent and rare, but point in the same direction. Gilligan & Stedman (2003) examine the conditions under which the UN deploys PKOs in civil wars. For civil wars active after 1988, the study finds, among other things, a positive relationship between civil war duration and number of casualties (battle-related, indirect and direct deaths), and the probability of a UN operation. This finding supports the argument that UN decisions need to take the local conditions into account. Mullenbach (2005) reports partly similar findings. Related to this, Hultman (2009) reports that violence directed against civilians by *governments* in civil wars increases the likelihood of UN PKOs. A similar impact due to violence committed by rebel groups is reported, but only in so-called failed states. Meanwhile, no effect of civilian casualties is found on the likelihood of the occurrence of non-UN PKOs. This does not mean that non-UN PKOs have never been deployed because of atrocities, but only that there is no such overall trend. Another finding is that atrocities against civilians increase the likelihood that UN PKOs are given protection and robust mandates. Since the studies employ different data, research designs and statistical techniques, it is difficult to compare the findings in a straightforward manner. But at the very least, there are no statistical studies indicating that the UN tends to select the easy cases.

A natural follow-up question is whether these operations had the intended effect. Krain (2005) looks at ongoing G/P and attempts to predict their magnitude for the period 1955 to 1997. In contrast to impartial interventions, anti-perpetrator/biased interventions are reported to matter in a positive manner regardless of size. As Krain notes, the UN was always impartial during the period studied, and that makes it impossible to assess whether it can halt G/P should it be given a robust anti-perpetrator mandate that involves siding with one of the warring parties. Another challenge for assessing the general impact of UN operations is that the UN seldom intervenes before – or during – civil wars, even when violence is anticipated. Meanwhile, after civil wars, the risk for G/P is historically almost absent. This means

that, up to 1997, there were few examples in history where UN operations have been faced with ongoing large-scale atrocities.

Hultman (2010) focuses on ongoing civil wars and the narrower category of atrocities against civilians. It is reported that UN PKOs are generally associated with no impact, or even *higher* magnitudes of violence by governments and rebels. Meanwhile, UN PKOs with protection mandates decrease violence carried out by rebels as well as governments. Robust mandates are reported as having no impact. Kathman & Wood (2009) focus on the magnitude of regime-sponsored mass killings only for the period 1995-2005, regardless of whether they took place in the context of civil wars. Anti-perpetrator as well as neutral military interventions, such as PKOs, increase the magnitude of killings in the short-run (indicating that the government is trying to “finish the job” [Ibid.] before it becomes impossible), but only neutral interventions decrease the magnitude in the long run.

These studies are important contributions, but the findings should be regarded as tentative, and should be replicated with other model specifications, and other lists for non-UN PKOs. For instance, the studies rely on country-level data. There is then no control group to observe whether PKOs deployed close to or far away from the rebel groups and the level of violence are statistically proportional, and thus whether an operation’s impact is reasonably predictable and straightforward to explain. This means that we do not know exactly how this relationship should be explained and understood. In addition, there is no control for whether robustness or protection mandates of non-UN PKOs have any effect. As noted above, the patterns of violence in North and South Kivu also suggest that the causes are very much locally oriented. This means, in turn, that an analysis of the impact of PKOs needs to rely on local level rather than country level data to properly assess the impact of PKOs.

Meanwhile, few of the operations in these studies were initially deployed for the sole purpose (cf. Roberts 2006; Seybolt 2008; European Union 2009; United Nations 2009; Center on International Cooperation 2007, 2008, 2009) of protecting civilians, and even fewer used force reactively or proactively to halt G/Ps or atrocities. Among the UN operations, two stand out in terms of their robust methods for addressing G/P and atrocities carried out by armed groups. First is the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia that established protected zones, delivered humanitarian aid, and, on occasions, used force beyond self-defence. The second prominent example is the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), which may be said to be at the front line of the practice of robust pro-active use of armed force by UN operations against armed groups spoiling the peace and/or committing atrocities. MONUC has also since 2007 provided training (initially) to logistical support (food and fuel) and later also tactical support/joint operations (intelligence, medical evacuation, air strikes, joint patrols, fire support, and planning) to the DRC army in its war against rebels that have committed severe atrocities (Human Rights Watch 2009).

However, no UN operation has so far been *initially* deployed for the stated primary task of protecting civilians from genocide or atrocities, *and* has used force beyond self-defence to achieve those goals. Close cases include the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) deployed in 2007 as a successor to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) that had been deployed since 2004. While having a focus on protecting civilians from human rights abuses, it has not developed a robust practice of using force reactively or pro-actively. A similar case is the related United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) deployed in 2007 in the border areas of Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic to deal with spillover effects from the Darfur conflict.

In contrast, multilateral non-UN interventions deployed primarily and initially to halt G/P and atrocities are rather common (Roberts 2006; Heldt & Wallenstein 2007; Heldt 2008; Seybolt 2008, European Union 2009; United Nations 2009; Center on International Cooperation 2007, 2008, 2009), and by early 2009 they included:

- Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti 1994
- NATO’s invasion of Kosovo, 1999
- The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), 1999
- The EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR DRC/Artemis), 2003
- The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 2003
- The Multinational Interim Force in Haiti (MIFH), 2004
- The EU Military Operation in Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic (EUFOR Tchad/RCA), 2008

With the exception of Kosovo and Haiti, these interventions were aimed at non-governmental actors, though in the cases of Timor and Darfur, they targeted non-governmental actors that were seen as government proxies. Only the Kosovo operation and RAMSI were not initially authorised by the UN Security Council, and apart from the EUFOR operations in the DRC and Darfur, all were successful in ending atrocities and armed conflict. Perhaps not surprising, the successful interventions were large and overwhelming, and confined to small countries (Haiti, Kosovo, Timor, Solomon Islands), which is also where these kinds of operations were carried out. EUFOR DRC/Artemis and EUFOR Tchad/RCA were meanwhile local protection forces, and the EUFOR DRC/Artemis was very localized in its deployment. Another observation is that none of the operations allied themselves with any of the warring parties, and all operations were either followed by PKOs (Haiti, Kosovo, Timor), developed into PKOs (Kosovo, Solomon Islands), or were PKOs from the very beginning (Darfur, the DRC). The insight offered from the non-UN cases is that multilateral interventions have worked well when they are designed to be robust, impartial and applied to small countries/territories.

Final Reflections

The findings presented in this overview should be regarded as tentative and rerun for robustness checks with other model specifications, and other lists for non-UN PKOs. With these caveats in mind, and referring to atrocities that do not have

genocidal goals, even if the option may appear tempting, or appear as the only available option, data suggest that the proper strategy for PKOs in general in ongoing civil wars is not to carry out anti-perpetrator interventions that involve siding with one of the warring parties. If rebels are perpetrators, and they are weak, data suggest that anti-perpetrator interventions or continued and escalated warfare will motivate them to escalate violence against civilians if they are losing (or fear losing) territory to the other warring party.

Regardless of how difficult, naive and non-innovative it may appear, data suggest that the goal should be to create cease-fires (even localized ones), and in addition provide support to, and protection of, civilians. Historically such PKOs have decreased incentives for rebels to commit atrocities, since government forces are no longer considered an acute threat and territory is not being lost or threatened. It may also provide a breathing space for an unavoidable political solution to develop and for third parties to pursue diplomatic options. Data also suggest that peacekeepers may act robustly in impartially implementing a mandate to protect civilians, but should avoid siding with any of the warring parties. History then suggests that there is no need for the UN to change the impartial manner in which PKOs have been carried out in the past, but there are options in terms of robustness and the creation of safe zones that need to be explored further. Just as it is not a viable strategy for PKOs to enter into joint operations with warring parties, neither is it a viable strategy to act as a neutral bystander in the face of mass atrocities.

If the interventions are directed against governments involved in genocides, statistical data and examples like Kosovo, Rwanda and East Timor indicate that governments tend to escalate the violence in order to “finish the job” before further killings become impossible to carry out. However, if governments have genocidal goals, it raises the question of whether these civilians may have been killed anyway, albeit at a slower rate, in the absence of an intervention. From that perspective, government run genocides are more difficult to deal with than non-genocidal atrocities by rebels and governments alike, and may need to involve a different toolbox for peacekeepers, or may not involve peacekeeping forces at all but rather other kinds of intervention forces. However, data suggest that neutral interventions also in these kinds of cases have the most beneficial *long-term* prognosis for reducing G/P.

On a final note, statistical research on the topic is in its infancy. At this point data indicates that it is important to carry out analysis with local level data instead of country level data in order to better account for the dynamics of atrocities, and to be able to understand the causal processes behind the local impact of PKOs. This means, in turn, that a new research agenda needs to be established and new data collection efforts need to be initiated in order for this area of research to progress and deliver insights of value to policy planners at the strategic level and to field staff at the tactical level.

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How International Policy Changes in Kivu are Reflected in the FAST Early Warning Data, 2002-2007

Heinz Krummenacher
Can Deniz

The Research Question

From 1998 to 2008 swisspeace carried out a conflict early warning project called FAST.¹ Its methodological approach was twofold. On the one hand qualitative expert knowledge was utilized to assess root and proximate causes of potential violence, and on the other hand quantitative event data analysis served as a tool to measure short term trends in conflict and cooperation in the target countries. The uniqueness of the FAST approach consisted mainly in the introduction of so called "local information networks," i.e. systems of locally led information gathering units.² By comparison with other event data based systems, which use news wires or other print media as information sources, FAST's local observers identified many more salient events.³ In addition, since all events were geo-coded, data aggregation could be done for alternatively defined geographic regions, such as the Ferghana valley, which overlaps three Central Asian countries, and for thematic topics such as refugee flows or environmental degradation.⁴

Even though local information networks produce many more salient events than alternative sources of information⁵, it

1 FAST is a German acronym that stands for Early Recognition of Tensions and Factfinding. Funded by the Austrian, Canadian, Swedish, and Swiss development agencies, the early warning system covered 25 priority countries of these agencies. FAST had to stop its activities in April 2008 due to the donors' changed funding priorities.

2 Other than using local information networks as sources for information the FAST approach differed little from other event data based approaches. Thus the event types and indicators used were those defined in the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) framework. See for more details Krummenacher 2006.

3 Initially also relying on news wires from Reuters, Agence France Press, and Itar Tass, we decided to create our own local information networks when we realized that countries like Uzbekistan or Madagascar received so little attention by those news agencies. For example, the average number of events from Reuters on Uzbekistan was 2 to 5 events per month. With the FAST local information networks in place this number grew exponentially. For Uzbekistan we counted between 100 and 180 salient conflictive and cooperative events per month.

4 :See for example Krummenacher 2008. In this article we analyzed the relationship between environmental factors and violent conflict in different countries and regions (such as the Ferghana valley). With a traditional event data based approach this would not have been possible because (a) the data there is almost always aggregated on a national level and (b) event types are not linked to different event issues (like environment, economic or social system, etc.).

5 A study by Senn, Krummenacher and Hämmerli (2008) shows that the local information network approach used by FAST yields much better results than for example internet based systems.

would be naive to believe that all relevant events are actually captured. The basic assumption of the quantitative approach used by FAST, however, was that the events stored in the data base were a representative sample of all conflictive and cooperative events within the individual target countries and thus made it possible to describe accurately developments on the ground. This paper provides a test of the accuracy of this assumption. Looking at the data on Kivu province in eastern Congo, one of the 25 regions and countries covered by FAST, we ask whether and how major international policy changes are reflected in FAST early warning data that cover the period between 2002 and 2007.

Political Developments in Kivu between 2002 and 2007

To show graphically political developments in Kivu between 2002 and 2007 we use an indicator called "relative forceful events".⁶ This is the visual trace:

Graph 1: Relative Forceful Events Aug. 2002 – Dec. 2007



5 We found that only 25% of events captured by local information networks can also be found on the internet, while around 75% are missing. This ratio fluctuates from country to country, but even in the case of Pakistan or Afghanistan where the likelihood that an event coded by the FAST country coordinator also shows up in the internet is highest, only around 60% of all coded events could be found via google on the www.

6 The indicator "forceful events" depicts the proportion of events which entail the use of physical force compared to all direct actions (conflictive events). Direct actions consist of the following event types: threaten, demonstrate, reduce relationship, expel, seize and force.


At first glance we can distinguish roughly three different phases:

- Growing tensions starting in December 2002 and culminating in the fall of 2003.
- Second phase: a de-escalation process from the end of 2003 until spring 2007.
- Third phase: rapid conflict escalation in March 2007.

If we take a closer look at the 2002 to 2004 time span (see graph 2) we observe that after the signing of the Pretoria accord in July 2002, an agreement in which Rwanda agreed to withdraw an estimated 20,000 Rwandan troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo in exchange for an international commitment to disarm the Hutu *interahamwe* based in Congo, there was a temporary decrease of tensions before the overall escalation trend prevailed.⁷ This short period of relative detente was largely due to the massive diplomatic and financial pressure which the US government exerted on the Rwandan government to withdraw from the DRC, which they eventually did in September / October.

Graph 2: Phases of De-Escalation (green arrow) and Escalation (red arrow) Aug. 2002 – Oct. 2004

Phase of de-escalation October 2003 – December 2004



Yet the calm did not have a long shelf life since rebel leaders subsequently tried to strengthen their negotiation positions vis a vis the transitional government then in the making (January to June 2003). Even though there was strong support from the international community for the transitional government, which was formed in July 2003,⁸

⁷ All references, if not otherwise indicated, refer to the respective FAST Updates.

⁸ The leaders of the two main rebel groups (Azarias Ruberwa for the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD),

On the one hand, in June France had deployed army units to Bunia which were spearheading a UN-mandated rapid reaction force, but on the other hand dissident Congolese Tutsi officers (among them General Laurent Nkunda) jointly refused their nomination by Kinshasa to new posts in the national army (September 2003). Thus international peacekeeping measures were thwarted by internal dynamics which in the end meant that the situation continued to stay tense.

It was only in October of 2003 that the process of de-escalation gained momentum. Landmark events during this month were:

- The uniting of RCD-G⁹ and RCD-ML¹⁰ as well as the alliance between the two influential governors Eugene Serufuli and Julien Pakulu;
- The demobilization of the Mai-Mai militia and rebel groups supported by Rwanda;
- The appointment of General Nyabyolwa as head of the military region of South Kivu and of General David Padiri Bulenda, a former Mai Mai-warlord, to a high-ranking position in the Congolese Army;
- The turnaround in Ituri which was provoked by international pressure;
- The peace accords signed between the Congolese army and the Mai-Mai militia.

This de-escalation process went on in 2004 / 2005 and culminated in the adoption of a new constitution by the Parliament and the electorate, thus paving the way for elections in 2006. As illustrated in graph 1, during this period the proportion of forceful events decreased from 0.6 in September 2003 to roughly 0.1 to 0.2 in 2006 / beginning of 2007.

This positive development ended in March 2007 when forceful events increased exponentially due to the end of the power sharing agreement. While the co-optation of the main rebel groups' leaders during the transitional phase had softened political tensions, now the "winner takes it all mentality" after the presidential elections in late 2006 reversed this trend. The growing accumulation of power in the hands of the new President Joseph Kabila, whose party also gained the majority of seats both in the National Assembly and in the Senate, alienated other commanders who suddenly found themselves sidelined. It was the concentration of executive and legislative power in the hands of President Joseph Kabila which marked the end of detente in the DRC and prompted the frustrated opposition leaders to resort to arms again. The

⁸ Jean-Pierre Bemba for the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)) as well as Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndongbasi of the outgoing Kinshasa regime and Arthur Z'ahidi Ngoma of the political opposition were sworn in as vice presidents with wide competences (see FAST Update, September to November 2003, page 3.).

⁹ Congolese Rally for Democracy – Goma (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Goma).

¹⁰ Congolese Rally for Democracy – Movement for the Liberation (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de Libération).

power struggle peaked in March when governmental troops and several hundred body guards of opposition commander Jean-Pierre Bemba, who refused to be disarmed, engaged in fierce battles (International Crisis Group 2007).

Conclusions

The findings presented in this article provide ample evidence that international policy changes in Kivu between 2002 and 2007 are well reflected in the FAST data. Broadly speaking, we can identify three different phases:

- First, a rise in violence after the Pretoria peace accords due to the different rebel factions' attempts to consolidate their negotiation positions in the run-up to the upcoming presidential elections.
- Second, a rather extended phase of de-escalation in between the end of 2003 and spring of 2007, when international pressure forced the political rivals to accept a power sharing model, and
- Third, renewed sharp hostilities after the elections when President Joseph Kabila acted in a "winner take all" mode that is all too common following elections in post-colonial Africa.

The FAST data set, however incomplete it might be, is far more complete than other events data sets and quite accurately depicts the developments in the target region during the period under scrutiny. It clearly shows that political pressure and economic support by powerful external actors (such as the USA and France) at various occasions helped to curb the conflict spiral. At the same time, however, the data also provide ample evidence that in countries that lack adequate institutional mechanisms to cope with political and social conflict, sustainable and lasting peace cannot be achieved by outside intervention. As long as Africa's political and military elites are not willing to share power, outside interventions remain nothing but piecemeal and palliative efforts.

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How Africa's Internal Wars Ended: Lessons for Prevention?

Ted Robert Gurr

We cannot say with certainty that a genocide has been prevented, or for that matter that any deadly internal conflict was checked before it began. We usually do know, though, when an internal war has ended and how. Moreover almost all genocides and most massacres take place during such wars – often they are essential elements of contenders' strategies. So ending an internal war is a major step toward ending or mitigating mass atrocities. Usually, not necessarily, because victors may exact murderous revenge on losers, and because losers may rearm, regroup, and fight again.

This paper asks what might be learned about prevention, or mitigation, from the ways in which continental Africa's internal wars ended. In the accompanying table I have compiled information on 19 internal wars in post-colonial Africa: their protagonists and issues, outcomes, and what seem to be the most important factors shaping their outcomes. These are sustained, high-casualty wars between armed contenders. The list is not "complete" but it does include the most deadly of armed conflicts in post-colonial Africa.¹ Examples of more short-lived and low-casualty insurgencies excluded from the table are rebellions by Tuaregs in Mali and Niger in the early 1990s; the Casamançais secessionist movement in Senegal, also in the 1990s; and the Ogaden insurgency in Ethiopia that began in 1996. The 19 wars nonetheless provide the basis for some generalizations about how African wars end.

Genocidal Violence in African Wars

Genocides and politicides took place during ten of these wars, of the 18 such events identified by Barbara Harff. Mass killings by agents of the state occurred in three others, according to Ulfelder and Valentino's analysis² In three additional instances rebel groups relied on massacres of civilians as a primary war-fighting strategy – RENAMO in Mozambique, the RUF in Sierra Leone, and the GIA and other jihadists in Algeria. There were serious human rights violations in the remaining three cases – the Eritrean independence war, the Oromo insurgency in Ethiopia, and the insurgency in the Niger Delta – but they have not (yet) been shown to meet the criteria of geno/politicide or mass killing used by the authors cited here.

Outcomes

First, not all African internal wars that began in the last half

1 Not included are one-sided genocidal massacres like those of Equatorial Guinea (1969-79) and Zimbabwe (1982-87).

2 Barbara Harff, "Assessing Risks of Genocide and Politicide," in Monty G. Marshall and T. R. Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy* (College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005), p. 58; Jay Ulfelder and Benjamin Valentino, "Assessing the Risks of State Sponsored Mass Killings," Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for the Political Instability Task Force, February 2008.

century have ended. They continue in Darfur, the Niger Delta, Oromia, Chad, and eastern Congo. Second, of the 14 that have more or less conclusively ended, rebels won six and governments won two, plus Darfur where the Khartoum government is near victory.

- The National Resistance Army won power in Uganda in 1986, putting an end to five years of anarchic and often genocidal violence
- The Isaacs who dominated the the Somali National Movement established an independent Somaliland in 1991 after three years of war with the Siad Barre regime
- Tigrayans, allied with Eritreans, overthrew the Dergue regime in 1991 after a 17-year revolutionary war
- Eritreans achieved independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after 30 years of war
- The Tutsis of the Rwandan Patriotic Front defeated the Hutu regime in 1994, though not in time to halt genocide
- Two insurgent groups in Liberia defeated the Charles Taylor regime in 2003

In two of these victories an international presence helped shape outcomes. The UN in effect midwifed Eritrea's secession by ensuring that the question of independence was put to a referendum and that the results were honored by the new Ethiopian government. In Liberia ECOMOG and US military forces facilitated Charles Taylor's flight into exile and deterred revenge killings of his supporters. In Rwanda, on the other hand, UN and regional efforts to negotiate peace between the Hutu government and the RPF – the Arusha accords – failed and the UN peacekeeping force was rendered impotent by UN Security Council decisions in which the US played a major part.

These are the three wars that ended, or in the case of Darfur are close to ending in government victories:

- In 1970 the Nigerian government decisively defeated Biafran secessionists
- The Algerian military and security forces had eliminated most jihadist cells by 2005.
- The Khartoum government and their Janjaweed militia have suppressed or sidelined most Darfuri rebels

In both the last two cases some fighting continues, so it is premature for governments to claim total victory. Rather, as has been said about the Algerian war against Islamists, governments may find it useful to have continuing low-level rebellion to justify repressive policies and to help secure

external security assistance.

International actors sought to influence the outcomes in each of these three wars. France led European efforts, some from private organizations, to provide assistance to the beleaguered Biafran people. This aid probably did no more than prolong resistance. The governments of France and other EU countries proactively checked the flow of funds and recruits – relatively small ones – from Islamists in Europe to the Algerian jihadists, especially after 2001. And, also after 9/11, the US organized and funded a Maghreb-wide security program in cooperation with the Algerian, Tunisian, and other regional governments.

This leaves six African wars that ended with negotiated settlements:

- The first Sudan North-South war was ended by the Addis Ababa agreement of 1982
- The second Sudan North-South war concluded with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005
- RENAMO's 16-year insurgency against the Mozambique government was ended by a 1992 settlement
- UNITA's insurgency against the Angola government that began in 1975 was checked by the 1994 Lusaka protocol and, after another round of fighting, ended in 2002 with reaffirmation of the protocol
- The decade-long RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone ended in 2001 with a UN-brokered peace agreement
- Interethnic civil war in Burundi that began in 1993³ culminated in a 2001 peace and power sharing agreement that was accepted piecemeal by Hutu rebel groups – and a renegade Tutsi group – over the next five years.

There was very substantial international engagement aimed at ending internal wars, especially since 1991. Leaders of Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, South Africa – including Botha and Nelson Mandela - even Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe played significant parts in pushing for settlements and hosting the negotiations that arrived at them. The former colonial powers and the US usually played secondary, or at least less visible, roles. The US role was most open in Angola and Liberia. The UN and, later, the African Union also were engaged in some. Peacekeeping forces were provided by

³ An earlier episode in this recurring conflict was a 1988 Hutu uprising in northern Burundi in which hundreds of Tutsis were killed and as many as 20,000 Hutus were massacred in retaliation. An earlier genocide against Hutus was carried out by Tutsis between 1965 and 1973 with a death toll estimated at 100 to 200,000. Neither of these were wars fought by armed, organized political contenders like the 1993-2006 conflict.

the UN in several instances – Sierra Leone, eastern Congo – and by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG in Liberia.

Another distinctive feature of the successful settlements is the involvement of what might be called nonconventional actors. The World Council of Churches helped negotiate the agreement that ended the first Sudan civil war. The East African development agency, the IGAD, was a major player in ending the second Sudan civil war. And the Catholic lay organization Sant'Egidio was a neutral arbiter, trusted by both sides, in the lengthy negotiations that ended RENAMO's war against the FRELIMO government of Mozambique.

There is another side to international involvement in Africa's internal wars: outside support for some of the combatants in pursuit of the intervening party's own political and economic interests. In three instances African wars were sustained by support from the Cold War alliances – they had local political bases but were essentially proxy wars:

- Soviet-bloc assistance sustained the Dergue government of Ethiopia in its civil wars against Eritreans and Tigrayans, and also its international war against Somali forces in the Ogaden in 1977-85. When that assistance ended, the Dergue collapsed.
- In Angola and Mozambique the UNITA and RENAMO insurgencies were supported by South Africa and the US, while the Soviet bloc provided major support to the Angola government, and lesser support to FRELIMO in Mozambique. When the Cold War ended external support was suspended and it was possible to negotiate settlements.

African states themselves have repeatedly supported insurgencies in neighboring countries for a great diversity of reasons. These are some examples, others are mentioned in the accompanying table.

- The wars of eastern Congo began when Rwanda and Uganda instigated and backed the insurgency that overthrew Mobutu, with the aim of reducing attacks by exiled Hutu militants. Thereafter a number of neighboring countries piled in, mainly to exploit the region's rich resources, and at the same time patronized local warlords – who kept the conflicts and killings going until international agreements led to the withdrawal of most intervenors by 2003. In this as in other internal wars the follow-on local conflicts are self-sustaining and very difficult to contain.
- The Revolutionary United Front's insurgency in Sierra Leone was instigated and supported by Charles Taylor's regime in Liberia.
- Thirty years of civil wars in Chad have been variously encouraged, sustained, or checked by military and political intervention from neighbor-

- ing states – Libya in the earlier years, Sudan today – and from France and the US, among others. On the several occasions when Chadian contenders reached settlements it was usually in the absence of active international intervention.

Some Observations on Future Peace-Making

External military and political support for contenders has arguably been the single most important factor sustaining African internal wars.⁴ The grievances and greed that motivate the insurgencies ordinarily are local, but international support keeps them going. Low-level insurgencies like those of Tuaregs in Niger and Mali, and the Casamançais in Senegal, remain at low level and have been more easily susceptible to settlements because the rebels have lacked significant external support.

Containment of the spill-over effects of internal wars is crucial. Porous, unsecured borders allow rebels to take refuge in neighboring states and facilitate the movement of supplies, armaments, and refugees. One strong recommendation follows: the disposition of African states to advance their own interests by supporting one or another contender in their neighbors' internal wars must be countered by regional and international pressures and incentives.

The negotiations that have led to settlements of Africa's internal wars often lasted as long as the wars themselves. Observers talk about protracted civil wars; peace-makers must anticipate protracted talks-about-talks, intermittent negotiations, piecemeal cease-fires and agreements, and maybe, someday, comprehensive peace agreements. Successful settlements involve a great diversity of external actors -regional and international organizations, other African countries, NGO's. There does not seem to be any optimal combination of parties. It does seem to be important that one or several parties take "ownership" of the negotiation process.

The domestic parties to internal wars are the key actors in any negotiations and settlements. If governments and negotiators are to settle with rebels, especially those who have not yet suffered a decisive military defeat, they need to be bought off by giving their leaders positions in government, disbursing money to their constituents, and disarming and incorporating their fighters into armies – and paying them a living wage.

4 Much research has been done on the causes and consequences of international meddling in internal wars. See among many other examples Stephen Saideman, *The Ties that Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) and a recent overview by Monica Duffy Toft and Stephen Saideman, "Self-Determination Movements and Their Outcomes," pp. 39-50 in J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and T. R. Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2010* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2009).

The major powers outside Africa, including the US and Europe, ordinarily do not take a leading role in negotiations; that is better left to Africans. Where they can play a major part is in providing some of the inducements that nudge the contenders toward agreement, and in providing the means for security guarantees.⁵

Regional and international peacekeepers have played an important role in a number of African internal wars. But they are only effective to the extent that some key conditions are met: that peacekeeping is accepted by the main domestic contenders; that the peacekeepers have broad and flexible mandates; and that the sponsoring international actors provide ample logistic support. These conditions are not always satisfied – see the AU operations in Darfur – and are only likely to be met, if at all, late in the negotiation process.

Sources for *Internal Wars in Post-Colonial Africa and Their Outcomes* (see 32-33): Appendix on major armed conflicts as of 2005 in Marshall and Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005*; Appendix on major armed conflicts as of 2009 in Hewitt, Wilkenfeld and Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2010*; Patrick Brogan, *World Conflicts* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1992); all updated from entries in Wikipedia; for the Algerian civil war, the author's prepublication case study.

5 Security guarantees have been shown in comparative studies to be crucial for reaching settlements and ensuring that wars do not resume. One study to be recommended is Barbara F. Walter's *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

Internal Wars in Post-Colonial Africa and their Outcomes

Ted Robert Gurr June 2010

<i>Country, War Years , Genocidal Violence</i>	<i>Protagonists and Issues</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>	<i>Key Factors in Outcome</i>
Sudan 1956-1986 <i>Genocide</i>	Separatist civil war by Southerners opposed to Northern, Arab control	Addis Ababa agreement in 1982, major gains for southerners	Concessions by Pres. Nimeiri, talks sponsored by World Council of Churches
Sudan 1983 - 2005 <i>Genocide</i>	North-south civil war resumes after government defects from 1982 agreement, spreads to Nuba	Eight protocols culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 with major concessions on southern autonomy, development	Government military gains; split in southern leadership; international pressure for talks; support role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
Sudan 2003 –present <i>Genocide</i>	Rebellion by Darfuri for devolution of power, more funding for development	Genocidal violence, massive refugee flows, rebels fragmented and near defeat	Government commitment to ethnic cleansing and military victory; ineffective AU peacekeeping mission
Ethiopia 1961 - 1991	Ethiopia annexed UN-mandate Eritrea in 1962, 30-year war for independence followed	Revolutionary coalition of Tigrayans, Eritreans, others wins military victory in 1991, Tigrayans take power. UN-supervised referendum leads to Eritrean independence 1993	Mengistu-led Dergue regime was weakened by withdrawal of Soviet bloc support. After its defeat, UN presence and support for Eritrean referendum was crucial.
Ethiopia 1974 – 1991 <i>Genocide</i>	Violent opposition to the Dergue regime that seized power in 1974		
Ethiopia 1973 - present	Oromo insurgency for autonomy or independence led by Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	1994 regional autonomy offer by new government rejected; OLF refused to participate in 2004 elections	Military support from Kenya for government counterinsurgency; Eritrean military support for OLF
Nigeria 1967-70 <i>Genocide</i>	Biafran war of independence, precipitated after massacres of Ibo in northern Nigeria	Military defeat of Biafrans; mass starvation; non-punitive reintegration of region into federal Nigeria	Military superiority of government combined with blockade of European-provided military and relief supplies
Nigeria 1990 – present	Insurgency in Niger Delta for greater share of oil revenues, greater local autonomy	Fighting among ethnic groups and militias; raids on oil installations; negotiations rejected by all parties	Government relies on its military superiority, presumably because cheaper than redistribution of oil revenues
Mozambique 1976 – 1992 <i>Mass killings by RENAMO</i>	RENAMO insurgency against Marxist FRELIMO government, sponsored by Rhodesia and South Africa	Settlement negotiated over 27 months between FRELIMO and RENAMO, hosted by Catholic lay organization Sant'Egidio	FRELIMO's loss of external support, doctrinal shift, and rapprochement with the Botha government in South Africa; Sant'Egidio's status as neutral arbiter
Angola 1975 – 2002 <i>Genocide</i>	US and South African-sponsored UNITA insurgency against Soviet and Cuban-supported MPLA government	1994 Lusaka protocol called for political incorporation of UNITA; but in 1996 fighting resumed after urban massacres of UNITA followers; a 2002 agreement reaffirmed the Lusaka protocol	Loss of Cold War support for UNITA and MPLA prompted 1994 negotiations hosted by regional leaders; UN peace-keeping was ineffectual and UNITA rearmed; the 2002 death of its leader, Savimbi, led to implementation of Lusaka protocol

<i>Country, War Years , Genocidal Violence</i>	<i>Protagonists and Issues</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>	<i>Key Factors in Outcome</i>
Chad 1979 – present <i>Mass killings</i>	Civil wars among contenders from north, south, and now eastern groups, compounded now by refugees and rebels from Darfur conflict	Negotiations and agreements in the mid-1980s and 1994-97 have broken down repeatedly. Current government has diverted new oil revenues from development to military purposes	Libya, France, the US, and now Sudan all have provided material and political support for regimes, rebels, or both at various times, blocking any enduring settlement.
Uganda 1981 -1986 <i>Genocide</i>	Civil war: banditry in the North by remnants of Amin's army, guerrilla war by Okello and Museveni against the Obote regime	Museveni's National Resistance Army took power, ending genocidal killings that took 200 – 300,000 lives	Idi Amin was overthrown in 1979 by a Tanzanian-led intervention force that was withdrawn by 1981. Anarchy followed, providing the setting for MRA victory
Somalia 1988 – 1992 <i>Genocide</i>	Civil war by opponents of the Siad Barre regime, especially the Issaq of the north	Northern Somalia (Somaliland) declared independence in 1991; Barre fled in 1992	The Issaqs of the Somali National Movement returned from exile in Ethiopia in 1988 with major weaponry
Liberia 1989 – 2003 <i>Mass Killings</i>	Charles Taylor led an exile group that ousted the Doe regime in a 1989-1997 civil war. In 2000 two rebel groups began a second insurgency	Charles Taylor went into exile in 2003 under cover of a West African military force (ECOMOG) and US military presence. An elected government was installed in 2005	The insurgents were very close to toppling Taylor's regime; ECOMOG and US military presence accomplished a peaceful transfer of power
Algeria 1991 – 2005 <i>Mass killings by jihadists</i>	Civil war by Islamists reacting to a military takeover that blocked the FIS from an electoral victory. GIA jihadists relied on massacres, armed attacks, and banditry	Government reforms allowed limited political participation; jihadist cells were defeated by ruthless military action. An alliance with al-Qaida supports remnant cells in the south	The overwhelming superiority of the Algerian military was essential; amnesties and reforms encouraged defections; Islamist support from France was shut down by French security.
Sierra Leone 1991 – 2002 <i>Mass killings by RUF</i>	Insurgency by the RUF, encouraged by Liberia's Taylor and funded by "blood diamonds"	UN-brokered peace agreement in 2001, UN peacekeeping mission in place thereafter, fair elections in 2002	The UN's close involvement was essential, notably its follow-up efforts at disarmament and war crimes trials
Burundi 1993 – 2006 <i>Genocide</i>	Interethnic civil war after Tutsi officers killed the newly-elected Hutu president	Lengthy negotiations lead to a 2001 peace and power-sharing agreement and the accession of most rebel groups, mostly Hutu but also Tutsi	Pres. Buyoya's willingness to pursue agreements under South African mediation; AU and later UN peacekeeping operations
Rwanda 1994 – 2003 <i>Genocide</i>	Exiled Tutsis of the RPF invaded from Uganda while militant Hutu regime carried out a genocide	The RPF seized control of Rwanda in 1994 but Hutu militants in Congo carried out retaliatory attacks on Rwanda for years after, prompting Rwandan intervention	The Arusha accords of 1993 aggravated the Hutu-Tutsi conflict; UNAMIR peacekeepers had no power to prevent genocide; neither the UN or major powers controlled exiled Hutu militants
DR Congo 1996 – present <i>Mass killings</i>	Civil and ethnic wars in Eastern Congo, exacerbated by invasion from Rwanda and Uganda and incursions of both rebels and soldiers from other neighboring countries.	Innumerable accords and cease fires (1999, 2002, 2008) led to withdrawal of most foreign troops by 2003; the central government and large UN peacekeeping operation have limited success containing warlords and inter-ethnic violence	Foreign intervention has contributed to Congo's devastation but the root cause is the weak and corrupt central government. Regional powers, the AU, and UN have sought with partial success to stabilize via negotiations, peacekeepers, aid

The Use of Patterns in Crisis Mapping to Combat Mass Atrocity Crimes

Jennifer Leaning

For the most of this decade a terrible conflict has played out in Darfur, yet the international community still has not managed to acquire a reliable estimate of how many people have been killed and under what circumstances. The government of the Sudan successfully blocked all usual means and methods of gathering population-based data on war-related morbidity and mortality in the region. Yet this decade has also seen an explosion in capacities and creative uses of technology to amass information from a variety of indirect resources. The potential now exists for mass atrocity crimes to be identified and tracked through the application of remote sensing and information communication technologies.

A key conceptual and computational bridge must be crossed, however, before that potential can be fully realized. Massive amounts of data can now be gathered but extracting meaning from that mass requires the development of analytical frameworks and computational models that are informed by the empirical ways that human observers make sense of their world. This chapter argues that an essential element in this extraction of meaning from data is the development and use of visual patterns.

The argument in this chapter builds on the suggestion, advanced by many elsewhere, that visualization enhances the capacity to engage with large data sets, apprehend their main findings, and derive from that visual depiction a sense of patterns.¹ The intent here is to revitalize the notion that through the use of patterns, informal and experienced observers can interrogate an “apparent” fact picture, generate deeply relevant questions from that interrogation, and through further research, drive dozer to an understanding of what is actually going on, in a given place and time.

The specific focus of this chapter is to examine the potential of visual pattern recognition to expand our understanding of issues of human consequence in crisis settings, particularly major disasters and wars. This potential, once realized, could allow the humanitarian and policy worlds to recognize elements of evolving crises sooner and more coherently than we do now and thus support the development of more relevant and timely strategies than we have presently for mitigating the impact of these crises on human populations.

At the level of populations and population sub-groups, issues of human consequence include visual or visualized patterns of population movements and settlement, shelter options and conditions, population interaction with surface topography and terrain, population adjacency and access to sources of food and water, occurrence of and population response to threats and hazards (military, environmental, disease), and parameters of demographic and epidemiological stability and change.

bly be inferred from these population-based patterns, assuming aggregation of previous patterns and fine-grained political, historical, economic, and psychological analysis of what these patterns can tell us about individual and social perceptions, relationships, and choices.

The approach taken here draws eclectically from methods used in the empirical social and natural sciences, particularly those from demography, epidemiology, and geographical mapping techniques. It also invokes normative and analytical frameworks elaborated in law, political science, history, and social psychology, including international humanitarian and human rights law and constructs of human security.

Visualization as Analysis

Human beings apprehend information in visual modes and think about this information generatively in terms of visual adjacencies. These visual adjacencies of data points, which may be displayed in terms of time and geographical space, or in more abstracted relationships, form patterns in the mind's eye. The mind asks questions and raises hypotheses regarding these perceived adjacencies or patterns. These questions and hypotheses become more fully informed when experiences people provide information relating to context and offer interpretations of what is seen. Experienced people, by definition, have acquired a virtual library of patterns and can search, in the array of new data, for patterns that they may recognize from the past.

The use of patterns as a means of understanding the world of observed phenomena has a complex and eclectic history. The word itself, “pattern,” straddles different concepts and methods. Advances in mathematics and computational capacities have played significant roles in mobilizing methods of displaying vast amounts of data in visual format and demonstrating the independent intellectual power of pattern formation and recognition. Computer-enhanced graphing and mapping technologies have brought the question of patterns into the mainstream. We can now gather data and information in many categories, levels, and formats and we can increasingly geo-code virtually any of these data. The challenge now is to “make sense” of this flood of input from the empirical world.

The validity of a project that seeks to “make sense” of data gathered through indirect means is based on three premises:

- 1) That aspects of human consequence—where human beings act or are acted upon—occur in settings that can be characterized in terms of time and place.
- 2) That these aspects can be identified and assessed by gathering data of various kinds and interpreting them through the use of standard and evolving techniques of inference, hypothesis generation, and hypothesis confirmation through

iteration of results. These scientific methods, applied to qualitative or quantitative data, rely on probabilistic determinations of what is most likely to be the case, based on what we have seen before.²

3) That the opportunity to visualize these data, depicted in various modes once they have been gathered, leverages enhanced human powers of hypothesis generation and interpretation by strengthening the process of pattern recognition. Also, perhaps more important, visualization of data allows observers to apprehend, through immediate visualization of departures from the pattern that we expect to see, interesting new questions to address.

This chapter proceeds from these premises to argue that these aspects of human consequence, occurring in space and time, can be visualized directly through satellite or land-based imagery or displayed in graphical or mapping formats as reported in real time—prior to deliberate and methodological scientific data gathering and analysis. It is argued that the very act of visualizing these phenomena allows informed observers to discern patterns, raise questions about departure from patterns, and generate relevant hypotheses in advance of, or as substitute for, standard approaches to data acquisition and assessment.

The History

John Snow, in his investigation of the cholera outbreak in London in 1854, was an early adopter of the use of maps to interrogate data.³ He had compiled lists of deaths from cholera at the household level (number of deaths per day and per week) through the summer of that year and could have let his inquiry rest there. His genius was to incorporate the household data into the second dimension of geography, thus shifting the data to a map of the streets of London. The map, to his interpretive eye, revealed clusters of death around certain streets.

A number of possible explanations went through his mind and for various reasons were rejected as not fully accounting for the pattern that he was seeing. (His list of possibilities was wider than necessary since in those days before the germ theory had been established he was wrestling with a phenomenon—infectious disease—whose underlying dynamics were not yet understood.) Finally he hit on a water pump on Broad Street as the possible source of transmission. Deaths from cholera declined after the pump handle was removed, and his hypothesis, based on visualization of a pattern, was confirmed.

Snow is properly hailed as one of the foundational practitioners in public health (because he resorted to advocacy to get the pump handle removed on behalf of the public good) and as one of the founders of the field of epidemiology (where methods are developed to trace the

distribution and determinants of conditions and events affecting a given population over a defined time.)⁴ He is less renowned—perhaps we now take it for granted—for his technical creativity and intuition in realizing that if he could see the data arrayed in space, he might learn something further.

Development of Visual Analysis

The rapid growth of “applied” social science in the years leading up to and during World War II enlisted qualitative and quantitative methods to arrive at “best fit” simplifications of reality. In the years after 1945, amid mounting concerns about accelerating world instability and militarization, social scientists in the U.S. and elsewhere endeavored to understand the behavior and actions of the great powers. Subjects of special interest were the pace of military growth, spending, and strategies; descriptions and interpretations of economic and political trends; and ways to discern social behavior under stress and social attitudes, particularly discontents and latent hostilities.⁵ These efforts produced increasingly vast amounts of data and information, which demanded the development of analytical capacities and methods for making sense of the elements that were being gathered.

The search for ways in which data elements could be seen as related to each other, in some causal way or in some other important parameter, has been a long-standing aspect of scholarly activity, and this quest accelerated rapidly in the inter-war years. The field of war studies straddled at least three disciplines (history, sociology, and political science) and a focus on the use of quantitative methods and mathematical models emerged as inter- and intra-disciplinary debates.⁶

It is outside the scope of this chapter to attempt to recapitulate or assess these trends. It is relevant to note, however, that the methods of some of these early empiricists in the study of war did not include visualization, even in rudimentary forms such as charts or graphics. The results of their extensive data aggregation and quantitative modeling were not expressed in readily appreciable conceptual forms, hindering fruitful application in new settings. The opportunity for this crucial outcome—generating ideas that might form the basis for pattern formation, or aggregating data so that it suggested patterns—was not taken up. The failure to communicate visually was important in its own right but also reflective of a deeper incapacity, when one is faced with enormous amounts of data, to recognize how meaning is created and communicated.

An example of one such effort is the magisterial work, *A Study of War*, by Wright.⁷ Undertaken in the years after World War I and first published in 1942, this book endeavored to gather all facts and ideas relevant to a general theory of how wars come about and how they might be prevented. It is a grand effort, filled with categories, themes, and subthemes; and it is packed with detailed tables of quantitative information.

However, the book relies on few maps and its graphical depictions are infrequent and invariably hard to read. Deep in the appendices is a laboriously derived differential equation that presumably serves as the basis of his overall conclusion, expressed in abstract theoretical terms the cause of war results from disequilibrium within and among nations in four major categories (technology, law, social organization, and attitudes). Wright's book serves many purposes, but it does not offer generalizations of practical and testable value to apply in dynamic settings of unfolding conflict.

From the 1940s to the 1970s, when the applied social science scholarship was advancing, one needs to look somewhat strenuously to find early instances of the use of graphics to convey an abundance of empirical information in visual formats were not yet highly developed. According to Tufte, who speaks of the "graphically barren years from 1930 to 1970":

Much of the twentieth-century thinking about statistical graphics has been preoccupied with the question of how some amateurish chart might fool a naïve observer. Other important issues, such as the use of graphics for serious data analysis, were largely ignored. At the core of the preoccupation with deceptive graphics was the assumption that data graphics were mainly devices for showing the obvious to the ignorant. It is hard to imagine any doctrine more likely to stifle the intellectual progress in a field.⁸

It is of course the power of ideas rather than the deftness of a graphic that determines the durability and the influence of intellectual work. Yet, it is striking that two of the most influential scholars dealing with crises and war, Pitirim Sorokin and Raul Hilberg, both based in the evolving traditions of mid-twentieth century social science, did indeed grasp the need to convey their conceptualizations of processes and trends in visual forms.

Sorokin, a sociologist with protean empirical interests, and Hilberg, a documentary historian and political scientist, although contemporaries of Wright, each managed to avoid the turgidity and impenetrability of Wright's approach and certainly steered clear of the quantitative obscurantism of his disciple, Richard Barringer. Their research, compared to the efforts of Wright, was equally grounded in a broad and deep command of historical empirical detail, quantitative facts, and data sets. What distinguishes their work are three main features: a respect for the role of informed judgment and intuition in making sense of the data they amassed; a capacity to frame and intuition in making sense of the data they amassed; a capacity to frame information in the service of generative ideas and hypotheses regarding relationships among and between events; and a recognition that to transmit complex ideas there is sometimes nothing better than a good visual portrayal of the pattern of

relationships that had been discerned.

In this last aspect, their notion of pattern is one that is tied to what can be learned from visual depiction, not analytical depiction: it is a pattern of associational relationships, gathered inductively from masses of evidence and depicted in a graphical mode that empowers comprehension. Their patterns arise from what they see in this data, not from a theoretical relational model that data serve to validate.

In this classic study, *Man and Society Calamity*, Sorokin sets out to assess the impact of different kinds of historical calamities on human populations.⁹ His extensive research and previous writings (captured in twenty-six pages of notes), elegantly persuasive use of specific facts and lists, and eloquent generalizations combine to create a social panorama of centuries of distress that is at once convincing and deeply inquiring. Table 10-1, which encapsulates his research on the effects of famine on human behavior, conveys in a simple format an immense amount of information and brings to the surface a wide array of general observations that could form the basis for much in-depth study.

The categories are robust and useful. His findings provide guideposts for the initial framing of any information we might receive from a given famine region. In his research on famine, he found cannibalism to be extremely rare, whereas violations of basic honesty and fairness were highly variable. So were we to find, in a current famine area, reports of widespread cannibalism, we might initially mark these reports as perhaps exaggerated, requiring further probing. Yet if observers noted that up to 70 percent of the population had lied about ration cards, we might consider that information unexceptional.

Sorokin explores widely but thinks in patterns. His book is thus highly accessible to experts and general readers alike and it has served as a foundational trove of ideas and hypotheses for those who have followed.

Hilberg was the first historian to make methodical and exhaustive use of the German and Allied archives relating to the Holocaust. His masterful work, *The History of the Destruction of the European Jews*, was begun in 1948 and first published in 1961. In the preface, Hilberg states:

Only a generation ago, the incidents described in this book would have been considered improbable, infeasible, or even inconceivable. Now they have happened. The destruction of the Jews was a process of extremes. That, precisely, is why it is so important as a group phenomenon. That is why it can serve as a test of social and political theories. But to perform such tests, it is not enough to know that the Jews have been destroyed; one must also grasp how this deed was done. That is the story to be told in this book.¹⁰

Table 10-1. *How Famine Influences Our Behavior*

<i>Activities Induced by Starvation</i>	<i>Percentage of Population Succumbing to Pressure of Starvation</i>	<i>Percentage of Population Resisting Such Pressure</i>
Cannibalism (in non-cannibalistic societies)	Less than one third of 1 per cent	More than 99 per cent
Murder of members of family and friends	Less than 1 per cent	More than 99 per cent
Murder of other members of one's group	Not more than 1 per cent	Not less than 99 per cent
Murder of strangers who are not enemies	Not more than 2 to 5 per cent	Not less than 95 per cent
Infliction of various bodily and other injuries on members of one's social group	Not more than 5 to 10 per cent	Not less than 90 per cent
Theft, larceny, robbery, forgery, and other crimes against property which have a clear-cut criminal character	Hardly more than 7 to 10 per cent	Hardly less than 90 to 93 per cent
Violation of various rules of strict honesty and fairness in pursuit of food, such as misuse of rationing cards, hoarding, and taking unfair advantage of others	From 20 to 99 per cent depending upon the nature of the violation	From 1 to 80 per cent
Violation of fundamental religious and moral principles	Hardly more than 10 to 20 per cent	From 80 to 90 per cent
Violation of less important religious, moral, judicial, conventional, and similar norms	From 50 to 99 per cent	From 1 to 50 per cent
Surrender or weakening of most of the aesthetic activities irreconcilable with food-seeking activities	From 50 to 99 per cent	From 1 to 50 per cent
Weakening of sex activities, especially, coitus	From 70 to 90 per cent during prolonged and intense starvation	From 1 to 30 per cent
Prostitution and other highly dishonorable sex activities	Hardly more than 10 per cent	Hardly less than 90 per cent

Source: Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Man and Society in Calamity* (New York: Penguin, 1942), 81.

Hilberg's approach was to distill the details from every document, testimony, and fragment of evidence that he could find to describe that "process of extremes." As a historian, he dealt with the facts; as a political scientist, he sought patterns. A simple graphic (see figure 10-1) reveals, at the population level, the steps that the reigning authority took in what Hilberg defines as the "destruction process."


Here, in the most simple of figures, is the depiction in space as well as in time (since the steps are sequential), of a path that has now become forbiddingly familiar. And, providing empirical evidence of the "concentration" step, Hilbert tracks the progressive concentration of Jews in two Polish ghettos in 1941 (see table 10-2).

These steps (i.e., definition, concentration, etc.) we now recognize as a repeating pattern in genocide. Further research is needed to see if these steps also pertain to communally based instances of crimes against humanity. Human rights analysts have suggested that when a government begins to identify people on the basis of communal differences (race, ethnicity, language, religion, tribe, and caste), a process may be set in motion that leads to various restrictions on mobility, serious assaults on life and property, and forced migration or violent death.¹¹ In the field of genocide scholarship, a noted component of early warning is the specification and segregation of particular identity groups.¹²

The graphical depiction of complex data in visually accessible formats has been pursued to good effect in the realm of demography and epidemiology, but these are mid-twentieth century developments. The applications developed for diseases include geographical map notations and time-series. Maps (such as Snow's) appear to have preceded time-series charts, which twentieth century analysts have imposed on the tabulated data methodically gathered by earlier (fifteenth through nineteenth century) observers.¹³ Had Ignaz Semmelweis (a contemporary of Snow and the physician who uncovered the process by which puerperal fever was propagated and how it might be prevented) not left his data enmeshed in endlessly long and unreadable tables but instead had developed graphical charts, his crucial findings might have received a much earlier and more favorable hearing among his peers than they did.¹⁴

Epidemiological interest in the impact of war and crisis on human populations is a relatively recent development (apart from the work of visionaries such as Rudolf Virchow and Florence Nightingale).¹⁵ However, familiarity with analysis and display of large data sets has allowed epidemiologists now engaged with war to advance our understanding of this impact considerably. The techniques are widely diffused throughout the public health community and these professionals, when at work in humanitarian crises, gather and supply the data that can then be robustly analyzed in terms of incidence, prevalence, and trends. These data are usually depicted as graphics of mortality or morbidity, or disease incidence rates across time. It is the compilation of these graphics over time that provides the basis for pattern recognition.

Figure 10-1. Steps in the Destruction Process




Source: Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of European Jews* (New York, 1961), 39.

For example, the graphics from a landmark book, *Forced Migration and Mortality*, are presented below to show the refined U-shaped pattern of mortality experienced in flight to and settlement in refugee camps in response to famine.¹⁶ This pattern (see figure 10-2) is created from data recorded during many particular crises, in which public health personnel noted increased deaths as exhausted, ill, and malnourished people reached the camps, and that mortality declined as suitable health and nutrition measures were introduced. This pattern, familiar throughout the humanitarian community, is used as a tool to monitor whether effective interventions have been delivered in an appropriate time frame.

Compare this standard U-shaped pattern to the graph in figure 10-3, an age-sex specific graph of mortality across time from the Katala camp in Zaire in 1994. The slow and ineffectual humanitarian response to a cholera outbreak among the hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Rwandan genocide contributed to this high mortality outcome. It is markedly divergent from the age-specific death rate curves for stable populations in this part of Africa.¹⁷

These two graphics represent cumulative data sets, gathered from many observations over many years. They are, in fact, patterns of patterns. As such, these two graphs constitute adequate and robust depictions of recurrent demographic behaviors of populations in war and peace. Confronted with population mortality data from a new event, demographers, epidemiologists, and humanitarian authorities will compare the patterns captured in this new data set against the stan-

Figure 10-2. Model of Mortality Change in a Forced Migration Situation




Source: National Research Council, *Forced Migration and Mortality* (Washington, D.C., 2001), 11.

standard graphs of previously observed experiences of mortality and morbidity.

Confronted with population mortality data from a new event, demographers, epidemiologists, and humanitarian authorities will compare the patterns captured in this new data set against the standard graphs of previously observed experiences of mortality and morbidity. Departures from these standard patterns do not mean that the new data are wrong but that they are unexpected—and warrant vigorous analysis and if need be further data collection for verification and explanation.

Key among these standard processes is attention to data quality, as well as quantity. In crisis areas, information is not prospectively or routinely gathered; documents or incidental data sets may be available, but the usual case in crisis settings is that whatever information one needs, one must gather at the time. First, one should obtain contextual information and initial hypotheses from informed observers in the community and from international stakeholders who have been in the region for some time. One should then gather data from many different sources, with the intent to triangulate among these sources, and move quickly to display the data in visual formats. These formats can then be used for intellectual and analytical provocation. Looking at the graphic or provisional pattern elicits further questions and forces a check and re-check of the accuracy and validity of the data that have been gathered. At the same time, this

Figure 10-3. Age-Specific Death Rates for Rwandan Refugees in Katala Camp, Zaire, July 17–August 5, 1994, and for Coale-Demeny Life Table “West” Level 12



Source: National Research Council, *Forced Migration and Mortality* (Washington, D.C., 2001), 15.

of the data that have been gathered. At the same time, this examination enlists a search for possible explanations (hypothesis generation). Local observers may be prompted to inject into the discussion unexpected new sources of information relating to context or explanation. Repeating these steps iteratively winnows out serious flaws in data quality, adds further data quantity, and affirms major findings. This iterative process can result in rich data sets, whose descriptive and analytical power can best be expressed through visual patterns.

This process is ultimately probabilistic. Qualitative and quantitative data are gathered in a variety of ways. When they are arrayed in graphics and patterns, one can look for departures between what one has observed and what one might expect from previous instances (e.g., the patterns received experience, such as standard age-adjusted mortality curves). Departures from the expected will spark questions and point to the need for new explanations. And so the process continues.

In this empirical and inductive approach to finding out about the world, what we seek—the meaning we apply to the endeavor—is never understood to be the “truth.” That quest lies in other domains of inquiry. Nevertheless, people caught in war and disaster are confronted with and affected by a reality that the humanitarian and policy community seeks to understand. The successive steps outlined here help to develop a factual picture and interpretation through iterative analysis and pattern formation that seems, over time, to fit

best with the mix of externalities and choices that define the outcomes of flight, shelter, disease, death, loss, suffering, and survival that characterize populations in crisis.

Humanitarian Actors' Pattern Formation

In terms of data gathering and analysis, the relationship of humanitarian actors to information is distinct in many ways from that of social scientists. The data gathering task for humanitarians is more omnivorous, more based in real time, more tied to local input, more micro in geographic scope, and more limited in time frame. The data gathering is also problem-directed, aimed at uncovering issues that are already known to be vital aspects of threat or survival option for populations in crisis. In this sense, much of the effort to find data proceeds from mental patterns already held. We know that violent attacks on villages have been preceded or accompanied by systematic rape—has that been the experience in this new situation? Not knowing what to look for is, in these contexts, an error as grievous as not looking at all.

The data analysis is tethered more tightly to geographical and visual display, based on the assumption that people act in space as well as in time and on the need to grasp the data relatively quickly and comprehensively. Visual display permits that rapidity of data apprehension. Humanitarian actors value speed as well as accuracy and prize trenchant simplification. Pattern formation and pattern recognition provide ideal routes for direct understanding.

Patterns of events, a time series, patterns based within geographic maps, or patterns showing relationships in relation to other forms of relationships all furnish background understanding and context for the more particular set of interests that are the focus of the inquiry. Much of what we take to be knowledge or information is in the structure of “compared to what” or “what else is going on as well.” Patterns are ideal for those who are concerned about departures from the usual state of affairs, because these departures will show up as sentinel events. The presence of these instances, outside the normal curve or pattern, evokes, first of all, attention, and then, depending on whether there is an immediate explanation, further question. Patterns—as opposed to lists of numbers or narrative accounts—allow us to see the full picture, as well as the details within it, literally at a glance. Patterns of events can also be displayed in ways that support discernment of trends through time, transmission or passage of phenomena across space, and variations in degrees of intensity or frequency.

A great range of information from different fields is applicable to pattern formation in crisis mapping settings. The different categories of interest include, for example:

- Geography, human and natural
- Demography, current and past trends
- Social and cultural variables
- Weather conditions and trends
- Agricultural and livestock impacts on land and water

- Market, trade, travel, and financial dynamics
- Fuel and transportation routes
- Weapons design, use, impacts
- Human behavior under various kinds of stress
- History of previous conflicts and responses
- Known behavior of assailants
- Recent seasonal and crisis migrations

From the humanitarian perspective, the patterns of interest that emerge from data relating to these issues will array along the dimensions listed below:

- Sense of geography, settlement, and land use in terms of steady state pressures and options for flight, exit, and hiding
- Changes in settlement and land use when residents are under acute or long-lasting attack
- Dynamics that infringe upon human security, international humanitarian law, and human rights
- Human behavior (individual and group)
 - When at risk of or under attack;
 - In the context of ethnic cleansing and genocide;
 - In the context of fear or repression; and
 - In the context of restricted movement
- Parameters, indicators, and escalation scenarios for
 - Nation-state war fighting;
 - Nation-state counter-insurgency war fighting;
 - Sub-state war fighting; and
 - War crimes, crimes against humanity (ethnic cleansing, mass killings), and genocide

Information organized along these lines can create a mental framework of alert systems for humanitarian aid personnel. Pattern formation serves to produce recognition heuristics and structures that help each of us to interpret phenomena quickly and usually accurately. These heuristics bear conscious attention, whenever possible, because they need to be updated and revised as new insights are obtained.

A recent article on improving humanitarian efforts to protect civilians in conflict settings included guidance that does not convey—but reflects—patterns of experience that seasoned aid personnel have developed.¹⁸ Experts listed markets of community behavior that they knew had proved significant in many past operations and had proved sensitive to early degradations or improvements in civilian society (see table 10-3). Their effort was undertaken to prompt imagination and cognition; to support informed, natural observation; to guide newly arrived personnel; and to stimulate those who, through burn-out or fatigue, had ceased to take adequate notice of the perceptible nuanced shifts in their daily surroundings.

Methods for acquiring these data are varied, and the data may be subject to statistical analysis expressed as trend lines, scatter plot diagrams, as various detail levels of geo-

Table 10-3. Examples of Potential Markers of Civilian Protection
Commuting/Travel

Frequency and form of check-points, behavior of check-point staff, observed treatment of UN staff/NGO staff compared to local population
 Driver behavior (anxiety on particular routes or at check-points; requests to transport persons other than staff; evasive response to questions about choice of routes)
 Volume and type of traffic (time of day, type of cargo, reaction of civilians to passing military convoys)

Neighborhood/Community Appearance

Aggressive political slogans (graffiti, posters, official photographs)
 Visible armed presence of police/militia/military (interaction with civilian population, treatment in bars and restaurants, behavior of soldiers on R&R; particular attention to GBV in all of these behaviors)
 Weaponization of civilian population (people carrying guns and other weapons openly; guns, other weapons, and ammunition for sale in local markets; guns and other weapons in the homes of local staff)
 Mobility of local population around community, by road, foot, to collect food, water, herd animals, etc.
 Existence of formal or informal curfews
 Church/mosque/temple/school attendance decreased
 Evidence of children playing outdoors at all
 Farmers reluctant to travel to sell produce (crops not harvested, minimal road traffic, market days infrequent, and limited range of goods)

Social Interaction

Staff from local NGOs or administrative structures (teachers) not willing to be seen meeting with international humanitarian staff
 Open hostility from local community manifested in verbal abuses, assaults, graffiti, reluctance to do business
 Local staff or civilians prepared to discuss government/politics
 Translators reluctant to translate certain questions or work with certain staff members (reflecting community tensions or security fears)
 Staff reluctant to discuss certain issues on phone/via email

Local Media

Political type and content
 Tone, biases, availability
 Censorship

Local Bureaucracy

Contact with local officials (open and easily facilitated)
 Permissions for programming (bribery; predictability; conflicting requirements from different government departments; attempts to manipulate or direct programming)

Source: Groff Loane, Jennifer Leaning, Sara Scheming, Alexander van Tulleken, Kelli O'Laughlin. "Civilian Protection and Humanitarian Assistance – Report of the 2009 Civilian Protection Working

Group." *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, XXIV (2009), 200.

patial organization, or as qualitative associations and contextual understandings derived from inputs such as photographs or narratives that have been evaluated or tested by repetition through time.

Patterns can be expressed in two or three dimensions and be presented as static snapshots or across appropriate resolutions in time and space. A most important feature of pattern formation is that the data, to be robust or attentive to the kinds of issues we are concerned about, must be gathered or amassed from a rich array of sources. What is envisioned is that as the process of pattern formation and recognition matures, our capacity to identify a parsimonious set of highly relevant indicators will become increasingly more effective.

Darfur: 2003-2006

As the conflict in Darfur began to attract international attention, a prominent feature of discussion among policymakers and humanitarians related to the dimensions of the war, its conduct, and the apparent targets of attack. Allegations of grave atrocities perpetrated by proxy soldiers (janjaweed) of the government of the Sudan began to surface, along with charges that their targets were black Africans from African tribes. Early observers in Darfur managed to sound the alarm, and Darfuri villagers, fleeing attacks on their homes and families, arrived as refugees in Chad and began to give riveting testimony about what had happened to them.

The need to obtain information about the conflict, including possible parameters of war crimes and specifics relating to the humanitarian needs of the affected population, loomed large at the onset of this war early in 2003 and continues to perplex the outside world. The government in Khartoum proved successful early on in restricting access, limiting information flows, and punishing local and international personnel who dared to counter the bland official denials and outright lies. How many people were dying and from what causes? Were their farms and villages being destroyed? Was there evidence of targeting of populations on the basis of defined characteristics? Were large numbers of women and young children being raped? What health and nutrition needs could be identified and how could food supplies be assessed over time?

Frustration with this profound information blockade, which hindered many forms of substantive and political response from the international community, propelled the quest for indirect means, methods, and technologies for finding out what was going on. How might people get in to report out? What means could people inside use to communicate to the outside? What indirect indicators or factors might be used to get at the questions of interests? How could we gain systematic knowledge from Chadian refugees? What could be learned from the air? Who was flying over Sudan? What satellite information was already available, and how could more be acquired were there political will to do so?

The Darfur crisis, more than any other in the last ten years, has cast into stark relief the capacity of an oppressive and rapacious state to block the light of independent scrutiny. The Sudan is not a small or isolated country, remote or meager in terms of international commerce, travel, or diplomatic engagement. Yet for almost eight years it has successfully prevented the compilation of a comprehensive and accurate account of how its war in Darfur has affected the nearly 8 million people of that region.

Interference with the usual information pathways led to a number of developments in pattern formation and crisis mapping.¹⁹ Humanitarians first relied on familiar tactics to try to obtain reliable quantitative and qualitative information from the affected population through survey methods, questionnaires, and focus groups. The problems with these approaches were numerous. For example, access within Darfur was so uncertain, limited, and insecure that no adequate sampling system could be developed and adhered to for the time it would take to reach but a small number of people in a given affected area. Transport and terrain were similar hindrances to those trying to reach refugees in Chad and no group developed a sampling mode that permitted generalizations beyond the population of one refugee camp there. The government of Sudan closely managed official visits from international authorities. The authorities' subsequent reports, transmitted in diplomatic understatement, reflected the constraints on independent ascertainment.

In the breach, a number of information gathering techniques were honed or newly attempted. Human rights organizations and, to some extent, humanitarian organizations began to ask new questions relating to experiences of populations during their flight, since it became apparent from refugees' and internally displaced persons' testimonies that the struggle to escape and to survive in the punishing environment of Darfur and eastern Chad exacted a heavy toll. Photographs were used to convey context in the absence of witnesses or key informants. People who had re-congregated in marginally safer areas were asked to draw maps of their village and to recount what had happened to them. Major governments and international institutions also expanded their mapping capacities (often relying on satellite imagery) in an attempt to transmit a common understanding of current updates and share concerns regarding access, unreached populations, and food supplies. Within international civil society, all forms of existing information and communication technology (ICT), such as cell phones, and all remote sensing imagery in the public domain were leveraged to extract whatever findings might be relevant.

Maps

The influential maps of Darfur that the Humanitarian Information Unit of the U.S. Department developed are familiar to all who have worked on the Darfuri conflict in the recent years. The example here illustrates the strengths of this graphic (geographical accuracy based on satellite imagery; topog-

Figure 10-4. *Eastern Chad and Darfur, Sudan: IDP/R and Confirmed Damaged/Destroyed Villages*



raphy, major roads, and seasonal acidity; some information on refugee camps in Chad; and updated visuals depicting the extensive assault on villages throughout Darfur). The political boundaries in the region are not clearly shown; nor is any attempt made to convey population density. What was striking about this map, when it appeared in its first iteration, were the flaming images of destroyed or partly destroyed villages. Analysts in the humanitarian and human rights community embraced these images and then struggled to make further interpretive use of them. Satellite images could portray geo-referenced locations and intensity of fires, but could not provide information relating to the tribal or ethnic affiliation of the villages that had been attacked. It was known that people clustered in villages based on communal identity (tribes and clans of Arab or African Darfuris), but no data existed (in libraries, on old maps, or in documents or published literature from anthropologists or historians) regarding the geo-spatial coordinates of villages that had been studied in the past. Hence, it was impossible to use satellite imagery to make the case one way or the other relating to the communal dimensions of the conflict.

When talking with individuals or groups who may have been harmed, human rights investigators have found that the drawing of maps is among the most generative prods to memory and narrative. In virtually all cultures, local people can trace a map on the sand or a piece of paper of their vil-

Figure 10-5. Janjaweed Attack on Furawiya



Source: Physicians for Human Rights, 2005.

lage or local area; and they can superimpose on that map the direction of attack, the flight path that they took, the major sites of interest and value (storage homes, markets, religious and other public areas, fields, stables, and pastures); and major and minor roads, paths, and sources of water. On that map they can also depict what was destroyed, the livestock killed or stolen, and the locations of killings and atrocities. As one person draws the map, the stories spill out, with others in the group adding details, pointing to areas on the maps where the first narrator, the first cartographer, had not provided information or had not been a witness to events.

Clearly, human beings seem wired to tell stories in place as well as in time. In fact, it has proven useful when asking people about close sequences of events in time to ask them to draw a map, and to query them exactly about where they were in relation to each event being described. Invariably, prompted by a visual graphic, people become more precise in their chronologies and provide richer detail of what happened to them at a particular point in time. If this kind of mnemonic does not result in fuller information, one has grounds to question the psychological and cognitive status of the witness (perhaps traumatized, perhaps still deeply fearful) or the person's veracity. Shown on the previous page is a hand-drawn map—a page from the notebook of an investigator for Physicians for Human rights, who in February 2005 gathered information from a group of male refugees in Chad about the details of an attack that drove them from their Darfur village of Furawiya. Several men participated in sketching and filling in the map as they recounted what happened at each site along the path of the janjaweed assault (tracked by the arrow).

Photographs

The role that photographs play in establishing the plausibility of an event, as relayed in verbal reports or news stories, has been extensively debated, with concerns raised about selection bias and other forms of subjectivity (and not including newer issues related to digital enhancement).²⁰ Yet from another perspective, photographs, when taken and interpreted with an informed eye, can yield important insights about the context in which the reported events are said to have occurred. What does it mean, in terms of daily experience, to say that the conflict of Darfur arose over disputes about dwindling resources? Why do women in particular have a difficult time escaping hot pursuit as they run into the bush after village attacks?

The photograph on the next column, taken on the Chad-Darfur border in May 2004, captures two camels in tow after a day out gathering firewood. Significant features of this photograph, when described by an informed observer, permit the elaboration of an argument relating to environmental resource constraints and environmental degradation in this region. Note that the camels are not carrying a full load. The paltry pile of firewood on each of the camels suggests a real scarcity of fuel. The shape and leaf formation of the trees support that inference. It is early rainy season and leaves have sprouted, but the branches are tiny against a relatively heavy trunk and branch structure. The photograph has captured a feature that is common in deforested areas marked still by some element of social stability. People abide by a conservation etiquette: they will cut small amounts of wood from adolescent-size branches but leave the trunk and the early shoots alone so that each season there is still some wood to harvest. A third element in this photograph is harder to grasp as it relates to the condition of the soil. This terrain, when viewed at a distance and not traversed on foot, may look relatively unpopulated. Up close, however, the fine sandy soil is crisscrossed as far as the eye can see by numerous human and animal footprints. It is finely interspersed with the dust of animal dung. Already, in mid-2004, this land had reached its carrying capacity for human populations while the refugees from Darfur had barely begun to arrive there.

In the photograph on the next page, the four women fleeing an attack on their village are easy to spot and pick off, given the bleak terrain and lack of cover. A wider shot would have underscored this observation even further. But the vulnerability of these women derives in large measure from another factor, discernible at this resolution. Three of the four women are carrying at least one child.

It takes a great deal in most cultures struck by war or disaster for women to abandon their children. This generalization might well be supported by citation but it is so regularly affirmed in the experiences of humanitarian actors that it is taken as a given. Sorokin, after exhaustive trawling of recorded experiences, reported that under 0.3 percent of people at



John Stefferman, Physicians for Human Rights



Brian Stoville

the extreme edge of starvation resorted to cannibalism. That generalization forms the basis for pattern recognition. Similarly, this generalization (less academically substantiated) forms the basis for another pattern: The attachment of motherhood slows a woman down.

The information conveyed in this photograph not only supports that pattern but provides additional insight into why women are so particularly and consistently caught when the janjaweed go after them on horseback. They are of course not as physically strong or as fast as their male counterparts. But they also are always, or in many cases, encumbered by at least one child. In regions of relatively high fertility, a woman is very likely to be burdened by at least two of the following reproductive conditions: she may be pregnant, nursing an infant, carrying a baby who cannot yet walk, or holding the hand of a toddler. The physical concomitants of motherhood, as well as the psychological, make escape unlikely.

Alternative interpretations of these images could well challenge the contextual information gleaned from these photographs. That is the strength of the process of pattern formation. Hypotheses are generated, further information from many sources could and should be sought, and based on that further information, the hypotheses are refined. The point here is that the kind of hypothesis generated from these photographs is different from what one might develop upon reading a narrative text of environmental conditions in eastern Chad and Darfur (both areas known to be parts of the same diminishing ecosystem) or from a woman survivor who recounted what she and her sister had been through. Human beings choose to act or are acted upon in relation to their natural and lived environment. The verbal or textual account provides a linear subjectivity, with a focus on what is being reported; the photograph provides a contextual subjectivity, a visual panorama of the setting and circumstance in which the action is taking place. Robust pattern formation, in the context of conflict mapping, will need inputs from both categories. The effort is to situate every data point in the

Graphics

Graphics with quantitative content can employ images to differentiate among items and to convey relative size and proportionality. They can also communicate the meaning or value of these items in terms that are compelling because they are non-verbal. For example, in Darfur, families were reduced to half their size and lost large numbers of livestock in the attacks on their villages and the flights to Chad. Livestock are sources of wealth, food, and transport and are highly valued in all Darfuri communities. These losses were captured in a graphic in a Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) report, wherein the average number of survivors of each kind (humans by age and sex and animals by species) is depicted in a dark shade and the average number killed or missing is in lighter shades.²¹ The cumulative impact is to show the force of numbers and the extinction of many members of the household that had grown up and lived in one land and now, attacked and dispersed, were forced to find their way in another.


The graphic developed for the PHR report on Darfur was influential in shaping the graphic for a New York Times cover story on the magnitude of deaths in the long-term standing war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.²² The point conveyed in this graphic (see figure 10-4) is the large proportion of civilian deaths (women, children, and elderly) dying of causes secondary to the chronic instability and disruption wrought by years of war.

Both of these graphics were based on quantitative data, gathered and analyzed by careful epidemiological methods of sample surveys. Other ways to display these data (histograms, pie charts, and line plots) would have drained the social, psychological, and emotional meaning of these numbers. In war, perhaps more than in other circumstances, numbers tell only part of the story.

As graphics, numbers provide a pattern of what to look for

Figure 10-6. *Nonviolent Deaths in Congo's War Zone*

For every violent death in Congo's war zone ...



Source: © New York Times Graphics. Based on International Rescue Committee; printed in Marc Lacey, "Beyond the Bullets and Blades," *New York Times* (20 March 2005).

in certain kinds of wars. Wars that involve an armed force deliberately targeting a sub-population will result in massive human and material losses. Those conflicts among armed groups that persist for years in the same wide area and which may also include targeting of civilian populations include a number of civilian deaths for every combatant killed.

Satellite Imagery

Flourishing possibilities to improve our understanding of a vast range of phenomena through remote sensing are now carrying over into the field of crisis mapping. Pattern formation and recognition are central tools for interpretation of satellite maps, although much that is seen is not yet sufficiently understood for stable and robust generalizations, even in military circles where this technology has been remarkably developed and long-deployed. In the case of Darfur, a creative use of satellite imaging and historical overlays of several bands, including infra-red, has demonstrated an increase in the vegetation that livestock have consumed in the areas of destruction and devastation.²³ Such independently derived observations validate refugee and humanitarian observers' reports of the slaughter or capture of animals at the time of attacks.

As satellite images become more available for general use

(and historical data are now moving on line) the technological wings of the humanitarian community will begin to engage actively in the task of developing patterns relevant for early warning of mass atrocities.

Conclusion

Human beings and natural systems vary infinitely but general rules regarding their behavior and interactions are increasingly well understood. These generalities permit functional and essential simplifications to support the inductive process of acquiring knowledge and assessing situations. Pattern formation constitutes a creative means of developing candidate generalizations and pattern recognition provides a potent approach to simplification. Visualization in time and place fosters pattern development and hypothesis generation. Since data exist to generate patterns of almost infinite complexity and detail, human experience and contextual knowledge—plausibility of relationships and historical perspective—will always be needed to provide ongoing skeptical interrogation of presumptive patterns.

The quest for such means to organize and simplify information in the field of crisis early warning and early intervention is long-standing and urgent.²⁴ The capacity to generate patterns, when harnessed to the potential of emerging ICT and remote sensing technologies, presents the humanitarian and early warning communities with new assessment possibilities in real and actionable time frames. It has been often asserted that lack of political will rather than lack of information has constrained international policy development and response in the face of impending wide-scale mass atrocities, such as crimes against humanity. Accelerating advances in pattern formation linked to new technologies of ascertainment, display, and communication will, in the next several years, provide more opportunities to test that assertion. The aim among those pressing these advances is to make it much more difficult to say that in the face of information about mass atrocity crimes, we did not know enough soon enough to act decisively.

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The International Campaign to End Genocide: A Review of Its First Ten Years

Gregory H. Stanton

Genocides, politicides and other mass murders killed more people in the twentieth century than all the wars combined. "Never again" turned into "Again and again." Again and again, the response to genocide and other forms of mass murder was too little and too late.

Yet until 1999 there was no international movement on the order of an Amnesty International dedicated to ending genocide in the twenty-first century. I will describe Genocide Watch's efforts to create such a movement, and will make some proposals about where we should go from here.

Genocide Watch

In 1985, Leo Kuper and Martin Ennals founded International Alert Against Genocide and Massacres. They hoped to start a movement against genocide, but Leo soon became frustrated when International Alert lost its focus on genocide. IA has done very good work on conflict resolution and early warning, although it has never declared an 'international alert.' In the late '80's, Leo Kuper and I went to New York together to meet with the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch to propose the formation of a new organization to be called Genocide Watch, to begin as a project of Human Rights Watch. We hoped it would be sponsored by an already existing human rights organization with a solid financial base, so that it would not have to go through all the start-up time and costs of founding a new, free-standing organization. Unfortunately, the Executive Director did not have time to meet with us, so we had coffee with an intern - a very bright intern who later worked in the Legal Advisers office at the State Department, but who did not convince his Executive Director to adopt the project.

I never gave up on the idea. In June of 1998, I wrote a proposal for a 501(c)(3) to be incorporated as Genocide Watch. Its purpose would be to lead an international campaign to end genocide made up of a coalition of human rights, religious, legal, and civil society NGO's from around the world. I took the proposal around to a number of organizations in Washington, D.C. The International Crisis Group, the group I thought could best lead the movement, was going through financial and leadership crises of its own. Human Rights Watch already had too many other special projects. It didn't fit within Amnesty International's 'mandate.' So Genocide Watch, Inc. was incorporated in 1998 in order to organize and coordinate an international coalition against genocide.

At the Hague Appeal for Peace in May, 1999, a coalition of ten organizations from the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Israel co-founded a new coalition called the Campaign to End Genocide. The coalition included Genocide Watch (USA), The World Federalist Association (USA), The Cambodian Genocide Program, GenNet (USA), International Alert, Physicians for Human Rights (UK), The Leo Kuper Foundation (UK), The

Committee for an Effective International Law (Germany), The Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide (Israel), and Prevent Genocide International (USA).

Having observed the successes of the NGO coalitions that had helped bring about the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court and the International Treaty to Ban Landmines, we thought the best model of organization for the movement was a coalition. However, those movements also had secretariats sponsored by one of their founding members and each was led by a brilliant organizer (Bill Pace and Jodie Williams, respectively) with a full-time salary from a sponsoring organization. The World Federalist Association (USA) agreed to play that role for the Campaign to End Genocide, although the motion passed at the July 1999 meeting of its Executive Committee by only one vote. At the same meeting, Tim Barner, the original backer of the Campaign, was ousted from his job.

In March 2000, the new President and CEO of the World Federalist Association - U.S.A., John Anderson, reversed the previous decision of the WFA-USA Executive Committee, ordered me to work exclusively with U.S. organizations, and ordered me to terminate my work with the overseas groups who made up a majority of the members of the Campaign to End Genocide. I therefore resigned from my job with the World Federalist Association, U.S.A. in order to continue the renamed International Campaign to End Genocide. WFA-USA's actions were a temporary setback for the international movement. We lost the organizational base that WFA-USA had given us - the office, equipment, personnel system, and salary, however meager, for the people working on the Campaign. There was no office space for interns. There was no organizational and accounting history to use in fund-raising. But on the other hand, we were freed from the control of an organization whose primary purpose is the promotion of world governance, not the prevention of genocide. We learned from the experience that the movement must be led by an organization whose sole purpose is genocide prevention.

Genocide Watch continued to coordinate the International Campaign. Every member of the original international campaign except the World Federalist Association-USA and WFA's affiliate, the Campaign for UN Reform, remained a member of the International Campaign to End Genocide. The International Campaign's Steering Committee met in London in October 2000 to plan future directions and outreach to other groups. The Aegis Trust joined the International Campaign then, and the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship Global Mission also joined, the first religious group to do so. Directors of our member organizations met again in London in January 2002 and again during the meetings of the International Association of Genocide Scholars meetings in Ireland in June 2003. By then we had twenty member organizations and a Board of Advisors that includes many of the world's

most prominent experts on genocide.

Genocide Watch and the International Campaign to End Genocide monitor the world for early warning signs of genocide and other mass killing and declare Genocide Alerts when such signs are found. We utilize the Eight Stage model I developed at the State Department in 1996 to monitor trends that could lead to genocide or mass killing. We are eclectic and also rely on the expert knowledge of analysts like Barbara Harff, Ted Gurr, Ben Valentino, and Matthew Krain. We rely on field reports from people on the ground from the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and members in the Campaign such as the Minority Rights Group and Survival International. And we sweep the world press daily using algorithms used by Open Source Solutions, an organization that the State Department hired under David Scheffer to provide him with reports for his Atrocities Task Force.

When we detect signs of precursors of genocide or other threats of mass killing, we mobilize member organizations of the International Campaign as well as other human rights and religious groups to educate key governments and the United Nations about potential or actual genocides or genocidal massacres. We seek to quickly create the political will among such governments to take action to prevent and stop atrocities. Most of our interventions have been with people we know in governments, and are conducted without publicity, except that we maintain a website www.genocidewatch.org to alert the public to threats of violence.

The International Campaign to End Genocide

The International Campaign to End Genocide is an international coalition dedicated to creating the international institutions and the political will to end genocide. We have four goals:

1. The provision of public information on the nature of genocide and creation of the political will to prevent and end it.
2. The creation of an effective early-warning system to alert the world and especially the U.N. Security Council, NATO and other regional alliances to potential ethnic conflict and genocide.
3. The establishment of a powerful United Nations rapid response force in accordance with Articles 43-47 of the U.N. Charter, as well as regional rapid response forces, and international police ready to be sent to areas where genocide threatens or has begun.
4. Effective arrest, trial, and punishment of those who commit genocide, including the early and effective functioning of the International Criminal Court, the use of national courts with universal jurisdiction, and the creation of special international tribunals to prosecute perpetrators of genocide.

The Campaign is a de-centralized, global effort of many organizations. In addition to its work for institutional

reform of the United Nations and regional organizations, its aim is to bring pressure upon governments that can act on early warnings of genocide through the U.N. Security Council, NATO, and other means. The Campaign is gradually establishing an informal, unclassified NGO early warning system on its members' websites and listservs, including www.genocidewatch.org, www.crisisgroup.org, www.aegitrust.org, www.survivalinternational.org, www.minorityrights.org, www.genocideintervention.net and other websites. Bypassing the secrecy of government intelligence services, the Campaign hopes to facilitate establishment of truly confidential communication links that will allow relief and health workers, whistle-blowers, and ordinary citizens to create an alternative open source intelligence network that will warn of ethnic conflict before it turns into genocide.

The International Campaign to End Genocide works to create political will through:

1. Consciousness raising -- maintaining close contact with policy makers in key governments, particularly of U.N. Security Council members, providing them with information about genocidal situations.
2. Coalition formation -- working in coalitions to respond to specific genocidal situations and involving members in campaigns to educate the public about solutions.
3. Policy advocacy -- preparing options papers for action to prevent genocide in specific situations, and presenting them to policy makers.

Genocide Alerts

The first Genocide Alert declared by Genocide Watch and the International Campaign was in September, 1999, when Indonesian troops and militias began genocidal massacres against the people of East Timor after they had voted for independence in a U.N. sponsored referendum. East Timor was at stage six on the eight stage scale months before the referendum because of 'trial massacres' and assassinations characteristic of that stage. Immediately following the referendum stage seven genocidal massacres began. Crisis Groups were organized in Washington, D.C. and London to divide up the tasks of education, lobbying, and humanitarian response. In Washington, they included Genocide Watch, Amnesty International, the Asia-Pacific Center for Peace and Justice, Catholic Relief Services, the International Crisis Group, Mennonites, Human Rights Watch, and the East Timor Action Council. The first meeting in Washington was opened by Nobel Peace Prize winner José Ramos-Horta.

We set five goals: 1. Get an international peacekeeping force into East Timor. 2. Get aid to the refugees and the displaced. 3. Get a special session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights convened in Geneva. 4. Get a U.N. Commission of Inquiry appointed to investigate the atrocities. 5. Get a criminal tribunal created to try those who committed crimes against humanity.

Crisis Group members lobbied the U.S. government, I.M.F., World Bank, and the governments of the U.K.,

France, and Australia, along with members of the U.N. Security Council. Genocide Watch concentrated on the government of Australia because of personal contacts it had with the Australian Embassy and Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra. Amnesty International took the lead in lobbying members of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and succeeded by one vote in getting the special session called, only the fourth in the Commission's history. The U.S., I.M.F., and World Bank told Indonesian President Habibie that international financial assistance would end if he did not accept a peacekeeping force in East Timor. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called General Wiranto and told him to call off his troops or be held accountable.

The President of Genocide Watch drafted an options paper on creation of a criminal tribunal for East Timor that was widely circulated in the U.S. State and Defense Departments and National Security Council, as well as to the governments of the U.K., France, Australia, and U.N. Security Council members. The day after U.K. International Campaign board members Bernie Hamilton (Leo Kuper Foundation) and Peter Hall (Physicians for Human Rights) presented the paper to the British Foreign Ministry, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook publicly supported creation of an international criminal tribunal for East Timor.

Most of our goals for East Timor were met. With Indonesian acquiescence, Australia sent in a U.N. authorized peacekeeping force. Catholic Relief Services took the lead in organizing relief for refugees. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights appointed a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the atrocities committed in East Timor. It recommended creation of a tribunal in East Timor, which tried some of those who committed crimes. (However, Indonesia has used its national courts to exonerate all but a few of those responsible.) A U.N. peace and reconstruction operation was authorized by the Security Council, and it has made major contributions to rebuilding East Timor.

In February 2000, Genocide Watch issued a Genocide Alert for the Eastern Congo where Hema and Lendu have repeatedly conducted genocidal massacres during a Congolese civil war that has cost at least three million lives. Genocide Watch held meetings for several years with U.S. government officials about the continuing crisis in Eastern Congo. Genocide Watch also issued Genocide Alerts for Southern Sudan (November, 2000) where a north – south civil war caused the deaths of two million people, and for Darfur (March 2004); Indonesian Borneo (March 2001) where Dayaks engaged in genocidal massacres of Madurese; Taliban Afghanistan (May 2001) where the Taliban issued an edict requiring Hindus to wear yellow patches of cloth and to identify their houses with yellow cloth markers; Zimbabwe (February 2002) where Shona militias engaged in murder of Matabele political opponents in the 1980's and were again torturing and murdering members of the Movement for Democratic Change and denying food aid to those without membership cards in Mugabe's ZANU-PF political party.

Genocide Watch issued another Genocide Alert for Côte d'Ivoire (December 2002) where a civil war divided the north and west from the south, and the foreign laborer population, which comprises a quarter of the total, was vilified and massacred. ICEG member, Prévention Génocides in Belgium made a film about the situation in Côte d'Ivoire which it showed both on Ivorian television and at the French Foreign Ministry, and it led the call for intervention and a negotiated peace in that country. It placed an advertisement in *Le Monde* in December 2002 signed by over 3000 human rights advocates from around the world. The French were therefore prepared to act quickly when Côte d'Ivoire descended into civil war, and they established a demilitarized zone dividing the north and south. Genocide Watch and Survivor's Rights International met with State Department officials to support that effort. The President of Genocide Watch, who had lived for four years in Côte d'Ivoire as a Peace Corps Volunteer and as a Fulbright researcher attached to the University of Abidjan, personally knew both President Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, one of the most incendiary rabble rousers. He obtained Goudé's cell phone number through a friend and called him directly to warn him that he could be tried by the International Criminal Court. Goudé toned down and eventually stopped his speeches. After he was appointed UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, Juan Mendez made a similar call to President Gbagbo to remind him that he could be tried by the ICC, and Ivorian National Radio immediately stopped broadcasting attacks on 'non-Ivoirians.' It was an example of preventive action at its best, not through the use of military force, but through legal deterrence.

Several other situations have warranted ongoing Genocide Watch attention, in particular: Burundi; Macedonia; Nepal; Gujarat, India; Nigeria, Brazil, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and North Korea. Genocide Watches and background articles are available on the Genocide Watch website. We have prepared briefing papers for use by policy makers in their meetings with key foreign leaders involved in violent conflicts. These Alerts have been circulated by FAX and e-mail to policy makers in the U.S. and Europe and have been posted on our members' websites. In October 2001, Genocide Watch co-sponsored a conference in Harare, Zimbabwe on Genocide Prevention and Peace-Building with the Council of Churches of Southern Africa and the Cooperative Baptist Fellowship. The conference was attended by ninety leaders of church denominations from eleven countries in southern Africa as well as representatives of the Islamic and Jewish faiths. Also in 2001, Genocide Watch went to Stockholm and Macedonia (twice) with interfaith leaders to lobby Albanian Muslim and Macedonian Christian leaders to settle their differences and prevent civil war in Kosovo from spilling over the border. The U.N.'s small, but effective, Peacekeeping Operation of just 400 troops established a buffer zone between Kosovo and Macedonia that was one of the best examples of U.N. prevention of violent conflict. When China vetoed continuation of the UN Peacekeeping Operation, NATO took up the operation.

Genocide Watch continued its work with key policy makers

on Darfur, Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, and Chechnya. Genocide Watch regularly attended the meetings of the Chechnya working group at Freedom House and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. As a representative of the State Department, the President of Genocide Watch attended all the monthly meetings of the Burundi Policy Forum, which later became the Great Lakes Policy Forum, established by Search for Common Ground, the Council on Foreign Relations, SAIS, and the Carnegie Endowment. Members of the ICEG were also active in the coalitions concerned with the African Great Lakes region in Washington, D.C. and in Brussels.

Ethiopia had been high on the Genocide Watch list since 1999, due to its senseless war with Eritrea, and repressive mono-ethnic minority domination of its government and military. In December 2003, Ethiopian Defense Forces and militias massacred 434 Anuak leaders in the provincial capital of Gambella Province, and continued the massacres for weeks afterwards, killing a total of over 1000 people. The Anuak have the bad luck to live over a rich oilfield and on some of the lushest farmland in Ethiopia. Chinese, Indian, Saudi and other investors have leased Anuak land from the corrupt Meles regime for very low prices and the regime wants to drive the Anuak off their traditional lands. Genocide Watch and Survivors' Rights International tried to get inquiries conducted by the major human rights organizations without success, so turned to several churches in Minnesota with numerous Anuak members, and raised the money to conduct two trips and write two reports on the massacres. The reports uncovered incontrovertible evidence of central government planning of the massacres.

On the day he first learned of the massacres, December 23, 2003, the President of Genocide Watch immediately contacted the desk officer for Ethiopia at the State Department, who in turn alerted the American Ambassador, Aurelia Brazeal. She sent a political officer and US Marines to Gambella to investigate the deaths of two US citizens of Anuak origin. Her strong protests to President Meles Zenawi finally brought the massacres to a halt, but not before thousands of Anuak had fled to refugee camps in Sudan. Human Rights Watch eventually followed up with a report a year later that confirmed the findings of the Genocide Watch/Survivors' Rights International reports. (It is the only report generally mentioned by reporters.) In 2005, the Meles regime sent Ethiopian troops across the border into Sudan to attack an Anuak refugee camp, but a satellite phone call from the camp to the President of Genocide Watch set in motion a late night call to the Ethiopian desk officer at the State Department, who called the US Ambassador, who went to President Meles and demanded that he withdraw his troops from Sudan. The attack was thus averted, though the departing Ethiopian troops killed a number of people on their route of retreat. Since then, Genocide Watch has helped the Anuak form the Anuak Justice Council, which has become a member of the International Campaign, and its leader, Obang Metho has testified before the UN Commission on Human Rights, British and Canadian Parliaments, and other world fora. He has organized the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia, and Genocide Watch has spoken at a number of

Watch has spoken at a number of its meetings and rallies.

The International Crisis Group joined the International Campaign in 2003, as did the Minority Rights Group, and Survival International. Each of those organizations have strong international field staffs and expertise in early warning and advocacy. By 2005, the International Campaign to End Genocide (ICEG), had grown to twenty member organizations, with offices in nine countries, and in 2010, the Campaign has over thirty member organizations in eleven countries on five continents. Members of the International Campaign to End Genocide have taken the lead in responding to several genocidal situations. Survivor's Rights International helped form the Sudan War Crimes Working Group in Washington, DC. The Aegis Trust has hosted numerous conferences on the Holocaust and genocide, has constructed a remarkable memorial museum in Kigali, Rwanda, and has organized an all-party parliamentary working group on genocide prevention in the British parliament, which became the model for a similar working group in the Canadian parliament. Aegis has also formed student groups throughout the UK, and each year leads the UK's remembrance of the Holocaust.

The International Association of Genocide Scholars

In 2005 the President of Genocide Watch was elected First Vice President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), and became IAGS President from 2007 - 2009. IAGS meetings became venues for meetings of the International Campaign's member organization leaders. Genocide Watch interns maintained the Genocide Watch website and created the IAGS website as an avenue for communication between its members and the general public. As President of the IAGS, the President of Genocide Watch incorporated the IAGS, instituted proper financial and accounting procedures, and advocated both a scholarly and activist role for the IAGS. He planned and directed the IAGS biennial conferences in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2007 (attended by 500 people) and George Mason University in 2009. The IAGS Journal of Genocide Studies and Prevention has become one of the most respected professional journals of genocide scholarship, and its emphasis on prevention sets it apart from the other major Journal of Genocide Research. The IAGS President worked for rapprochement with the International Network of Genocide Scholars, which will be consummated in the coming year. The IAGS President gave numerous speeches in the U.S., Europe, and Africa promoting the IAGS and the ICEG and explaining genocide early warning and prevention through understanding the stages of the genocidal process.

The U.N. Secretary General's Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide

For its first three years a central goal of the ICEG was ratification of the Rome Treaty of the International Criminal Court. When the ICC Treaty entered into force in July 2002, the ICEG shifted its main focus to creation of a position of Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General for the Prevention of Genocide. The President of Genocide

Watch and the Chairman of the Board of the International Campaign met with U.N. officials in October 2002 to promote the establishment of a permanently staffed Genocide Prevention 'Focal Point' (as we first termed it) on the policy planning staff of the U.N. Secretary General. In a paper presented to the Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide in January 2004, the President of Genocide Watch proposed appointment of a 'Special Representative for Genocide Prevention' in the U.N. Department of Political Affairs. He had shared the paper in advance with the Policy Planning staff and speechwriter for the Secretary General. Secretary General Kofi Annan responded positively to this idea and announced at the Stockholm Forum, and again at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights commemoration of the Rwandan genocide in April 2004, that he would name a Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide. In the summer of 2004, he appointed Mr. Juan Mendez to this position. Mr. Mendez had a distinguished career in the promotion of human rights, and we regarded his appointment as a major step toward improving the United Nations' work in preventing genocide. We advocated turning the position into a full-time appointment when Dr. Francis Deng became the second Special Advisor, and also advocated considerably increasing his staff.

Genocide Watch has also advocated institutional ways to support the work of the Special Advisor, including the establishment of a Genocide Advisory Group of experts on genocide prevention, and a Genocide Prevention Center to provide independent assessments to the Office of the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide. The Hungarian government has now taken up this idea, and plans to establish such an international Genocide Prevention Centre in Budapest.

The Interfaith Anti-genocide Alliance

Genocide Watch has concluded that the next major step in mobilizing a global movement against genocide is to enlist the already existing organizational resources of religious organizations, because they have the deepest grass roots and great potential for transcending ethnic and national divisions. In 2007, Genocide Watch and the National Council of Churches of the USA co-founded the Interfaith Anti-Genocide Alliance, and they intend to work with many organizations and faith groups to harness the tremendous organizational potential of religious groups to actively oppose genocide, rather than causing it. Genocide Watch has also worked with Martin Luther King III's Realizing the Dream project, especially its post-conflict work in Sri Lanka. One of the ICEG's member organizations, Plowshares, has focused its work on training leaders in non-violent conflict resolution in Indonesia.

Genocide Watch is also developing contacts with educational publishers and teachers' organizations to promote education for tolerance. The President chaired a panel at a conference in Berlin in March 2003 devoted to how school texts can be used to promote education about the history of genocide and its prevention. He also spoke at a conference on genocide education in

Strasbourg in 2009 sponsored by the Salzburg Seminar and has become a member of the Board of Directors of the Salzburg Seminar's project on genocide education. He will attend a conference in Salzburg June 27 - July 2, 2010 that will continue this project. This summer he plans to complete his book, The Eight Stages of Genocide, intended as a short introductory text for secondary schools and introductory courses on genocide that will reveal the common elements in the genocidal process.

The Cambodian Genocide Project and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal

After serving as Field Director for Church World Service and CARE in Cambodia in 1980, I returned to Yale Law School and in 1981, founded the Cambodian Genocide Project, Inc. in order to get the leaders of the Khmer Rouge tried for genocide and crimes against humanity. The Cambodian Genocide Project was incorporated as a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization.

After a judicial clerkship and two years with a corporate law firm, I became a law professor at Washington and Lee University. In the 1980's Ben Kiernan, David Hawk, and I gathered documentary evidence and testimony of eyewitnesses in Cambodia, including scores of hours of video-taped testimony funded by the U.S. Institute of Peace. A Memorial was prepared for a state-party to the Genocide Convention to take to the International Court of Justice, claiming violation of the Genocide Convention by Cambodia, which was still represented in the United Nations by the Khmer Rouge regime.

Due to State Department opposition that reached as far as Australia, we were unable to find any takers for the case and realized that the problem was political. When it came to finding a government to take the case to the World Court, we struck out. I learned a crucial lesson: human rights are not lost because of the absence of law, but because of the lack of political will to enforce it. We needed to change the political will of crucial nations, notably the United States, which opposed pursuing the case because it might legitimize the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh.

A group of us set out to change the political will of the U.S. government. Prof. Ben Kiernan, Dr. Craig Etcheson, Sally Benson and others formed a coalition called the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge, and I co-chaired its Justice Committee. CORKR worked with the staff of Senator Charles Robb to write the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. Although it was opposed by the State Department because it earmarked funds to establish an Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations in the State Department and declared that it was U.S. policy to prosecute the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, the bill passed the United States Congress in 1994 and was signed by President Clinton. The Cambodian Genocide Justice Act also earmarked funds for the investigation of the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. By 1992, I had taken the Foreign Service examination and joined the State Department. I

was assigned to the steering committee for the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations.

The State Department held an open competition, and in a decision from which I recused myself, the Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations steering committee unanimously chose to fund the Cambodian Genocide Program at Yale University, founded by Professor Ben Kiernan. Over the next two years, it was to receive \$1.5 million in State Department funding. As a result of the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act, the evidence collected by the Cambodian Genocide Program and the Documentation Center it established in Cambodia, along with pressure applied by Ambassadors David Scheffer, Charles Twining, Charles Kartman, me and others within the U.S. State Department, we finally moved U.S., and U.N., policy to support creation of a tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge. Funds provided by the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act supported establishment of the Yale Cambodian Genocide Program and the Documentation Center of Cambodia in Phnom Penh, which produced hundreds of thousands of pages of evidence of the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge in Democratic Kampuchea.

In July 1997 as a Foreign Service Officer in the State Department, I wrote the State Department options paper and proposals that led to U.S. pressure on the United Nations to assist Cambodia in trying the Khmer Rouge. In 1997, at the suggestions of Thomas Hammarberg and David Hawk, the co-Prime Ministers of Cambodia requested assistance from the U.N. in establishing a tribunal. The U.N. appointed a Commission of Experts, which in 1999 recommended establishment of an international tribunal outside Cambodia, a conclusion unacceptable to Cambodia.

The United Nations and the Royal Cambodian Government (RCG) entered into negotiations to set up a tribunal. The U.N. withdrew from negotiations in February 2002 citing concerns about the impartiality of the Extraordinary Chamber proposed by the Cambodian National Assembly. The Cambodian Genocide Project offered to assist in breaking the legal logjam, and with funding from the Open Society Institute provided the legal advice to the Cambodian government that led to the breakthrough March 17, 2003, when the Cambodian government and U.N. Office of Legal Affairs signed an agreement to set up the tribunal. The agreement was approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 2003, and by the National Assembly of Cambodia in 2004. As soon as pledges of funding were raised for the tribunal, estimated at \$57 million over three years, the UN and Cambodian governments appointed judges and staff and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia came into being.

The Cambodian Genocide Project worked with other organizations in the U.S. and Cambodia to assist the Cambodian government in doing the planning necessary to get the tribunal up and running. The Cambodian Genocide Project, in particular, assisted the Secretariat of the Cambodian government's Task Force in preparing draft rules of procedure and evidence for the tribunal. We

benefited from the expertise and advice of some of the finest international lawyers in the world in doing this work.

Most recently The Cambodian Genocide Project has helped support clerks for the tribunal's judges through generous grants from the Planethood Foundation, founded by Ben Ferencz, the Nuremburg Prosecutor of the Einsatzgruppen, and his son, Don Ferencz of London. In November and December 2009, I conducted an inquiry for the tribunal's Victim's Section into how victim testimony could be preserved and used in healing of the trauma caused by the genocide.

Lessons Learned

My experiences with Genocide Watch, the Cambodian Genocide Project, and the International Association of Genocide Scholars have taught me a number of lessons:

1. As Rudy Rummel has pointed out, the key to addressing the problem of genocide is confronting power. Forces with the power to commit genocide must be overcome by forces with the power to prevent it. Engaging those forces means mobilizing the world's democracies to take action. There are ways to do that, such as getting legislation passed to overrule a recalcitrant State Department bureaucracy. But they take a lot of work by committed people. It is often better to work quietly with people on the inside of powerful institutions, leveraging their decisions to take action for prevention.

2. In the U.N., democratic states can lead the Security Council to take Chapter VII action in some situations when genocidal dictators like Saddam Hussein have committed aggression. When the U.N. Security Council is paralyzed, as it often is, and was regarding the Cambodian Tribunal, democratic states can lead the General Assembly to take action. When that cannot be done, democratic states must still take action to fulfill their obligations to prevent genocide, acting under the customary international law of humanitarian intervention and its fuller modern version, the emerging norm called the Responsibility to Protect.

3. Organizing a human rights group or movement is full-time work. It cannot be done part-time or without significant funding. That is why the Campaign to Oppose the Return of the Khmer Rouge hired Craig Etcheson, who was largely responsible for the passage of the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. It is why the Cambodian Genocide Program needed a full time Director, Susan Cook. Coordination of an international campaign need not be a full-time job if its member organizations do the work of the coalition. But the International Campaign to End Genocide could have been more effective if it had hired full time help. The next phase in the anti-genocide movement, a new Anti-Genocide Alliance will almost certainly require full-time personnel, especially to enable international organization in countries at risk.

Effective human rights work costs money, lots of money. A few human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the International Crisis Group, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, the Fund for Peace, and

the Open Society Institute have the biggest foundation funders and professional fundraising operations. Representatives of the major foundations even sit on the Boards of Directors of the human rights organizations they fund, or maintain intimate connections with the organizations. Some would say these are interlocking directorates; others that it's just good grantsmanship. But it means to get money, you have to have money to pay professionals to get it. It is an exclusionary game, in which the organizations that have funding shut out organizations that have none, and also keep them out of decision-making. It is not a good way to fund a true international coalition. Government money can be gotten through national legislation. That is how the US Institute of Peace is funded, as well as efforts in Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland. But the bureaucracy will fight earmarks, as the State Department did vociferously against passage of the Cambodian Genocide Justice Act. And changes in government can end prevention programs.

From the beginning, neither Genocide Watch nor the Cambodian Genocide Project have sought foundation grants or attempted to increase our budget. The initial gift of \$25,000 for our work made by Charles Pillsbury and Jean Sanderson has supported everything we have done. The work has been self-sustaining, with every project financed as it has proceeded, and every honorarium for speaking plowed into the organization budget. Scores of student interns have contributed their time and brilliance to doing the work of the organization, and designing and maintaining the website. No one has ever received a salary for their work, though I insist on paying interns for their time or giving them academic credit because I do not believe in intern exploitation.

4. Institutionalization is vital to long-term genocide prevention. That is why the International Campaign to End Genocide has made its priorities creation of the International Criminal Court; support for the ICTY, ICTR, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Cambodian Tribunals; creation of the position and office of the UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide; support for creation of an international Genocide Prevention Centre; strengthening of the International Association of Genocide Scholars, and creation of an Interfaith Antigenocide Alliance.

Finally, the most effective genocide prevention is done long before the rifts in a society reach the stage of violent conflict. That is why strengthening of local and national institutions in countries at risk should now become our top priority.

The Importance of Our Movement

I believe the International Campaign to End Genocide in the twenty-first century will someday be seen in the same way we see the anti-slavery movement of the nineteenth century. It is time in human history to end genocide, the worst of all crimes against humanity. There were those in the nineteenth century who said that slavery couldn't be ended because the economic forces that supported it were

too great, that it was human nature, or even worse, that it was ordained by religion. There will be similar defeatism about the movement to abolish genocide. There has always been genocide, so it must be part of human nature. The world political order is not yet developed enough to prevent and stop it. Or, worst of all, genocide is ordained by jihad or ethnic purity or religion.

But those who say we cannot end this curse upon mankind are no more right than those who said slavery could not be defeated. It is a matter of human will. And we make that human will. As Archbishop Tutu is fond of saying, "God is a God of justice. But to do justice, God depends on us."

Risk Assessment and Early Warning and Their Uses for Prevention: Three Mini Case Studies

Barbara Harff

Three countries at risk of geno/politicide are sketched. The cases are identified using data on all states of the international community that have populations over 1 million. The basis for the analysis and the full risk list is in my article in *Politorbis* (Harff 2009) and also posted on the GPANet website. First, though, I will refresh your memory on how we came to do systematic risk assessment and comment on the state of early warning.

The idea of systematic early warning is at least 25 years old, the execution young.

Of the dozen or so scholars worldwide who did comparative research on genocides in the early 1980s, six of us met at the ISA meetings in St. Louis in 1988. We knew then that we needed to spread the message that genocides were not unique (as most Holocaust scholars would have it in the 1980s). I had just published my data set identifying 46 cases of geno/politicide (Harff and Gurr 1988) which made it easier to persuade critics that the critical mass was achieved that would allow for systematic and not so systematic comparison of cases. This dataset consisted of 46 mini case studies that identified types of victims (class, race, religion, ethnies)—the same for perpetrators, as well as essential information on timeframe in which the episodes occurred, number of casualties, circumstances of death, and type of polity; it would eventually be part of the dataset of state failures compiled for the Political Instability Task Force (see <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/>).

We understood that prevention is not possible if we do not understand the etiology of a given disease—to invoke a medical metaphor. We also needed to understand the causal chain that turns a high risk situation into a full-fledged genocide—the task for early warners.

The idea of EW in cases of genocide was probably advanced first by Israel Charny, a clinical psychologist. In 1986 we had tried to combine forces in developing an early warning model that would encompass several levels of analysis. His concerns were—true to his training—how group dynamics impact behavior and how individual motives, training, and psychological conditions could turn ordinary citizens into mass murderers. Mine were similar but I was more interested in identifying local and national and international factors that enabled elites to commit crimes against humanity and get away with it. Our efforts faltered. Why? When we tried to account for all possible reasons why genocides occur the model became too convoluted to be tested and applied. A more parsimonious model later developed in the late 1990s with the help of the Task Force yielded sufficiently strong and consistent results to permit solid risk assessment (Harff 2003).

The model is the result of testing relevant hypotheses derived from the conflict and genocide literature and focuses on structural factors. We tested some 40 variables, ranging from economic indicators to political to environmental to demographic variables. The best-fit model identified the preconditions of over 80% of all post-1955 cases of geno/

politicide. The current risk assessments uses a somewhat better model fitted to the most recently available data. The methodology is explained in sources mentioned above—briefly what we asked was, why do some deadly and disruptive political conflicts—state failures—lead to genocides or politicides whereas most do not.

Just a very brief introduction to EW, it is different from risk assessment. EW is supposed to tell us WHEN conflict is likely to turn into genocide. In the late 1990s I was asked by the US intelligence community to develop an EW model for geno/politicide. I had developed such a model and applied it to data on events leading to mass atrocities in Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi and Abkhazia (Harff 1996).

Mind you, I was not only fully aware of the concerns of area and country experts but shared at least some of their sentiments: structures cannot and do not tell the whole story. However, I am skeptical about the importance of cultural factors. For example, the idea that something in the German culture led to blind obedience among Nazi followers does not really pan out. Probably more persuasive is the fact that in a totalitarian police state individual heroism is costly for not just the individual but whole families and obedience or acceptance become the easy way out. For political scientist regional, global factors matter more not to mention social organization, structures and authority patterns. Culture is the fuzziest of all concepts and very hard to operationalize.

In the EW project: we tracked daily such variables as increasing militancy of rebels, increases and decreases in material, diplomatic and military aid to both rebels and regimes, hate propaganda, and changes in state capacity. We also tracked increases and decreases in state discrimination and violence against specific groups. Moreover we were concerned with and monitored some international and regional state behaviors. Data were analyzed using standard and not so standard statistical methods. How different was our effort from reports from the International Crisis Group? Simply put, in our risk assessment, information was coded and interpreted using theoretical filters and then systematically analyzed and reported. And we were specifically concerned with genocides, politicides and mass atrocities, not generic conflict. Much was learned from this effort. For example, a key element that accelerates the genocidal process is increases in hate propaganda, as in Ivory Coast in the mid 2000's, and we know the outcome thanks to Juan Mendez's diplomatic efforts.

politicide. The two highest risk cases are Sudan and Burma, familiar to all of you. The third case is Saudi Arabia, identified by my risk analysis as at medium risk. First, Sudan and Burma were a long time in our sights. Both have had historical geno/politicides—a key risk factor. In Sudan during the civil wars victims were mostly Southerners; the campaigns against the Nuba and then Darfur were well known in advance of full-fledged assaults. The same goes for Arakanese Muslims in Burma. Both cases rank highest on our structural risk factors. (1) They are at high risk of

future instability.¹ (2) Both practice state-led discrimination against one or more specific communal groups, as identified in the Minority at Risk dataset. (3) Both are potentially repeat offenders, having committed other geno/politicides since 1950. Both have (4) ethnically polarized elites and (5) exclusionary ideologies. (These variables were derived from my original dataset on cases and re-coded for the Political Instability Task Force). (6) Both have autocratic regimes. And (7) trade openness is low in both countries, indicative of relatively low levels of international engagement.

There are other indicators of interest in these and other cases—indicators derived from our EW research: They include increases in bribery and corruption, less spending on public goods affecting minorities, militias that increasingly take on the role of state authorities, and ideological encroachment on the judiciary.

In summary, both Burma and Sudan rank high on all relevant structural indicators, and medium on future instability—a very temporary situation. Burma's medium-low trade openness grade is due mostly to the large black market sector. On EW indicators both rank high—questioning of course whether or not the rule of law means anything in both systems.

What do these rankings mean for prevention? First, some general comments.

Structural factors can be influenced by outsiders. Take the variables of state-led discrimination, type of polity, and trade openness—the international community can have impact on seemingly intransigent regimes through pressure and incentives. Take Southern Sudan's self-determination referendum, scheduled for January 2011. Is it possible to secure it? Given the lack of structures, the rainy season, lack of human security, and tension between the northern and southern governments, then international help is a must. Is it possible to preserve a relative peace between North and South in a united Sudan? I think a clear separation is preferable, given the nature and length of past conflict. However successful dissolution, without a new genocidal civil war, presupposes that the international community makes up its collective mind about who and what efforts to support. Who should oversee or guarantee an orderly process for distributing oil revenues, or establishing contested borders? If states are more so interested in preserving the status quo, i.e. the shaky peace between the North (the NCP) and the South (the SPLM), then massive help is needed to stop food shortages, provide for human security, and control rebel and militia activities. Somehow the international community must find ways to break the cycle of mistrust between Northern and Southern leaders. And, as always, the UN and African Union must have the means and mandate to take sides in order to quell massive violence, if and when it resumes.

Burma is the most intransigent case in my opinion. There was never and may never be a unified Burma. Whereas some regional minorities have made (at least temporary) peace with Rangoon, others remain at the fringes—discriminated,

¹ Future instability is rated using a composite index developed by J. J. Hewitt (2009) and described in T. R. Gurr's paper for the GPANet conference, "A Legacy of Deadly Political Violence".

disenfranchised, and victims of ethnic repression. I have argued for a long time that Burma needs to be fully included into the international community not excluded. As mentioned above, internal change can only be accomplished if other states can gain entry or are at least are of some importance to intransigent regimes. A refined carrots and sticks policy may work for China, Japan and ASEAN states and regional organizations that have a semblance of influence on Burmese politics. Neither the US nor Europe can have significant impact without prior coordination with our Asian partners.

What are the risks now? The Rohingya Muslims are targets (again) of religious persecution and other human rights violation—leading to an increase of Rohingyas seeking refuge in neighboring countries—despite restrictions on movement. Discrimination against Chins by local authorities is not just tolerated but actively encouraged by the ruling junta. There is no independent judiciary. The Shan states throughout history were either independent, aligned with Burmese monarchies, conquered by or aligned with China, or supported by Thailand (at least as far as non Communist Shan insurgent movements were concerned). They continue their tortuous path to independence or at least formal autonomy. Despite some overtures by Rangoon, not all Shan militias are likely to abide by the cease fire now in place nor will they disband. The old Kuomintang bases are now home to many Chinese citizens doing brisk local business and extracting resources. And the opium fields still support many local warlords.

What to do? Support and focus on ASEAN, Japan and China to work out some formula that would lessen oppression of ordinary peoples—there is no comprehensive solution for Burma. And yes there is China—a country aggressively pursuing its international economic interests. Interestingly enough its involvement in select African states tells a story. They built highways, ports, factories, railways—in other words infrastructure where there was none. In exchange they exploit and export needed natural resources. Call it neo-colonialism—but it somehow works better in improving the lives of ordinary people. They circumvent corrupt elites and avoid giving aid for projects that never get off the ground. They also build by bringing in Chinese labor to work with locals. What can be learned from that model? Get China involved in Burma via their economic interests—and recognize that aid without political conditions leads to apathy, corruption and dependence.

Saudi Arabia as a medium risk case may come as a surprise to many. Here we are not talking about the imminence of genocide but a possible (albeit not likely) politicide. So why bother talking about it? This is a case that is not likely to make anybody else's list; but we should worry about an increasingly radicalized Islam. Wahabism is more than a puritan form of Islam; it is the basis of a powerful political ideology. Local radical clerics appear to gain influence and attract disgruntled youth vis a vis the moderates (and what, I ask you, do we here mean by moderates????) Saudi royalty (including the king) seem to be no match for the growing influence of Wahabi/Hanbali doctrines in the region and abroad—as far as Morocco in the west, Malaysia in the

east, and in the Balkans in the north. We know that Saudi public and private foreign assistance has supported radical organizations that celebrate martyrdom aka terrorism. Islamic militancy Wahabi style is also spreading throughout the Arabian peninsula. In Yemen the Sa'ana leadership has little power over Northern tribal leaders nor the former South. Wahabism has already increased illiteracy, suppression of women, and the control of education and information—eventually leading to more poverty, less development, and radicalization of tribes. We need to build schools, de-salination plants, infrastructure, and give targeted aid to connect the backwaters of the Muslim world to the international community. If the Saudis are our true friends—then they need to stop supporting radical causes and movements and control their own. If Wahabis ever come to power in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere then the likely victims of oppression or worse include women, foreigners, Christians, Jews, moderate and secular Arabs, Shi'a, Alevis, Bahai's and still others.

In conclusion, let me be blunt. It would be great to have solid risk assessment and a reasonably well functioning EW system. These buy time for would-be intervenors or at least allow for better planning. But here is the real problem for interested parties. Any form of active involvement by international actors is driven by national interest and capacity. Samantha Power calls it political will—but in my view this is a too narrow perspective. National interests are shaped by a combination of economic, political, and environmental/security/demographic factors as well as moral considerations. If national interest dictates some action then state capacity comes into play. And capacity means more than the possession of material means to act. States may be hindered or encouraged by history, law, and public pressure to engage. And finally, it is necessary to assess realistically who our true friends are—neither Saudi Arabia or Pakistan should make the cut.

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Supporting Regional Approaches to Genocide Prevention: The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)

Andrea Bartoli
Tetsushi Ogata

An essential and often discussed issue regarding genocide prevention is states' lack of political will to take action. In the late 20th century willful neglect by many states, especially powerful ones, and by international governmental organizations, has been criticized as condoning acts of genocide. In political reality most states were and are reluctant to act alone in the face of emerging and ongoing massive human rights violations. This is beginning to change: regional frameworks are beginning to be built for effective and sustainable genocide prevention systems. For many states the problem is not so much about whether political will exists or whether there is some particular threshold that makes response imperative, but how to design and coordinate responses with other states. In this context regional and sub-regional organizations are playing an increasingly innovative and promising role.

Regional Fora: Regional Inter-governmental Frameworks for Preventive Action

There are promising signs that genocide prevention has become politically more relevant in the last decade. More than 60 years after the signing of the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and especially after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the international community has seen a series of new initiatives that give genocide prevention a prominence never achieved before.

Sweden was the first to take the issue of preventing genocide seriously at the international level when it convened a series of four international fora that culminated in the Stockholm International Forum of January 2004 on Preventing Genocide: Threats and Responsibilities.¹ Delegates from 55 countries attended and signed a Final Declaration. At the Forum the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the establishment of the Office of Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. The office's mandate was fully supported by the subsequent commitment of Member States in the 2005 World Outcome Document to a "responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity."²

Several years later the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Commerce and Religion of the government of Argentina launched an initiative to organize a series of regional fora on genocide prevention. The first Regional Forum was convened in Buenos Aires, in December 2008. The objectives of the regionally oriented approach,

¹ See the conference report, *Stockholm International Forum 2004, 26-28 January Proceedings: Preventing Genocide Threats and Responsibilities*. Stockholm: Svensk Information for the Government of Sweden, June 2004.

² U.N. General Assembly, 60th session. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1), 24 October 2005, paras. 138-140.

as summarized by Argentine diplomat and jurist Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, were to:

- Analyze existing norms and standards, as well as the jurisprudence of existing mechanisms to sanction and to prevent genocide;
- Draw lessons from the different regional experiences and views in preventing genocide;
- Identify political, cultural, religious and legal challenges with a view to formulate recommendations in the field of the prevention of genocide and support the activities of the UN Special Adviser for Prevention of Genocide;
- Sensitize the different regions of the world, regarding the need to prevent genocide, as a first step towards an alliance among countries of different regions to combat genocide;
- Identify how prevention and sanctions can reinforce both prevention and the guarantee of non-recurrence.³

For the Forum in December 2008 Switzerland and Argentina secured the participation of high ranking UN officials and eminent experts such as Francis Deng, UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide; Edward Luck, UN Special Adviser on Responsibility to Protect; Rene Blattmann, Second Vice-President of the International Criminal Court; Juan Mendez, the first UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide and Director of the International Center for Transitional Justice; and prominent scholars.

Among the many positive outcomes of the Buenos Aires meeting was a keener appreciation of the role of sub-regional organization. In particular, while analyzing the links between human rights violation monitoring and genocide prevention, it was noted how in the September 2008 case of the massacre of 30 farmers in Pando, Bolivia, by paramilitary forces, UNASUR responded very forcefully and effectively by deploying a fact-finding mission and expressing a coordinated and unanimous call for corrective action.

After the 1st Regional Forum, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Republic of Tanzania joined with their Swiss and Argentinean counterparts to host the 2nd Regional Forum on the Prevention of Genocide in Arusha, Tanzania, in March 2010. More than 90 representatives of 31 states, international and regional institutions, and NGOs, joined by experts in the fields of genocide prevention, human rights, prosecution of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes, participated in the Forum. The 2nd Forum provided a space for African states to frame genocide prevention as also an African agenda. Representatives were able to share concrete examples of lessons learned and failed actions as well as cases of good

³ Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, "The Regional Fora: A Contribution to Genocide Prevention from a Decentralized Perspective," *Politorbis* 47 (No. 2, 2009), published by the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, p. 155.

early warning detection. It was a significant step forward in strengthening regional networks of countries willing to develop regional, sub-regional and inter-governmental mechanisms to prevent genocide. It was particularly important in linking knowledge and perspectives from the local, national and regional levels with the international ones.

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR): A Sub-Regional Inter-Governmental Platform

Similarly to what happened in Buenos Aires, the Forum in Arusha provided an opportunity to learn from actors on the ground experimenting with new approaches. Notable was the intervention of Ambassador Liberata Mulamula, Executive Secretary of ICGLR, who gave a comprehensive update on the efforts of the ICGLR in the area of genocide prevention. It must be noted that the region – which includes Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, and Zambia – has been badly affected by genocidal violence. The visit to the region by the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, confirmed that the dynamics at play contribute to a high risk of future genocide.

The ICGLR was established in 2004 with its main objective to “consolidate peace and security in the Great Lakes region... [by] institutionalizing democratic governance values, promoting sustainable growth and shared development, and resolving critical social and humanitarian issues that contribute to destabilization in the region and undermine peace, security and stability in the region.”⁴ It is a relatively new sub-regional organization and it is not yet particularly strong. However, given its history (Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, the Burundi civil war that embroiled the DRC and other neighboring countries, the Uganda-Tanzania war in the late 1970s, and the electoral violence in Kenya in 2008) the region is so closely interlinked on social, demographic, economic, cultural and linguistic dimensions that conflict destabilizing one country can easily metastasize throughout the entire region. It was against this backdrop that ICGLR was born with the premise that any meaningful attempt to establish peace and security in the Great Lakes region must be carried out on the basis of a regional approach. It is undoubtedly still an experiment, a work in progress, but it is a hopeful sign that genocide prevention feature so prominently in its agenda.

The history of the ICGLR shows that prevention of genocidal violence was a core objective from its outset. In November 2004, the ICGLR Heads of State and Government signed the *Dar es Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region*, more commonly known as the Dar es Salaam Declaration. The Declaration acknowledged that weaknesses of good governance, and democratization processes in the region were the main precipitating factors of violent socio-political

4 “Genocide Prevention: Experience of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR),” paper presented by Ambassador Liberata Mulamula at the Regional Forum on Genocide Prevention, March 3-5, 2010, Arusha.

conflicts. It went on to specify policy agendas and guiding principles for member states, calling for a shared vision for democracy, reconstruction, durable peace and political stability, sustainable development and the rule of law in the region. The Declaration included explicit commitments to fight against all forms of discriminatory ideologies, policies, and practices; all acts of genocide and massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; terrorism; racism; ethnics; exclusion; as well as all other forms of violence against civilians.

The ICGLR Heads of State and Government then signed a legally binding Pact in 2006, which entered into force in 2008, following ratification by the member states. They collectively affirmed their determination to “transform the Great Lakes region into a space of sustainable peace and security, political and social stability, shared growth and development, a space of cooperation based on convergent strategies and policies driven by a common destiny.”⁵ Included in this Pact is *the Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination*. The ICGLR member states thereby acknowledge that the crime of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are crimes under international law and against the right of peoples, and they agree to oppose impunity and to take actions:

- To refrain from, prevent, and punish such crimes;
- To condemn and eliminate all forms of discrimination and discriminatory practices;
- To ensure the strict observance of this undertaking by all national, regional and local public authorities and institutions;
- To proscribe all propaganda and all organisations which are inspired by ideas or theories, based on the superiority of a race or a group of people of a particular ethnic origin, or which try to justify or encourage any form of ethnic, religious, racial or gender-based hatred or discrimination.

The ICGLR thus represents the epitome of a regional organization’s commitment to self-organize the prevention of genocidal violence and mass atrocities in an endogenous manner. ICGLR encompasses sub-structures to ensure that there is effective follow-up on the Pact, consisting of the National Coordination mechanism, the Conference Secretariat (of which Ambassador Mulamula is Executive Secretary), the Regional Inter-ministerial Committee (RIMC), and the Summit of Heads of State. The composition of ICGLR is designed to ensure that there is a response mechanism to function as “eyes and ears” of any unfolding violence and early warning signs within the member states.

The risks of future violence in the Great Lakes region states are considerable. Ethnic and other violence often accompany national election campaigns. Eight presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place in seven countries in the region in 2010 and 2011. It is imperative that preventive mechanisms like those of the ICGLR be fully supported now and in the near future to

5 *Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region* (2006). Available at <http://www.icglr.org/icglr-pacte.php>

check any escalatory spiral of violent outbreaks during or after these elections.

The Potential Role of the GPANet in Regional Frameworks and Platforms

ICGLR plans to align preventive efforts through close coordination and collaboration across regional, national and community levels. It will do so by utilizing the existing ICGLR National Coordination mechanism chaired by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in each member state. Strategic planning and coordination is currently underway between the ICGLR Secretariat and ICAR, and it is planned that those 11 national coordinators be the focal points to connect various political, social and cultural institutions within the state, such as Ministries of Education, Internal Affairs, Justice; human rights organizations and offices; cultural leaders; religious leaders; intelligence organs; parliament; and civil society. In effect, these 11 focal point coordinators function as the steering committee of ICGLR and identify their counterparts in their communities – at district, county, sub-county, and village levels – to streamline information gathering and dissemination processes, as stipulated in the Protocol:

- Regularly reviewing situations in each Member State for purposes of preventing genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and discrimination;
- Collecting and analyzing information related to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and discrimination;
- Alerting the Summit of the Conference in good time in order to take urgent measures to prevent potential crimes
- Suggesting specific measures to effectively fight impunity for these crimes,
- Contributing to raising awareness and education on peace and reconciliation through regional and national programs;
- Recommending policies and measures to guarantee the rights of victims of the crime of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity to truth, justice and compensation, as well as rehabilitation, taking into account gender specific issues and ensuring that gender-sensitive measures are implemented;
- Monitoring among the Member States, where applicable, national programs on disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, repatriation and reinstallation (DDRRR) for former child soldiers, ex-combatants and combatants;
- Carrying out any other tasks that the Inter-Ministerial Committee may entrust it with.

In parallel, the ICGLR Secretariat is coordinating with the UN Office of Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to conduct a training session in September 2010 on the OSAPG Analysis Framework for UN personnel and other stakeholders in the Great Lakes region. Thus there are emerging opportunities for GPANet to support ICGLR during the implementation phase of ICGLR strategies in consultation and advisory capacities. Especially when launching the steering committee of 11 focal points, GPANet's collaboration

with ICGLR Secretariat could be beneficial in these areas:

- Plan and coordinate programs to build grassroots, national and regional capacities, tailored to unique local dynamics and conflict issues in each affected area;
- Establish and expand a network of genocide and violent prevention actors and stakeholders, shifting from a “victims” frame to an “agents of genocide prevention” frame at local, national and region levels;
- Identify training and education need to create a cadre of respected facilitators for mediation and dialogue to resolve local, national and regional disputes peacefully;
- Gather and share knowledge, tools, methods and skills on violent conflict and genocide prevention initiatives and experiences within the region and from other parts of the world;
- Participate in the evaluation and monitoring of activities at regional and national levels.

The GPANet's members, collectively and individually, may be able to connect expert knowledge, practice, and data on genocide prevention with the needs of the peoples in the region. ICGLR is one of a very few political groupings of states collectively committed to genocide prevention and one of only two at the regional or sub-regional level. Supporting regional approaches to genocide prevention like ICGLR means facilitating connections with other initiatives that are already in place, initiatives that can and should complement one other. There are a number of programs working concurrently on genocide prevention such as training activities by ICAR's Engaging Governments on Genocide Prevention, data collection and information management systems by Ushahidi (the crowdsourcing initiative developed after the Kenya disturbances in 2008, which uses local informants in crisis situations to develop and evaluate information from crisis-ridden areas), Genocide Watch, Conflict Early Warning Learning Initiative led by Humanity United, and many others. GPANet was at the beginning of a development that started from the Stockholm gatherings, and its members have played a significant role in the risk assessment research that makes genocide prevention conceptually convincing. GPANet members were also instrumental in calling for the establishment of the office of the Special Advisor on Genocide Prevention at the United Nations and have become a hub of genocide prevention debates, along with others. The emerging collaboration with the ICGLR steering committee can provide an unprecedented opportunity to link experts with local, national, regional and international action for an effective, sustainable genocide prevention system – a system in which knowledge can be actually shared and collective political will be put in practice.

China's Growing Economic Interests In Africa: A Pragmatic Basis for International Policies to Restrain Repression and Genocide?

Yehuda Bauer

I do not claim to be an expert on China, or even especially knowledgeable, though I did study Chinese history. But I think it is essential that we try to understand Chinese policies, and make an attempt at analyzing them and their impact. It is clearly China that prevents any meaningful non-military international preventive policies in regard to the situations in Sudan, Burma, or Iran. Other possible foci of concern – see Barbara's risk assessments (Harff 2009, pp. 75-78) – may also be or may become centers of Chinese economic and political activity.

The background for this paper is my conviction that what we are witnessing is a slow decline in US influence. The US is no longer the only superpower. The current economic depression hit the West. China is one of the countries which suffered rather mildly. But it is not only the US and China, but also a number of countries and groups of countries that have become meaningful players on the global scene: India, Germany, South Africa, Iran, Turkey, the Arab League/Organization of Islamic States, and so on. Our emphasis on looking to the White House as the arbiter of world affairs is mistaken, although the US certainly is the *primus inter pares*, the first among equals, and therefore crucially important. The basic difference between open or relatively open societies such as the "Western" countries (US, Canada, most but not all of Latin America, the EU, some African countries, Japan, Thailand (more or less), Indonesia (more or less), Australia and New Zealand) on the one hand, and closed or relatively closed countries, such as China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc., is basic: in the first group of countries one has access to the public, in the other one does not. All our talk about NGOs, public opinion, and so on is vitiated by the fact that for at least half of humanity this is a world that has no relevance for them

My sources are of course purely secondary, and not systematic. This paper is designed to encourage all of us to delve more deeply into this complicated matter. Take Chinese activity in Africa. Trade with Africa (that includes all African countries) was (US) \$3 billion in 1995, \$55b in 2006, and \$107b in 2008, the balance being in Africa's favor. What does that mean? It means that China was importing oil and raw materials, and exporting a combination of means of production, infrastructure, and (cheap) consumer goods. In fact, in 2009, oil, gas, and minerals accounted for 86% of all African exports to China. By partial comparison, oil accounted for 88% of all US imports from Africa in 2008. But I am not sure that these figures for China and the US are at all comparable, because US investments are concentrated in countries like Nigeria and South Africa (French in Chad and Cameroon), whereas the Chinese import their stuff largely from more problematic countries – Sudan, Angola, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and now also Ethiopia and others. Chinese foreign trade altogether was \$2.56 trillion, so that China's African trade was about 4% of the whole. However, in 2008, US trade with Africa came to \$140 b, and

China was already second.

A crucial question concerns Chinese dependence on foreign oil. In 2008, 50% of the oil that China consumed came from abroad. That oil supplied 12% of all the energy China consumed, because it still depends on coal, nuclear power, and hydro-electricity. One third of the 12%, or 4%, came from Africa. Again, by comparison, the US imported 5.2% of all its energy needs from Africa. But some 79% of African oil for China is used for industrial purposes, whereas in the US a similar 70% are used for motor vehicles. To put all this in perspective, China receives 8.7% of African oil exports, whereas the US and the EU receive some 33% each. The Chinese apologetic argument is, therefore, that China does not dominate African oil markets; the answer is that Chinese oil imports grow by leaps and bounds, whereas Western imports are more or less static. China imports its African oil from the more problematic countries, its imports are exploitative, and income does not filter down to ordinary people, and this is so even when one takes into account Western exploitative investments, such as in Nigeria. Are the Chinese also penetrating Nigeria? I don't know, but I am trying to find out.

A major issue is the Chinese investments in African infrastructures. The West has not helped Africa, to put it mildly, and that is true both of state-sponsored and of private investments. China, on the other hand, has pledged \$25 b. for infrastructure for the next three years, but I could not find figures as to the fulfillment of the pledge – one assumes that it was more or less accomplished. This probably contrasts with the non-fulfillment of Western pledges of \$25b in 2005 – by 2009, only \$2.3b were delivered.

The way China invests in infrastructure contradicts all accepted norms. Take Angola. By 2007, China had loaned Angola over \$6b, with an interest rate that went down from 1.5% to 0.25%. The loans were made to a notoriously corrupt government, and no provision was made for reports as to how the funds were to be spent. 70% of the projects were open to bids from anywhere (30% from Angolan investors), and most of these went to Chinese companies (all of whom are controlled, directly or indirectly, by the government/party). Repayment of the loan was in oil, of course. The US Treasury termed China a rogue creditor. But one can understand the Angolans: they are indebted to the West to the tune of about \$300b, and are paying relatively high interest, whereas China regularly cancels the repayments of its loans. The problem is that the people who benefit are a) the corrupt, and often dictatorial and murderous, governments, and b) their individual corrupt officials. Sometimes, Chinese investments are totally interest-free – as for instance in a highway between two Ghanaian cities (Accra and Kumasi). And it does not seem that Western loans and investments are less prone to misuse by corrupt governments and officials.

The point in all this is not the static situation, but the dynamics. The slow decline of global American – and generally, Western – economic and political supremacy may take decades to work itself out, but who knows, it may take much less time. China is penetrating markets, and especially energy sources, at a growing speed. This is true not only for Africa, but also for Burma, South-East Asia, and Taiwan (!!). It is also true for tiny Israel, for instance: \$4.5 b was invested by China in Israel in 2007 alone, buying up controlling interests in start-up high-tech companies, and in engineering ventures (part of the trans-Israel highway). Why? I would guess that it was Israeli technical know-how that was sought.

It is true that China is not the only Power that supports authoritarian, dictatorial, corrupt and reactionary governments. It is not China that has a special relationship with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nigeria, and so on. But there is a basic difference: in the case of Western exploitation, there are real or potential correctives in the form of democratic institutions in Western countries, and a (mostly) free press that can mobilize – again, potentially – public opinion, and oppose policies. There is no such possibility in China. Chinese policies are driven by a tremendous rate of growth (between 7% and 11%, depending on whose statistics you rely) and a resulting need for energy resources to develop – at break-neck speed – industries to satisfy a growing demand. There is also the 'danger' that millions of Chinese workers may demand higher wages and salaries, and they have to be held under control on the one hand, but given more leash on the other hand.

I have tried to find out something about the internal workings of the Chinese system. Clearly, this is state-capitalism controlled by a dictatorship. In fact, re-reading Lenin's analysis of imperialism, I am convinced that this is an almost classic case of predatory imperialism, on a par with the Western model. There is no need to occupy foreign lands physically, in fact this would be counter-productive. Local corruption matters little. Oil, gas, and minerals matter more. Low interest rates and lost loans are small change for full support by the exploited countries of Chinese policies globally. Penetration into different countries and continents (I have not discussed here very major Chinese investments in Latin America, for instance) are of primary importance in order to make China the second most important, and in the future the first most important, player on the international field. Western press, such as the NYT and its major analysts, understand this very well. And yet, there is a major misunderstanding, I believe: in the West, at least lip-service is paid to moral norms in internal and international politics. As far as the Chinese are concerned, moral considerations are simply absent. There is absolutely no point in approaching Chinese diplomacy with arguments based on morality, they are impervious to them. What matters are economic and political interests. This does not mean that the Chinese are somehow "bad" people. It means that their economic needs are so overwhelming and urgent, that no other considerations matter. At previous points in global history, other regimes, and especially Western ones, did not act differently.

What I do not find in any of the reporting and the analyses is what seems to me, as an historian (who, a couple of million

years ago, took a second major in Far Eastern history) to be pretty obvious: China, model 2010, is not unlike China, model 1410 or 1710. The present Emperors are not (so far at least) related to each other, but are elected by the Party leadership for a period of several years; the present Emperor is Hu Jintao, and the next one will bear another name, but he (most likely not she) will be a copy of the 16th century Ming or the 18th century Manchu Qing Emperors. Forget about Communism – the adoration of St. Marx is still there, but these are purely liturgical ceremonial acts. Who in China today knows about or is interested in Friedrich Engels, the Manchester industrialist and exploiter, or in Plekhanov, Martov, Gorki, or Kautsky? The number of Chinese billionaires is larger than the parallel number in the US. But the Party controls 'private' Chinese industry and trade. Exactly how this is done is known only in outline, or not at all. There seems to be a reporting system, whereby reliable Party cadres report to higher instances exactly what individuals do, in the economic social, and cultural spheres. This is, more or less, the way the Mandarin class under the Manchu and the Ming (and before that), operated. This is also the way the Soviet nomenclatura handled things. The Mandarin class recruited itself, by and large, from the lower and upper middle class, trained the most promising individuals, and integrated them into the ruling stratum of society. The breakthrough occurred in about the 15th century, when the Ming began to include the merchant class (in addition to the landowning class) in the population from which the cadres were drawn – in a general population of about 200 millions. The Manchu continued this tradition, though the top positions were still reserved for the Manchu conquerors themselves. The CP does the same: it recruits its cadres from the general literate society, and with 1.3 billion people around there are many good candidates. They are integrated into a Party that builds its persuasiveness on several foundations: a) success, over the past coupe of decades, which cannot be doubted, by any standards, in almost all spheres of a person's existence; b) tradition – historical memory of Chinese greatness; c) nationalist patriotism, even chauvinistic nationalism (we are better than anyone else, or: we are the heirs of the Middle Kingdom); d) opportunity in a growing and developing society with an optimistic view of unlimited success in the future. Instead of class struggle there comes, as indicated, the ideology of a supercilious nationalism.

Chinese international policies are characterized by great caution. The major principle which concerns issues of genocide prevention is support for any government that can protect Chinese interests, and opposition to any attempt to put pressure on such a government for any reason or purpose. I think that there are two main reasons for this: one is an historical one: China was occupied several times in its history by foreign powers: by the Mongols in the 13th-14th centuries, by the Manchu in 1644, and by the West in the 19th century. Foreign interventions in any country's affairs are therefore looked upon as bad, en principe. The other is the problems that China faces internally – Tibet, Xinjiang, and ethnic diversities of other groups. We don't want you to intervene in our affairs, and we will refuse to intervene in other nations' affairs.

Despite the argument about the lack of any moral sensitivity

presented above, can one nevertheless see some weaknesses in this utilitarian armor? The Chinese need to save face in their relations with the rest of the world, and they are as capable as anyone to mouth the usual universalist clichés. They also are aware of the fact that as they control some 20% of the US debt, and are the main creditors of the Americans, they are also dependent on the health of the American market, both to secure their investments and to sell products in America. They may therefore be accessible to pragmatic arguments that touch their interests – both positively, i.e. in securing their present and future investments and markets, and negatively, by exposing them to risks. They are not accessible to Elie Wiesel's sermonizing.

As to the lack of public opinion or freedom of expression in China: the chances that this might yet develop are there, but they are not very bright. I would argue that there appears to be a possibility of the entrenchment of a new kind of capitalism-imperialism. Until now, we all thought that a successful capitalist society requires freedom of opinion and of action, things that can only be guaranteed by democracy. We equated capitalism with middle class, individualism, and democracy. China seems to show another possibility: private enterprise open to unlimited expansion and controlled by the government/party, combined with a dictatorship that guarantees that Chinese entrepreneurs do not need democracy. They can get everything they want by placing themselves under the protection of Comrade Hu. This development, if it continues, presents the greatest possible danger to a West that is committed to a free (relatively speaking) society. There are precedents for such a situation: Nazi Germany permitted and even encouraged free enterprise, and its control system was arguably less efficient than the one practiced in China. Fascist and semi-Fascist states in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere all practiced similar types of capitalism. Wilhelmine Germany, Tsarist Russia, and Meiji Japan all practiced what Jeffrey Herf calls "reactionary modernism", where feudal or backward-looking elements controlled a modern capitalist development, in the case of Germany and Japan even with a tightly-controlled parliamentary shop-window. The equation capitalism=middle class=individualism=democracy as an iron rule is demonstrably wrong.

I think that all this has to be considered against a much more general, historical background. We do not usually take into account that democracy is not only a weak reed, but also that it is very new. If democracy means formal equality of all citizens, then ancient Athens was not a democracy – it was built on slavery. Neither was the US, until the sixties of the last century, when the Civil Rights movement finally gave some legitimacy to the formal equality enshrined in the American Constitution, which by then was some two hundred years old, but had never been fully translated into practice. Britain had no equal rights for women until after World War I, nor did some other democracies. Very recently, democracy has again lost some ground, in Russia, in South Africa, and elsewhere; of course, these societies are still counted as democracies in typically self-delusory fashion by some Western media. In fact, I would argue that, contrary to the widely accepted American ideology, people do not normally fight for democratic freedoms. If left alone, they rather tend to hide in conservative family, clan, and

ethnic structures, which give them greater personal security and provide a familiar environment. If we want to advance democracy, we have to realize that this is a constant struggle, which sometimes (perhaps oftentimes) has to take place against instinctual opposition. China is an excellent example where, apparently, masses of people do not feel any need to change an authoritarian system to which they have become historically attached. Capitalism without democracy seems to be an option, and a pretty dangerous one. Genocide prevention, among other issues, will not be advanced until we find ways and means to persuade the Chinese bureaucracy. At the moment, this can only be done by putting ourselves in their shoes and argue from their own interests, as it were.

There are several basic principles followed by Chinese foreign policy: one, sovereignty. This, again, is part of a historical legacy in which China was, repeatedly, conquered by foreigners, and defense of the country and its people, the Han majority, is a basic reaction. We will allow no one to mess with Tibet and Xinjiang, and we will not interfere with others. Two, togetherness. China prefers a common, non-military approach to contentious issues, except when areas considered by China to be Chinese (Taiwan, some islands in the Sea of China, etc.) are the issue. Togetherness stands in contradiction to sovereignty, and this is a dialectic that should be exploited for prevention of genocidal situations. Three, as already stated, the absolute supremacy of Chinese economic interests

There is a wonderful dog story from communist times: two dogs met on the border between communist Czechoslovakia and Austria. The Austrian dog was thin and all bones, and the Czech dog was big and fat. The Czech dog wanted to cross into Austria, and the Austrian dog asked him why. Look at me, he said, I am all skin and bones, and you are big and fat. Yes, said the Czech dog, but I would like to bark, just once, please. The Chinese dog seems to be growing fat, while on a tight leash, and he feels no need for barking. We do, and wonder how to do it effectively, so our bark is heard in Beijing.

What could be the options? One, any approach to China should start from a guarantee of Chinese investments and interests. Two, utilitarian arguments should be put forward. Example: a new North-South conflict in Sudan will endanger Chinese interests, because most of the oilfields are in the South, the pipeline crosses through disputed territory, and the port, Port Sudan, is controlled by the North. Hence, an approach to China could well emphasize that there is a common need ('togetherness') to guarantee economic interests as embodied in Sudanese documents granting oil concessions to China. A recent report talked about new Chinese oil concessions in Southern Darfur. If this is correct – I do not know whether it is or not – then one could extend the argument to Darfur. The argument of lack of stability in Sudan might also be of some importance, if the government does not succeed in totally wiping out rebel opposition in Darfur. An approach to the French regarding Chad may have to be made before one talks with China about Darfur. Detailed knowledge of internal Zaghawa policies, and the tortuous behavior of that great humanitarian, Mr. Deby, would be a precondition, of course. But one should always

remember that no Chinese politician will agree to do anything drastic about the government in Chad. Three, although any economic pressure on China is totally unrealistic, one should remember that as China is the major creditor of the US, it has a vital interest in the well-being of the American economy. In other words, they need Americans to buy Chinese products. Greg Stanton has argued in favor of more attempts to achieve public support for action on Darfur, despite past failures. Eyal Mayroz has shown, in his paper for this meeting, that there is a gap between public support, in principle, of a proactive policy on Darfur, and its translation into pressure that will impact on decision-makers. There is the danger of 'sham compliance', i.e. of seeming agreement with the principle of acting on Darfur, and real action. But there are, in relatively recent American history, examples of issues that did not affect the immediate interests of Americans (e.g. Soviet Jewry) where effective pressure could be put on policy-makers. This has to be done in an American way, i.e. grassroots organization, down to block stewards, local politicians, and, very importantly, religious organizations. Such a movement may affect customer behavior, and cause disinvestments and so on, without actually declaring an economic war on China. One could then argue with the Chinese that it is not worth their while opposing an active policy that will force Khartoum to arrive at compromises, if the price for the lack of action endangers Chinese economic interests.

In conclusion, I would argue that there is a possibility, hopefully, of influencing Chinese policies, provided of course we find Western governments who would be willing to take that path.

Impunity in Afghanistan?

No Future Stability without Justice

Roy Gutman

Impunity is defined as the exemption for a person who commits a crime from punishment, harm or recrimination. It negates the rule of law and is the evasion of due process. Most of us have never experienced it first hand. But it is the everyday experience for Afghans. Small crooks and robbers go free; and so do big-time scoundrels and war criminals. I want to share with you a few anecdotes from my notebook. This is not the result of an exhaustive study, just stories I picked up without seeking them out.

In January 2010, while on a month's assignment in Afghanistan, I spent four days in Gardez, southeast of Kabul on a project, living at the U.N. compound, traveling in both directions via U.N. helicopter and vehicles. It's a small town in the mountains, a lot better environs than Kabul where they describe the air as fecal dust. But Gardez is not safe; unemployment is very high, and there are no signs of investment or development. You don't walk around the market of this town; you have a feeling that the Taliban are everywhere.

I interviewed "Ravi," a very enterprising local English teacher who had served as a translator for U.S. forces for many years, had directed a language school, and now runs a construction firm. Here's what he told me about the state of law in Gardez. Three days before we met, police in Gardez had captured three men in the act of looting and mugging. Ravi told me that he knew of the looters: because they'd robbed his brother in his house and beaten him. The morning I interviewed Ravi, police had released the looters.

"We'd talked to the National Directorate of Security," the NDS, a cross between an FBI and a CIA, he told me. "They knew everything about them." But the three were freed, and apparently money changed hands. Ravi said he could have gone to police when the three were arrested and made a complaint, "but I knew it wouldn't do much good."

"People are losing trust in the government of Afghanistan," he added. "If the Taliban were running things, they would have cut off their heads. People feared them. There was no bribery at that time. Now it is just the opposite. " And if the people have a problem, they will refer it to the Taliban. They are everywhere. They are doing justice when the government won't. "

It's an outrage, but on a small scale describes what happens all over the country regularly. Corrupt local officials not only do no justice but do major injustices.

This is the Karzai government's failed judicial system. Into this swamp the United States has introduced some more elements of disorder.

For a story I was researching, I had occasion to interview the man who served as Gardez's first police chief after the fall of the Taliban. Abdullah Mujahid had fought the Taliban and was appointed to his post by the Karzai government. In July 2003, about a year and a half into his post, U.S. forces

arrested him in what seems to have been a case of mistaken identity. He was taken to Guantanamo where he was held for five years. Then he was released without an official apology or any compensation. No one ever accused him to my knowledge of corruption or succumbing to bribery. As he put it: "I was not a fugitive or someone on the run from the government. I was a friend of this government. I was working in this government."

Among the accusations against Mujahid, is that he was suspected of being an Indian Muslim who'd fought in an earlier war between India and Pakistan. He told his U.S. interrogators he was too young to have fought in the war in question. Later, his interrogators informed him that another man of the same name -- apparently the man who had fought in that war -- had been killed several years earlier. A second charge was that he had contact with Nasrullah Mansour, a commander for Hezb-i-Islami, which is fighting the Karzai government in the Zurmat district in Paktia province. Then it was discovered that Mansour had been killed 16 or 17 years ago.

Mujahid was not beaten in Guantanamo, nor did he witness beatings. But he described it as a place that did no credit to the U.S. government, nation or people. "This facility will leave behind a very sordid history for America," he said. Now he lives in his hometown in fear -- because the Taliban are in the ascendant, and he had fought against the Taliban. "For the past one or two years, since I was released from detention, I haven't gone beyond the U.N. compound down the main square. I haven't crossed these areas," he told me.

The former police chief man is a Tajik, an unlikely person in the first place to have joined the Taliban, who are mostly Pashtuns. I've read transcripts of the interrogations of Mujahid, and the degree of ignorance shown by the prosecution, and the lack of due process, make your hair stand up. Mujahid was not among the 66 released detainees interviewed by McClatchy journalists in a project that ran two years ago. (www.mcclatchydc.com/detainees). That's because he was still in prison.

Back in Kabul a few days later, I met a lawyer who works for the Department of the Interior, which oversees and directs the police in Afghanistan. Mohamed Taher, 38, features in a story that we posted in March on the McClatchy DC web site. (<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/14/90084/local-taliban-officials-may-ignore.html#storylink=misearch>) Unfortunately, he told me, most police are not skilled or educated and don't know their responsibilities. They don't know the law; they will do things against the law. They must develop their skills and in particular the military skills of leaders. We don't have good leaders, from the minister on down.

All this is by way of prelude. In Afghanistan today the judicial system is deeply corrupt at the local level. First and foremost it disillusiones those who want a just order and a democratic state. Moreover the mentors to the Afghans have

run a detention policy that lacks due process, fairness, or compassion and has arrested some of those same friends of the democratic order. Mujahid perhaps was not an ideal police chief – he had had no training and did not rise through the ranks, and would not qualify as the next minister of the interior. But the American military had no grounds for arresting him and detaining him for five years. There are hundreds of other Afghans like him.

Lest anyone think the Taliban are going to bring law and order, I direct you to a story that we posted on the McClatchy web site in mid-March, in which I wrote: “The Taliban have issued a set of rules on the treatment of captured prisoners. No one is to be executed without the express orders of Mullah Omar, the rule says. (<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/14/90083/weve-met-the-enemy-in-afghanistan.html#storylink=misearch>) But I came across a case of two Afghan security personnel who were abducted, held, tortured and executed, clearly without any due process. Afghanistan today is truly, as Milovan Djilas one said of interwar Yugoslavia, a ‘land without justice.’”

Let me focus on impunity for war crimes. A war crime is one that takes place in time of war and is defined under the laws of armed conflict. If you want to know more, see the writings of international law professor Michael Scharf. For a journalist’s version, here’s the book to have: *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know* (edited by Roy Gutman and David Rieff, first edition by W. W. Norton, 1999).

Many might like to forget history in a country that’s been at war for 30 years like Afghanistan. But for the victims of war crimes, and the survivors, that isn’t easy. Violence done to people as groups, whether Hazara, Tajiks, or Pashtun, festers. We know from the former Yugoslavia that the memories of victimization carry on from generation to generation, as oral history, often magnified many times from the original crime, especially if there’s been no exhaustive investigation, no judicial process for resolving it, no agreement on what happened, who was responsible, or who were the victims.

Afghanistan has impunity on the petty scale as I already described, but also on a grand scale, and it is all the bigger because no one in power will acknowledge it, and there seems to be no one outside that will bring it onto the stage of justice.

There have been five wars in Afghanistan:

- from 1979-1989, the American-backed war against Russian occupation
- in 1989-1992 the war to unseat the proxy government left behind by the Russians
- in 1992-1996, the civil war between the Mujahidin, who were installed with the help of the U.S. State Department, and Pakistan-backed proxies trying to unseat that government with the help of Pakistan’s ISI and by extension the CIA
- in 1996 to 2001 the war between the Taliban who tried but never were able to vanquish the remnants of the Mujahidin government, with its charismatic leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud; and
- from 2001 to the present the war between the U.S.

- installed Karzai government and the remnants of the Taliban regime.

Throughout these wars, in some of which the CIA played the leading role, in others the State Department, the U.S. attitude was consistent. The U.S. showed no interest whatsoever in investigating, pursuing or prosecuting crimes and atrocities - some of which, under the Taliban, bordered on genocide. Nothing was said about what Afghans did to captured Soviets; and little was written or said about what Soviets did to Afghans.

The modern era really began there 1989. Based on my experience in the Balkans, I set out in my newest book, *How We Missed the Story: Osama bin Laden, the Taliban and the Hijacking of Afghanistan* (U.S.I.P. 2008) to record carefully and sort out the evidence about every allegation I heard.

In 1997, in one of their biggest single blunders, the Taliban seized Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, imposed Sharia law and acted like conquerors. But they had fallen into a trap. Thousands of their troops were captured by a local warlord, Malik Paklavan, who had seized power and temporarily toppled a well known power of northern Afghanistan, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum. The Taliban prisoners were loaded into containers, where they suffocated, were tossed into wells and then buried in mass graves. The U.N.’s special rapporteur for human rights determined that some prisoners had been “lined up and mowed down with heavy caliber machine guns.” The U.N. called for an investigation. But the U.S. refused to put any money into it, or to put the spotlight on the crimes and the U.S. lost credibility with the Taliban from that moment on.

In 1998, the Taliban again conquered Mazar-i-Sharif. The man who bore responsibility for the slaughter in 1997 was Malik Paklavan, an ethnic Uzbek. But in 1998 the Taliban were determined to take vengeance on the Hazara. It was a bloodbath, ordered from the top. They slaughtered at least 2000 innocent civilians, as many as the soldiers they lost in 1997. Refugees fled with startling eyewitness stories. Almost no one would listen to them. It got almost no coverage —so I’ve carefully reconstructed it in my book. One reason is that the “killing frenzy” in Mazar-i-Sharif occurred simultaneously with Osama bin Laden’s operation to bomb two U.S. embassies in East Africa, which killed over 200, including 12 Americans, and wounded thousands. Once again, the Clinton administration remained silent. There was never an investigation.

Fast forward to 9/11 and the U.S. intervention. Late in November 2001, after Afghan and U.S. forces defeated the Taliban and their allies, General Dostum, back in his traditional seat of power in northern Afghanistan and took charge of the transport of thousands of Taliban prisoners to the same desert location, Dasht I Leili, in northern Afghanistan. Dostum had them loaded into containers, even as his mutinous deputy had loaded Taliban into containers four years earlier. Hundreds, probably at least a thousand, died of suffocation or were shot. I helped research this story at *Newsweek*, which broke the following August, and the U.S. government obfuscated or refused to comment – the

Pentagon even expressed doubts that it had happened (see Babak Dehghanpisheh, John Barry, and Roy Gutman at <http://www.newsweek.com/2002/08/25/the-death-convoy-of-afghanistan.html>). Again there was no investigation.

Later, early in 2008, Gen. Dostum ordered the removal of the graves. We at McClatchy sent a reporter there and he attested to the empty holes with scraps of clothing or human remains still scattered about. (<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/12/11/57649/as-possible-afghan-war-crimes.html#storylink=misearch>) Dostum was out of the country at the time but deputies, who had broken with him, said that Dostum had destroyed the evidence. The U.S. embassy had no comment. The U.S. military had no comment. The United Nations had no comment. The Afghan government and military also had no comment. There was no investigation.

What is the relevance of these atrocities today? I asked that question during the month I spent in Kabul in January 2010/ Here's the view of Vahid Mojdeh, a former Taliban official, who maintains links with the Taliban leadership. "That massacre of Taliban (at Dasht I Leili) was the base or foundation for all the fighting that is now going on. General Dostum did this work. But the Taliban do not only blame Dostum. They also blame the Americans, because they were present. They claim the Americans killed 5,000 Taliban to take revenge for 9/11 – against people who knew nothing about 9/11."

Mojdeh thinks it is possible that the Taliban would not have returned to the fight if this had not happened. Pashtuns, he pointed out, if there is no admission of guilt in a crime, want revenge. I asked him: Can the Taliban make peace with a government of which Dostum is a member? I don't see the possibility, he said.

To my amazement, U.S. officials, at least in the military, accept this judgment. The massacre "absolutely...has increased (Taliban) motivation," a senior general of the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force told me. "Those kinds of things just thicken the hatred and cause more people to join." As for General Dostum: "When leaders like that do stupid things like that, they only serve to hurt what we're trying to do out here." He added: "if some of these guys are fighting because of this reason, by stuffing some of their relatives into containers, and then dumping the containers out, that's a problem. That's very believable. And that will cause others to join the fight."

Footnote: Gen. Dostum now has been appointed chief of the Afghan army. And sometime in January, without any public debate and at a point parliament was not in session, President Karzai is reported to have issued an amnesty for him and others against whom war crimes charges could be placed.

My conclusion is that the problem of impunity, not only for General Dostum, but also for the Taliban leadership and Dostum's one time deputy, remains hidden, but it is a time bomb. Unrecognized atrocities are an issue at the center of bringing stability to Afghanistan. If the Afghans won't address the issue, we the United States should. If we won't, then the International Criminal Court should.

I think there's no question that Afghans need justice, they want their lives back; and they want the war to end. If this is to happen the U.S. will be the major instrument. But the U.S. must examine its own record and it must not be a party to impunity, to covering up past crimes. Not if it wants to extricate itself from Afghanistan any time soon.

Author Biographies

Yehuda Bauer is the Professor Emeritus of Holocaust Studies at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and Academic Adviser of Yad Vashem. He is a member of the Israeli Academy of Science, and author of fourteen books, mainly on the Holocaust. His latest books are "Rethinking the Holocaust" (2001) and "The Death of Shtetl" (2010).

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Ted Robert Gurr is Distinguished University Professor, Emeritus, at the University of Maryland, College Park. He founded, directed, and continues to consult on the Minorities at Risk project, which tracks the political status and activities of more than 300 communal groups world-wide. His two dozen books and monographs include, in addition to the award-winning *Why Men Rebel* (1970, rev. ed. 2010), *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (with Hugh Davis Graham, 1969, 1979, and 1989 eds.), *Peoples vs. States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (2000) and *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (with Barbara Harff, 1994, 2004 eds.) In 2001 he co-founded and continues to co-author the biennial report series *Peace and Conflict: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy*, prepared at the University's Center for International Development and Conflict Management and published by Paradigm Publishers. Since 2007 he has been convenor of the Genocide Prevention Advisory Network (GPANet.org).

Roy Gutman is a foreign affairs journalist in Washington and abroad. Currently foreign editor for McClatchy newspapers, he spent more than 20 years at Newsday, 12 at Reuters, and briefer stints at Newsweek and UPI. While at Newsday's, his reports on "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Herzegovina won the Pulitzer Prize for international reporting (1993), the Selden Ring Award for investigative reporting, a special Human Rights in Media award of the International League for Human Rights, and other honors. At Newsweek, in 2002, he was a co-winner of the Edgar Allen Poe award of the White House Correspondents' Association, and in 2003, the National Headliners First Prize for Magazines and the Society of Publishers in Asia awards for excellence in magazines and reporting. He is the author of *Banana Diplomacy* (1988) and *A Witness to Genocide* (1993), and one of the three co-editors of *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know* (second edition, 2007). His latest book, *How We Missed the Story, Osama Bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan*, was published in February, 2008. Named one of "50 visionaries who are changing your world" by the Utne Reader; awarded honorary citizenship and a key to the city of Sarajevo, April 2010.

Barbara Harff, Ph.D. (Northwestern University, 1981), is Professor of Political Science Emerita at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland and has been Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Clark University. She helped plan the 2004 Stockholm International Forum on the Prevention of Genocide and is a founding member of the Genocide Prevention Advisory Network. Her books include *Genocide and Human Rights: International Legal and Political Issues* (1984) and, with T. R. Gurr, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (1994, revised edition 2003). In 2007 she prepared *Essays in Honor of Helen Fein*, coedited with Joyce Apsel and published by the International Association of Genocide Studies. She also has written some sixty articles, chapters, and monographs on the international and comparative dimensions of massive human rights violations. Professor Harff's current research focuses on how to respond to and prevent genocides and politicides. She has held visiting appointments as PIOOM Fellow at the Center for the Study of Social Conflicts, University of Leiden (1993), and Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research (1996-97).

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Heinz Krummenacher started his professional career with the Swiss Defense Department where he directed a study group dealing with the re-definition of Swiss security policy (1985-1989). Between 1990 and 1992 he served as foreign editor with the Swiss daily newspaper "Der Bund". Before joining swisspeace in 1998 he was head of the social research department at IHA-GfK. He is a member of the UN staff college's Early Warning Preventive Measures Training Unit. At swisspeace he was head of the early warning program FAST International. He is now CEO of the BEFORE project and Deputy Director of swisspeace.

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Eyal Mayroz is currently pursuing his PhD at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney (to be completed 2011). His thesis explores the relationship between US policy-making, news media coverage and American elite and mass opinion during 2004 in relation to the genocide in Darfur. He holds a Master of Peace and Conflict Studies (University of Sydney); a Bachelor of Computing; and a Diploma in Arabic Language and Middle East Affairs.

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Eric Reeves is Professor of English Language and Literature at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts. He has spent the past eleven years working full-time as a Sudan researcher and analyst, publishing extensively both in the US and internationally. He has testified several times before the Congress, has lectured widely in academic settings, and has served as a consultant to a number of human rights and humanitarian organizations operating in Sudan. His book about Darfur (*A Long Day's Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide*) was published in May 2007.

Gregory H. Stanton is the Research Professor of Genocide Prevention and Studies at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia, USA. He founded the Genocide Watch and the International Campaign to End Genocide in 1999, and the Cambodian Genocide Project in 1981. From 2007 to 2009, he was President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars.